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ABSTRACT
Ambiguity arises when a decision maker fails to assign a subjective probability
to an event. This failure to attach a subjective probability to an event is caused by a
lack of information about the event. Ambiguity provides a gap in the scope of game
theory, since the basic assumption of being able to assign meaningful probabilities to
ones opponents actions is no longer valid. It thus opens the debate of how inviduals
would react if faced by an ambiguous event.
Risk is a special case of ambiguity, where the decision maker has information
about the probabilities of events. There is considerable experimental evidence doc-
umenting the fact that individuals show a marked preference for situations in which
they face a known level of risk, as opposed to being in a situation where they are
faced by an opponent whose strategies are ambiguous. Ambiguity averseness is the
tendency of individuals to prefer known risk situations to ambiguous ones.
Although there is extensive experimental literature which shows that ambiguity
a¤ects decision making, most of these studies are restricted to single-person deci-
sions. Relatively few experiments test whether ambiguity a¤ects behaviour in games,
where individuals interact with each other. The research documented in this thesis
aims to study the e¤ect of ambiguity in games. Since many economic problems can
be represented as games we believe this research will be useful for understanding
the impact of ambiguity in economics.
Moreover, though previous studies have established that ambiguity a¤ects deci-
sion making, they do not document the nature of the impact that it has on decision
making. It is thus di¢ cult to predict the e¤ect of ambiguity, and the direction in
which it will cause behaviour to change. This thesis aims at studying the e¤ect of
ambiguity in strategic situations, by analysing individual behaviour in games.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Ambiguity arises when a decision maker fails to assign a subjective probability
to an event. Keynes (1921) describes ambiguity being caused because of a lack of in-
formation about an event, when the concievable information regarding its occurence
could be much more. Ambiguity provides a gap in the scope of game theory, since
the basic assumption of being able to assign meaningful probabilities to ones oppo-
nents actions is no longer valid. It thus opens the debate of how inviduals would
react if faced by an ambiguous event.
Risk is a special case of ambiguity, where the decision maker has information
about the probabilities of events. Considerable experimental evidence documents
the fact that individuals show a marked preference for situations in which they face
a known level of risk, and can assign probabilities to their opponents strategies,
as opposed to being in a situation where they are faced by an opponent whose
strategies are ambiguous. Individualstendency to be ambiguity averse, was discov-
ered simultaneously by Fellner (1961) and Ellsberg (1961), who were both working
independently.
Although there is extensive experimental literature which shows that ambiguity
a¤ects decision making, most of it studies single-person decisions. There are rela-
tively few experiments that test whether ambiguity a¤ects behaviour in games. A
game is a stylized situation where a group of individuals are asked to make a number
of linked decisions, which together model the economic interactions we face in day
to day life.
The research documented in this thesis aims to experimentally analyse the e¤ect
of ambiguity in games. Since many economic problems can be represented as games
we believe this research will be useful for understanding the impact of ambiguity in
economics.
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Moreover, there is very little previous experimental research on the impact of
ambiguity in strategic situations. Previous studies have established that ambigu-
ity does a¤ect decision-making. However, they do not document the nature of
the impact that ambiguity had on decision-making. It is thus di¢ cult to predict
what e¤ect ambiguity has, and in which direction ambiguity will cause behaviour to
change. This thesis aims at studying the e¤ect of ambiguity in strategic situations,
by analysing individual behaviour in games.
Chapter Two provides a summary of the existing literature on ambiguity, ambi-
guity in games and previous experiments conducted to test ambiguity in games.
Chapter Three reports on experiments conducted to test whether ambiguity in-
uences behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in
the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose
an ambiguity safe option. We consider a modied version of the Battle of Sexes
game which has an added safe strategy available for Player 2. The safe strategy (in
our game, option R), is a dominated strategy which would not be played in a Nash
equilibrium or selected by iterated dominance.
As in the case of the traditional battle of the sexes games, our game has two
Pure Nash equilibria, neither of which is focal. Hence the e¤ect of ambiguity as to
which equilibrium strategy will be chosen by the opponent is high, making R (the
ambiguity-safe option) attractive for Player 2. Thus, the strategy R which is elim-
inated under Nash equilibrium, may be chosen in an equilibrium under ambiguity
(EUA).
Chapter Four provides a report of experiments run with a set of linked games,
to test the theoretical prediction that ambiguity has opposite e¤ects in games of
strategic complements and substitutes. A pair of games well suited to testing this
hypothesis are the best-shot and weakest-link models of public goods. The games
are similar except the weakest link game exhibits strategic complements, whereas
the best shot exhibits a game of strategic substitutes. Our hypothesis is that the
e¤ect of ambiguity will be to decrease individualscontributions in the weakest-link
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version of the game, whereas it will lead to an increase in individualscontributions
in the best-shot version.
In addition, we attempt to ascertain whether subjectsperception of ambiguity
di¤ers between a local opponent and a foreign one. Kilka and Weber (2001) nd
that subjects are more ambiguity-averse when the returns of an investment are
dependent on foreign securities than when they are linked to domestic securities.
We used a pair of strategic complement/substitute games in which the subject is
either matched with a local opponent or a foreign one. Our hypothesis was that
subjects will be more ambiguity averse when their opponents are individuals of a
foreign country than when they are matched with local opponents.
Chapter Five reports the ndings of two series of experiments based on signalling
games. The design for the initial experiment was selected by Reinhard Selten. It
has the interesting property that the strategically stable outcome (Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986)) does not coincide with the outcome of the Harsanyi-Selten solu-
tion (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). The games are complex and as such, standard
renement concepts like the intuitive criterion, or the never-a-weak-best-response
criterion, do not help to rene among the equilibria.
The other motive for the design of the experiment, was to analyse whether a
change in the reward at a particular terminal node would a¤ect individual behaviour
and/or promote better coordination between subjects. Moreover, we wanted to test
whether subjects (in the role of the sender of the signal) could work together to
build a collective reputation.
The term "collective reputation" basically means that subjects in one role, ab-
stain from a certain action which is in their short run interest (but would harm
their opponent), in order to allow for coordination on a mutually benecial out-
come. They thus forego a short run gain, for a long term gain that accrues to both
players. We discuss how though observed behaviour cannot completely be explained
by Nash, it may be explained using alternative equilibrium concepts such as Quantal
Response Equilibrium, Cursed Equilibrium and Equilibrium under Ambiguity.
Chapter Six concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we discuss the existing literature on ambiguity in theory and
experiments. We begin by discussing decision making under risk and models that
axiomatise decision making under risk. We then describe how the emergence of am-
biguity alters individualspreferences and present models that axiomatise ambiguity
sensitive preferences. We go on to describe the existence of an equilibrium in the
presence of ambiguity and end with a review of the existing experimental literature
on ambiguity in single person decision problems as well as in games.
2.1 Ambiguity in Theory
2.1.1 Decision making under Risk and Expected Utility Theory
Standard game theory is based on the premise that an individual has the ability
to assign subjective probabilities1 to his opponents actions. Each individual thus
possesses a belief about how his opponent/nature would behave, and is able assign
probabilities all the possible events that could take place. This ability to assign
probabilities to all possible events, gives rise to a situation where individuals face
risky prospects (or gambles). Expected Utility Theory (Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944)) axiomatises the method by which individuals make choices, when faced
by a risky prospect.
The expected utilty of a prospect in the presence of risk, is determined by weight-
ing the utility the individual would receive from each possible event, with the prob-
ability with which it is expected to occur. Consider a prospect (x; p), which gives
$x with probability p, else $0 with probability (1  p) : If the utility of money
1A subjective probability is one that is derived from an individuals opinion about the likelihood
of an event/outcome.
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is represented by the function u, the expected utility of the prospect would be:
p  u (x) + (1  p)  u (0) :
Individuals may react to risk in three possible ways, they could be risk seeking,
i.e., they prefer a prospect to a sure outcome of equal/greater expected value; they
could be risk averse, i.e., they prefer a sure outcome of equal/greater expected value;
or, they could be risk neutral, i.e., they are indi¤erent between the two options.
Under Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the utility function of a risk-seeking invidual
is convex, while that of a risk-averse invidual is concave and a risk-neutral one is
linear.
2.1.2 Prospect Theory
Experiments conducted to test individualsreaction to risk, found that they re-
spond to risk in a fourfold pattern. As expected, individuals were risk averse for
losses and risk seeking for gains which had a low probability. However, individu-
als were found to be risk seeking for losses and risk averse for gains which had a
high probability. This fourfold pattern of response towards risk, where individuals
are neither purely risk averse nor purely risk seeking, but a combination of both,
was modelled by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and
Kahneman (1992)).
Prospect theory denes gains and losses in terms of monetary outcomes, with
respect to a reference point. Thus, when evaluating a prospect (x; p) ; individuals
initially set a reference point. Outcomes (in terms of money) that are less than the
reference point are treated as losses and those that are greater, are treated as gains.
The overall utility under Prospect Theory is given by the function:
U =
nX
i=1
w(pi)v(xi) = w(p1)v(x1) + w(p2)v(x2) + :::+ w(pn)v(xn);
where, U is the overall utility of the outcomes x1; x2:::xn; which occur with prob-
ability p1; p2:::pn; respectively. The weighing function w, captures the tendency of
individuals to overreact to small probability events while they underreact to large
probability events. The decision weights w are normalised such that w (0) = 0 and
w(1) = 1:
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The value function v, passes through the individuals reference point and assigns
a value to each outcome with respect to the reference point. As can be seen in Figure
2.1, the value function is asymmetrical i.e., it is convex for losses and concave for
gains. This is because losses hurt more in magnitude, than gains feel good. The
S-shaped value function, can be explained simply by saying: increasing the chance of
winning a prize by 0:1 has a greater impact, if it changes the probability of winning
from 0:9 to 1, rather than when it goes from 0:6 to 0:7 or from 0:3 to 0:4 (Tversky
and Kahneman (1992)). Similarly, decreasing the chances of winning a prize from
0:1 to 0, has a greater impact than decreasing it from 0:8 to 0:7. Thus there is
greater sensitivity to changes in probabilities which are close to 0 or 1:
Figure 2.1. S-shaped Value Function
However, even though Prospect Theory accounts for loss aversion and the four-
fold pattern of response to risk, it still assumes that individuals are aware of the
probabilities with which outcomes occur. However, there are certain events that
occur as a result of our interactions in a socio-economic setting with other people,
to which one cannot assign a meaningful probability.
2.1.3 Ambiguity and the Ellsberg Paradox
Ambiguity occurs when the consequence of a decision is not a single certain
outcome, but a number of possible outcomes, to which an individual cannot attach
probabilities with surety. When a player fails to assign a subjective probability to the
possible outcomes of a decision, we say that he views the situation as ambiguous.
According to Keynes (1921), ambiguity is caused by a lack of information about
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an event, when the concievable information regarding its occurence could be much
more.
Ambiguity creates a gap in the scope of classical game theory. The basic as-
sumption that individuals can assign meaningful probabilities to all the possible
outcomes is no longer valid, since individuals cannot attach probabilities with cer-
tainty. Thus, it throws open the debate about how an individual would react when
faced with ambiguity/an ambiguous situation.
Risk is a special case of ambiguity, where the probabilities of events are known.
Considerable experimental evidence documents the fact that individuals show a
marked preference for situations where they face a known level of risk, and can
assign probabilities to their opponents strategies, as opposed to being in a situation
where they are faced by an opponent whose strategies are ambiguous. The fact
that individuals tend to be ambiguity averse was discovered simultaneously by both
Fellner (1961) and Ellsberg (1961), who were both working independently. Ellsbergs
experimental demonstration of the concept of ambiguity aversion gave rise to the
"Ellsberg paradox", which is described below.
Consider an urn lled with 90 balls, 30 of which are red (R) and the remaining
60 are of an unknown mix of blue (B) and yellow (Y ). One ball is drawn at random,
and the payo¤ depends on the colour of the ball drawn and the act you choose.
Subjects are asked to choose between acts f , g, f 0, g0 as shown in the table below:
Table 2.1. Acts available in the Ellsberg experiment
30 balls 60 balls
Act Red R Blue B Yellow Y
f $100 0 0
g 0 $100 0
f 0 $100 0 $100
g0 0 $100 $100
Subjects who are asked to choose between f and g, generally prefer f because
of the denite 1
3
chance of winning $100 to the ambiguous act g, but when asked
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to choose between f 0 and g0; the same subjects prefer g0 which gives a 2
3
chance of
winning $100; again avoiding the ambiguous act f 0.
These choices cannot be represented as maximising expected utility with respect
to a standard subjective probability distribution : Choosing f rather than g implies
 (R) >  (B) : However preferring g0 to f 0 implies  (B [ Y ) >  (R [ Y ) : Given
the standard additivity properties of probabilities, i.e.  (R [ Y ) =  (R) +  (Y ) ;
these two inequalities are inconsistent. The inconsistency would not arise however,
if we represented beliefs by a non-additive set function . In this case it is possible
that (R [ Y ) 6= (R) + (Y ), which could be compatible with the choices in the
Ellsberg paradox.
2.1.4 Choquet Expected Utility
Non-additive beliefs were introduced in Schmeidler (1989)s seminal paper on
Choquet Expected Utility (CEU). In CEU, an outcome is evaluated by a weighted
sum of utilities, but unlike EUT the weights used depend on the acts. In the case of
non-additive beliefs, if an event is thought to be unlikely to occur, its complement is
not necessarily a certain event. It is however believed to have a much greater chance
of occuring than the former event. We give a brief explantion of CEU below.
Let S be the set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states of nature and A be
the set of events, such that A is the subset of S, and S;  2 A: Let C be the set of
consequences in terms of payo¤s or outcomes, such that D 2 C indicates a subset of
consequences. Additionally, let F be the set of acts such that, a consequence f(s)
will be the outcome of choosing an act f when s is the true state that materialises.
A function v : A ![0; 1] is a capacity if v() = 0 and v(S) = 1: Moreover,
the capacity v is monotonic if A  B ) v(A)  v(B); i.e., if event B is a subset
of event A, an individual would believe that A is more likely to occur than B.
Intuitively, suppose A describes the event that a number greater than 10 is chosen
and B describes the event that an even number greater than 10 is chosen. One can
note that B is a subset of A and that A is more likely to occur than B:
A capacity v would be an ordinary probability measure if it is additive, such that
v(A [ B) = v(A) + v(B), for all disjoint sets A and B. Moreover, a capacity v is
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convex (resp. concave) if for all A; B  S; v(A [ B) + v(A \ B)  v(A) + v(B)
(resp. v(A [B) + v(A \B)  v(A) + v(B)), where A and B are events contained
in the universal set S:
If there exists a capacity v on A, n possible states: s1:::sn and a utility function
U : C ! R such that U (f (s1))  :::  U (f (sn)) then the CEU of an act f is:
CEU (f) =
n 1X
i=1
(U (f (si))  U (f (si+1))) v (fs1; :::; sig) + U (f (sn)) :
Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide an intuitive exposition of Schmeidlers model.
They extend the CEU model in a way that preserves additivity in probability for
events in the presence of risk, while permitting non-additivity for ambiguous events.
The basic concepts on which the model is built, are described below.
Let F be the set of acts, such that Fua  F , is the set of all unambiguous acts;
and Fa  F , is the set of all ambiguous acts. An act f is constant act, if it gives
the same consequence f(s) = ; for all states s, where  2 C. A constant act is
referred to in terms of its resultant consequence. Thus, if f (s) =  for all s; then
the act would be referred to as :
The binary relation , gives the decision makers preferences over acts. Thus,
f  g implies that the decision maker weakly prefers act f to g: Similarly, f  g
implies that act g is weakly preferred to f: Moreover, f  g implies that act f is
strictly preferred to g; while f  g implies indi¤erence between acts f and g.
An act fAh refers to an act which results in consequences f(s) for all s 2 A
and h(s) for all s 2 S n A: For example, A refers to a constant act, that gives
an outcome  whenever event A takes place, else an outcome  (when A does not
take place). Moreover, if there exist outcomes    such that A  B; it
would mean that event A is more likely to take place than event B: Intuitively, the
former act gives an outcome  if event A occurs, otherwise : The latter act gives an
outcome  if event B occurs, otherwise : Since  is preferred to , we can conclude
that A would only be preferred to B; if A was more likely to occur than B:
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A preference interval P is a subset of consequences D; such that if ;  are
elements of P and     ; then  is also an element of P (Fishburn (1982)):
A cumulative consequence set is a set of consequences P; such that if  2 P and
  ; then  2 P: Intuitively this implies that if a is an element of P , but  is
weakly preferred to ; then  is also an element of the set P:
The CEU for a cardinal, bounded, nonconstant utility function U on C and a
unique capacity v on A, is maximised by the preference relation  if the following
postulates (See Sarin and Wakker (1992)) are satised:
1. Weak ordering.
This means that an individual has complete and transitive preferences over
acts, such that if f is weakly preferred to g (f  g) and g is weakly preferred
to h (g  h), it implies that f would be weakly preferred to h (f  h) ; for all
acts f , g and h.
2. For all events A and acts f; g; h; h0 where fAh; gAh; fAh0; gAh0 2 F ua :
fAh  gAh() fAh0  gAh0:
This is also referred to as the sure-thing principle. Note that the acts fAh;
gAh; fAh
0 and gAh0 are elements of the set of unambiguous acts. Intuitively,
act fAh gives consequences f(s) if event A occurs, else h(s); and so on: If a
decision maker prefers fAh to gAh; the sure-thing principle implies that he
would also weakly prefer act fAh0 to act gAh0; and vice versa. The Ellsberg
paradox suggests that the sure-thing principle applies to unambiguous events,
but not to ambiguous events.
3. For all acts f 2 F , consequences ;  and events A 2 A;
   ) Af  Af:
Both acts Af and Af give consequence f (s) ; if event A does not occur. If
a decision maker weakly prefers consequence  to ; it would imply that he
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would prefer an act that gives him  if event A; occurs rather than one that
gave him consequence :
Moreover, if A is an unambiguous event and f is an unambiguous act, then if
the decision maker prefers Af to Af; it would also imply that he preferred
consequence  to :
4. For all acts f; g, and cumulative consequence sets P;
f  g whenever f 1(P )  g 1(P ):
As described before, P is a set of consequences where, if  is an element of P ,
but the decision maker weakly preferred  to ; then it implied that  was also
an element of the same set P: This postulate states that if a decision maker
weakly prefers an act f that results in a consequence from set P; to another
act g which also leads to a consequence from set P , it would imply that he
weakly prefers act f to act g:
5. Consequences such as ;  exist, such that   :
Intuitively, this means that the decision maker can have strict preferences over
consequences, such that he strictly prefers getting  to getting :
6. Continuity: If f  g, where f 2 F ua; g 2 F; and  2 C; then for all elements
in the set of unambiguous events Aua; there exists a partition (A1; :::; Am) of
S; such that Ajf  g for all j, and the same is also true with  in place of
 :
Consider a decision maker who strictly prefers unambiguous acts to ambigu-
ous ones. Then there would be a set of unambiguous acts (A1; :::; Am), such
that the decision maker strictly prefers getting  if Aj occurs (else f), to the
ambiguous act g: Moreover, the reverse is also true, i.e., for some values of the
consequence , the ambiguous act g is preferred to Ajf:
7. For nonempty f   convex events A; and f; g 2 F;
f(s)Af  g for all s 2 A) f  g;
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and the same is also true for  in place of  :
An f   convex set is one such that, given s, s00 are elements of the set of
events A; and s0 is an element of S; then if f(s) is strictly preferred to f(s0)
and f(s0) is strictly preferred to f(s00); it implies that s0 is also an element of
A (f(s)  f(s0)  f(s00) ) s0 2 A): Intuitively, Postulate 7 states that if,
an act f(s)Af; that gives consequences f(s) if the event in f   convex set A
occurs, is weakly preferred to an act g, then it implies that the act f is weakly
preferred to g; for all elements of A. Similarly, if a decision maker prefers the
act g to f(s)Af; then g is preferred to f for all elements of the f   convex set
A:
In the case of the set of unambiguous events Aua; if the above 7 assumptions are
satised, the capacity is additive and convex.
As seen above, Sarin andWakker (1992) provide an intuitive extention of Schmei-
dler (1989)s model, thus permitting subjects to attach nonadditive probabilities to
ambiguous events, while also giving conditions under which CEU gets reduced to
SEU (for unambiguous events).
Individuals can be either optimistic or pessimistic in their outlook to ambiguity.
A decision maker with an optimistic outlook would over-estimate the likelihood
of a good outcome; whereas a pessimistic decision maker would over-estimate the
likelihood of a bad outcome. For some capacities, CEU preferences are compatible
with a multiple priors approach.
Convex capacities are used to model a pessimistic outlook to ambiguity, while
concave capacities model an optimistic outlook. Let  be a convex capacity on S
for any  2 [0; 1]; where  is the level of optimism/pessimism towards ambiguity. A
decision makers attitude to ambiguity is measured by ; with  = 1 denoting pure
optimism and  = 0 denoting pure pessimism. If the decision maker has 0 <  < 1;
he is neither purely optimistic nor purely pessimistic, but reacts to ambiguity in a
partly pessimistic way by putting a greater weight on bad outcomes and in a partly
optimistic way by putting a greater weight on good outcomes. Consider a capacity
v dened by:
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v(a) = (A) + (1  )[1  (SnA)]:
This is termed a JP-capacity and allows for both CEU and multiple prior forms
(Ja¤ray and Philippe (1997)).
For a capacity v on S; the core of the capacity v (core(v)), is a set of probability
distributions that yield a higher probability for every event than v: If there is no
ambiguity regarding the probability of an event, the decision makers capacity v
would be additive and the core would consist of a single probability distribution.
If  2 [0; 1],  is a convex capacity and v is a JP-capacity, the CEU of an act
(f) is given by:
CEU(f) :
Z
u(a)dv = minp2 core()
Z
u(a(s))dp(s)+(1 )maxp2 core()
Z
u(a(s))dp(s);
where  is the ambiguity attitude of the decision maker and the core of  is the set
of priors that describe his ambiguity (Ja¤ray and Philippe (1997)).
2.1.5 Neo-additive Capacities
Neo-additive capacities were introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant
(2007). The neo-additive capacity is a special case of a JP-capacity, with a convex
capacity ; such that (E) = (1   )(E) for all events E 6= S; where  is a
probability distribution on S and 0    1: Intuitively,  can be thought to be the
decision makers belief. However, given that the decision maker faces ambiguity, 
is an ambiguous belief. The level of condence that the decision maker possesses in
the belief is modelled by (1  ); where  = 1 denotes complete ignorance and  = 0
denotes no ambiguity. The set of priors is given by
P = core() = fp 2 (S)j p(E)  (1  )(E)g:
An intuitive explanation of the core of the neo-additive capacity can be made
using Figure 2.2 (Eichberger and Kelsey (2009)). We consider the case where the
set S consists of three possible states, S = fs1; s2; s3g. Let each state si occur
with probability pi: The corners of the outer triangle would then correspond to the
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Figure 2.2. Core of a Neo-additive Capacity
scenarios where each state occurs with complete certainty. For instance, at the top
of the triangle, s1 occurs with probability p1 = 1; while p2 = p3 = 0: Similarly at
the bottom-right corner of the triangle, s3 occurs with p3 = 1; while p1 = p2 = 0;
and so on.
As we move away from the point at which p3 = 1 along the line connecting it to
the point where p1 = 1; the probability of s3 keeps diminishing slowly, while that
of s1 rises. Along this line, p1 = (1  )1; i.e., the probability of s1 taking place is
weighed by (1   ); the ambiguous belief of the decision maker. Thus, as we move
towards the top of the triangle,  ! 0; such that at the peak, p1 = 1: The intuition
is the same for the other two sides of the outer triangle.
The belief pi = (1   )i; holds along all points on a line drawn parallel to
the outer triangle (in Figure 2.2, these are shown as the dotted lines). The inner
triangle (which is formed by the intersection of the three dotted lines), forms the
set of priors P, which represents the core of the neo-additive capacity :
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) consider a set of events E ; which is
subset of the set S: E is further divided into three subsets of events, on the basis of
the likelihood of their occurence:
1. N or the set of "null" events - This is the set of events that are considered
impossible to take place, for example,  2 N . If an event A 2 N ; then for
any event B which is a subset of A; B 2 N . Moreover, if both events A and
B are elements of N , then A [B 2 N :
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2. U or the set of "universal" events - This is the set of events that are considered
certain to take place. Intuitively, the complement of every act that is included
in the null set is an element of U , such that U = fE 2 E : SnE 2 Ng:
3. E or the set of "essential" events - This is the set of events that are considered
neither certain nor impossible, i.e. E contains all the events not included in
the previous two sets.
Mathematically the Hurwicz capacity of an event E, given the set of null events
N and  2 [0; 1] (where  is the degree of optimism) is:
N (E) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if E 2 N
 if E =2 N and SnE =2 N
1 if SnE 2 N
9>>>>=>>>>; :
The Hurwicz capacity is modelled such that it is a convex combination of two ca-
pacities: one capacity that attaches complete ambiguity to everything except the
universal set, while the other attaches complete condence to everything except the
null set. Thus, if an event is from the universal set, U (E) = 1; else U (E) = 0:
Similarly if an event is from the null set, N (E) = 0; else N (E) = 1: It is simple to
note that U is the complement of N ; or U = N : Given this framework, the Hur-
wicz capacity models an individuals response to an event E in a partly optimistic
way and a partly pessimistic way, such that
N (E) = 
N + (1  )N : (2.1)
In addition, the Hurwicz capacity N (E) can be modied to reect ; or the
degree of ambiguity as well. Given an additive probability distribution  on (S; ")
and ;  2 [0; 1] where  is the degree of ambiguity and  is the level of opti-
mism/pessimism towards ambiguity, the neo-additive capacity v(EnN ; ; ; ) for a
given set of null event N  " is:
v(EnN ; ; ; ) := (1  )(E) + Nx (E); (2.2)
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and the Choquet expected value of a function f; given the neo-additive capacity
v(EnN ; ; ; ) is:
CEU(f) :
Z
f dv = (1  )E [f ]+
 
 maxx : f 1 (x) =2 N	+ (1  ) miny : f 1 (y) =2 N	 :
It can be noted that varying the values of ; ; and  would lead to special cases
of the Choquet integral, as follows:
1. The case of expected utility, i.e., when  = 0:
2. The case of perfect optimism, i.e., when N = ();  > 0;  = 1:
3. The case of perfect pessimism, i.e., when N = ();  > 0;  = 0:
4. The case of Hurwicz criterion, i.e., when N = ();  = 1;  2 (0; 1):
Similar to the JP-capacity, neo-additive capacities also satisfy both CEU and
multiple-priors, i.e., capacities can be made convex/concave. From (2.1) and (2.2)
we have,
v(EnN ; ; ; ) : = (1  )(E) + Nx (E)
and Nx (E) = 
N + (1  )N
so v = [(1  ) + N1 ] + (1  )[(1  ) + N1 ];
where  reects the subjective belief of the decision-maker, (1   ) reects the
degree of condence he attaches to the subjective belief he holds ( = 0 would reect
complete condence),  and (1 ) reect pessimism and optimism, respectively.
Thus, v =  + (1  ); where  = [(1  ) + N1 ] is concave; and  is its dual
and hence convex (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007)):
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2.1.6 Maxmin Expected Utility
An alternative to Choquet integration was put forth by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), in the form of Maxmin Expected Utility. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
explore and build on a statement found in Wald (1950), which states that when
an a priori distribution of the set of events 
 is unknown to the decision-maker, it
would be reasonable to consider a minimax solution. In this subsection, we briey
describe the Maxmin Expected Utility (MMEU) model and its result.
Let X be a non-empty set of outcomes and Y be the set of probability distri-
butions over X. Intuitively, the elements of Y attach probability distributions to
elements in X, such that the sum of all the possible distributions equals unity: Y
may be thought of as the set of random outcomes.
Let S be the set of all the possible states of nature, such that S is a non-empty
set and
P
is an algebra-subset of the events contained in S: Let L be the set of
acts. L0 is a subset of L and contains the set of nite step functions from S to Y:
Lc denotes the constant acts in L0. L is a convex subset of Y s and contains convex
combinations that are performed pointwise, such that for f and g in Y s and  in
[0; 1]: f + (1  )g = h; where h(s) = f(s) + (1  )g(s) for all s 2 S:
A binary relation = over L gives the decision makers preferences, such that =
satises the following axioms:
A.1. Weak Order - a) For all f and g in L, either f = g or g = f:
b) For all f; g and h in L : If f = g and g = h then f = h:
This axiom means that an individual has complete preferences over acts, such
that either act f is weakly preferred to act g, or vice versa. Moreover, the
decision maker has transitive preferences, such that if f is weakly preferred to
g and g is weakly preferred to h, it would imply that f is weakly preferred to
h; for all acts f , g and h.
A.2. Certainty-Independence - For all f; g 2 L, h 2 Lc and  2]0; 1[:
f > g i¤ f + (1  )h > g + (1  )h:
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This axiom is less restrictive than the standard independence axiom, since it
is easier to think of mixtures of act f and g with a constant act h, rather than
an arbitrary one. Given that both mixtures of acts contain the constant act h
with the same probability (1  ) ; if a decision maker strictly prefers f to
g; it would imply that he strictly prefers act f to act g:
A.3. Continuity - For all f; g; h 2 L : if f > g and g > h, then there are  and 
in ]0; 1[ such that
f + (1  )h > g and g > f + (1  )h:
This axiom allows for continuity, i.e., it implies that small changes in acts
result in small changes in the decision makers preferences.
A.4. Monotonicity - For all f , g 2 L : if f(s) = g(s) on S; then f = g:
Put simply, if act f is strictly preferred to act g; irrespective of the true state
s 2 S that materialises; then the decision maker always prefers act f to g:
A.5. Uncertainty Aversion - For all f; g 2 L and  2]0; 1[: f w g implies
f + (1  )g = f:
This axiom assumes that decision makers are ambiguity averse and would pre-
fer to hedge across acts f and g: Thus, this axiom "smoothes" the distribution
of utility over states.
A.6. Non-degeneracy - Not for all, but for some f ,g 2 L; f = g:
The decision maker weakly prefers some acts over others.
Given these properties of the binary preference relation=;Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) state that the following conditions are equivalent:
1. = satises assumptions A:1  A:5 for L = L0:
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2. There exists an a¢ ne function u : Y ! R and a non-empty, closed and
convex set C of nitely additive probability measures on
P
such that: f = g
i¤ minP2C
R
uof dP = minP2C
R
uog dP (for all f; g 2 L0): Moreover, this
function u is unique up to a positive transformations and the set C is unique
if assumption A:6 is added to 1):
Thus, we consider a decision maker who has a known utility function u; that
allows him to calculate his utility from two acts f and g; given a set of probability
measures. The decision maker calculates the minimum expected utility he would
get from each act, i.e. the worst case scenario, and (being rational) prefers the act
that gives him the higher utility. He thus maximizes the minimum expected utility
from the two acts.
Intuitively, in the absence of information regarding probabilities, maxmin ex-
pected utility (MMEU) allows the decision maker to believe that a range of prob-
abilities are possible. If the decision maker has a von Neumann-Morgenstern type
of utility function and a convex set C of non-unique subjective probabilities, every
action would have an interval of expected possible utilities attached to it. MMEU
predicts that if there is an action a, such that its minimum possible expected utility
is greater than that of another action b, then the action a is preferred over action b.
If the convex set C, consists of a number of probability distributions, MMEU
uses maxmin to choose between alternatives. However, when C contains a unique
probability distribution, MMEU coincides with SEU, since only a single probability
distribution exists for the decision-maker. As such, MMEU is a hybrid of SEU and
maxmin.
2.1.7 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In a Nash equilibrium, players are believed to behave in a manner that is con-
sistent with the actual behaviour of their opponents. They perfectly anticipate the
actions of their opponent and can thus provide a best response to it in the form of
their own action.
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) propose another equilibrium for zero-sum
games in which players are completely ignorant of their opponents behaviour. They
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suggest that in the absence of complete information regarding the opponents behav-
iour, players consider what the worst outcome for all their strategies would be and
then choose the strategy which yields the highest payo¤ among the worst outcomes
(maximin).
However, in the case of ambiguity and non-additive beliefs, the Nash equilibrium
idea of being able to have consistent beliefs about ones opponents action and thus
being able to play an optimum mixed strategy as a response to these beliefs, no
longer holds. Dow andWerlang (1994) were the rst to allow for players to have non-
additive beliefs about their opponents strategy choice. They assume that players
opt for pure strategies and that in equilibrium, the beliefs about these pure strategies
are best responses to the opponents actions.
Consider a game with i players and a nite pure strategy set Si: Each player is
beliefs about the opponents behaviour is represented by a capacity vi on S i; which
is the set of strategy combinations which all other players excluding i could choose.
Given non-additive beliefs, the expected payo¤ that a player i could earn from a
strategy si is determined by using the Choquet integral.
Unlike Nash equilibrium where a player attaches additive probabilities to his
opponents actions, in the presence of ambiguity players need a "support" to be
attached to their capacities. A support is a decision makers belief of how his
opponent will act. The support of a capacity is the smallest set of the opponents
strategies, whose complement has capacity zero, i.e., the player expects it to be
innitely less likely that this strategy set is used, but not entirely null. It must
be kept in mind that even though the player might attach a measure zero to these
strategies, he is not completely certain that the opponent will not use this particular
strategy.
Let Pi be the non-additive belief and Ai be the pure strategy set for Player i:
Further, let ai be the support of the non-additive belief Pi: Thus; a1 would denote
the support for the non-additive belief P1; over a pure strategy set A1 for Player 1,
and so on.
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A pair of non-additive beliefs P1 over A1 and P2 over A2, is an Equilibrium under
Ambiguity (EUA) if there exist supports for (P1; P2) such that:
1. a1 maximises the expected utility of Player 1, given that P2 represents Player
2s beliefs and strategies for Player 1, for all a1 in the support of P1
2. a2 maximises the expected utility of Player 2, given that P1 represents Player
1s beliefs and strategies for Player 2, for all a2 in the support of P2 (Dow and
Werlang (1994)).
Thus, an EUA can exist no matter how ambiguity averse a player is, since agents
take into account payo¤s relative to the worst strategy of their opponent, while
deciding their own actions. Moreover, it allows a subject to play the same game
di¤erently against di¤erent opponents, since in every instance the beliefs regarding
the opponents strategies would change. The above denition of an EUA is also
compatible with bounded rationality justications.2 .
Klibano¤ (1993) and Lo (1996) provide an alternative approach to equilibrium
under ambiguity, which is consistent with MMEU. Players are allowed to have beliefs
which are represented by multiple sets of additive probability distributions, on the
basis of which they choose mixed strategies. Moreover, it is assumed that there is
a strict preference among players to randomise between strategies, when they are
indi¤erent to pure strategies.
2.1.8 Equilibrium under Ambiguity in N-Player Games
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), extend the Dow and Werlang (1994) approach to
n-player games. They assume that all players employ maximising behaviour given
their beliefs. Furthermore, they assume that players behave consistently with their
beliefs, i.e., no player expects his opponent to choose an action which is not a best
response given their beliefs. This best response of player i given the beliefs or
capacity vi; is denoted Ri(vi) = arg max fPi(si; vi)jsi 2 Sig:
2Bounded rationality is the idea individuals make decisions based on the limited amount of
information they possess and the cognitive ability of their thought process, given the restrictions
on their time. Thus, they might not make the universally optimal decision, but optimise given the
resources at their disposal.
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Given the maximising behaviour and consistency on the part of the players, a
set of capacities (v1; :::; v

I ) is an EUA, if for each player i 2 I there exists a support
vi such that this supp v

i  j2Infig Rj(vj ); i.e., vi is the best response for player i,
given all the other playersbest responses to it (Eichberger and Kelsey (2000)).
For simplicity, we consider a 2 2 matrix game with two players J and K. Each
player has a pure strategy set, such that SJ = fs1; s2g and SK = ft1; t2g for Players
J and K, respectively: The payo¤ matrix is in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Equilibrium under Ambiguity
Player K
Player J
t1 t2
s1 a11; b11 a12; b12
s2 a21; b21 a22; b22
Since each player has two strategies, the capacity representing Js beliefs can be
denoted as: vJ : (qt1; qt2);where qt1 is Js belief of the probability with which K will
choose t1; and qt2 is Js belief of the probability with which K will choose t2: Note
that both qt1  0; qt2  0; and qt1 + qt2  1:
Similarly, for K: vK : (qs1; qs2); where qs1 is Ks belief of the probability with
which Player J will choose s1; and qs2 is Ks belief of the probability with which J
will choose s2: Again, qs1  0; qs2  0; and qs1 + qs2  1:
The supports of these capacities is denoted:
supp vJ =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
ft1g; ft2g for qt1 = 0; qt2 = 0; i.e., J believes K would choose neither action.
ft1g for qt1 > 0; qt2 = 0; i.e., J believes K is more likely to pick t1:
ft2g for qt1 = 0; qt2 > 0; i.e., J believes K is more likely to pick t2:
ft1; t2g for qt1 > 0; qt2 > 0; i.e., J believes K could pick either option.
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
and
supp vK =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
fs1g; fs2g for qs1 = 0; qs2 = 0; i.e., K believes J would choose neither action.
fs1g for qs1 > 0; qs2 = 0; i.e., K believes J is more likely to pick s1:
fs2g for qs1 = 0; qs2 > 0; i.e., K believes J is more likely to pick s2:
fs1; s2g for qs1 > 0; qs2 > 0; i.e., K believes J could pick either option.
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
:
Moreover, the Choquet Integral of the capacities are calculated as under:
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PJ(si; vJ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
ai1  qt1 + ai2  (1  qt1) for ai1 > ai2
ai1 for ai1 = ai2
ai2  qt2 + ai1  (1  qt2) for ai1 < ai2
9>>>>=>>>>; ;
and
PK(ti; vK) =
8>>>><>>>>:
bi1  qs1 + bi2  (1  qs1) for bi1 > bi2
bi1 for bi1 = bi2
bi2  qs2 + bi1  (1  qs2) for bi1 < bi2
9>>>>=>>>>; :
Given this basic setup, three cases may be considered:
Case 1. Where one of the two players (or both) has a dominant strategy. In this
case there will be a unique Nash equilibrium.
Case 2. Where neither player has a dominant strategy. In this case, there is a
unique mixed-strategies Nash equilibrium.
Case 3. Where neither player has a dominant strategy. In this case, there are
three Nash equilibria - two Pure Nash and one with mixed strategies.
The three cases are discussed in detail below.
Case 1. Where one of the two players (or both) has a dominant strategy. If
a11 > a21 and a12 > a22; then s1 is the dominant strategy for J . If in addition,
b11 > b12 and b21 > b22; then K has a dominant strategy as well, namely t1: Thus,
there is a unique Nash equilibrium (s1; t1):
However, if K does not have a dominant strategy, while s1 is the dominant
strategy for J , then the unique Nash is determined by whether or not K believes J
will use his dominant strategy. For instance, if the 2 2 game is as under:
Table 2.3. Equilibrium under Ambiguity Case 1
Player K
Player J
t1 t2
s1 3; 8 3; 7
s2 0; 0 0; 7
For Player J , PJ(s1; vJ) = 3 and PJ(s2; vJ) = 0; therefore his best response
would be RJ(vJ) = fs1g: For Player K, PK(t1; vK) = 8  qs1 and PK(t2; vK) = 7:
If K believes that qs1 < 12 ; her best response would be RK(vK) = ft2g: Thus if
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(qs1; qs2) = (; 0) is believed to be played with  < 12 ; and (qt1; qt2) = (0; ) is
believed to be played with with  > 0; the supports for (vJ ; v

K) are supp v

J = ft2g
and supp vK = fs1g:
Hence ifK is not certain that J will denitely play his dominant strategy, she will
stick with her safe strategy t2; that guarantees her the payo¤ of 7: The equilibrium
under ambiguity in this case does not coincide with the Nash.
Case 2. Where neither player has a dominant strategy and there is a unique
mixed-strategies Nash equilibrium. An example of this case is the matching pennies
game as under:
Table 2.4. Equilibrium under Ambiguity Case 2
Player K
Player J
t1 t2
s1 1; 0 0; 1
s2 0; 1 1; 0
As can be seen above, neither player has a dominant strategy - both players are
indi¤erent between their strategies. The support thus consists of the full strategy
set. The equilibrium under ambiguity is (vJ ; v

K) where v

J(s1) = v

J(s2) = ; i.e., J
plays either/both of his strategies with some probability  and similarly, K plays
either/both of her strategies with some probability  or vK(t1) = v

K(t2) = : The
supports for (vJ ; v

K); are supp v

J = ft1; t2g and supp vK = fs1; s2g:
The expected payo¤s of J are PJ(s1; vJ) = 1  vJ(s1) + 0  (1   vJ(s1)) =  and
PJ(s2; v

J) = 1  vJ(s2) + 0  (1   vJ(s2)) = : Therefore his best response would be
RJ(v

J) = fs1; s2g: Using the same logic, The expected payo¤s of K are PK(t1; vK) =
1  vK(t1) + 0  (1   vK(t1)) =  and PK(t2; vK) = 1  vK(t2) + 0  (1   vK(t2)) = :
Therefore her best response would be RK(vK) = ft1; t2g:
The equilibrium under ambiguity is similar to the Nash equilibrium in this case,
since both players are indi¤erent between the strategies available to them. However,
the key di¤erence is that there is no certain probability  or  with which either of
the players must play their strategies.
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Case 3. Where neither player has a dominant strategy and there are three Nash
equilibria - two Pure Nash and one with mixed-strategies. For instance, let us con-
sider the game below:
Table 2.5. Equilibrium under Ambiguity Case 3
Player K
Player J
t1 t2
s1 1; 2 1; 1
s2 0; 0 2; 1
In this case, there are three Nash equilibria - two Pure Nash (s1; t1) and (s2; t2);
and one with mixed strategies ((1
2
s1;
1
2
s2); (
1
2
t1;
1
2
t2)). However, there are four types
of equilibrium under ambiguity:
i) (vJ ; v

K) :
8><>: qs1 >
1
2
; qs2 = 0; supp vJ = ft1g; RJ(vJ) = fs1g
qt1 > 0; qt2 = 0; supp vK = fs1g; RK(vK) = ft1g
9>=>;
Here Js expected payo¤s are, PJ(s1; vJ) = 1 and PJ(s2; vJ) = 2qt2: If he believes
qt2 = 0; his best response would be RJ(vJ) = fs1g: For K, PK(t1; vK) = 2  qs1 and
PK(t2; vK) = 1: If she believes qs1 > 12 ; her best response would be RK(v

K) =
ft1g: The support for these capacities is: supp vJ = ft1g and supp vK = fs1g:
The equilibrium under ambiguity in this case coincides with the rst pure Nash
equilibrium (s1; t1):
ii) (vJ ; v

K) :
8><>: qs1 = 0; qs2 > 0; supp v

J = ft2g; RJ(vJ) = fs2g
qt1 = 0; qt2 >
1
2
; supp vK = fs2g; RK(vK) = ft2g
9>=>;
Here Js expected payo¤s are, PJ(s1; vJ) = 1 and PJ(s2; vJ) = 2qt2: If he believes
qt2 >
1
2
; his best response would be RJ(vJ) = fs2g: For K, PK(t1; vK) = 2  qs1 and
PK(t2; vK) = 1: If she believes qs1 = 0; her best response would be RK(vK) =
ft2g: The support for these capacities is: supp vJ = ft2g and supp vK = fs2g:
The equilibrium under ambiguity in this case coincides with the second pure Nash
equilibrium (s2; t2):
iii) (vJ ; v

K) :
8><>: qs1 =
1
2
; qs2 > 0; supp vJ = ft1; t2g; RJ(vJ) = fs1; s2g
qt1 > 0; qt2 =
1
2
; supp vK = fs1; s2g; RK(vK) = ft1; t2g
9>=>;
Here Js expected payo¤s are, PJ(s1; vJ) = 1 and PJ(s2; vJ) = 2  qt2: If he
believes qt2 = 12 ; he earns the same payo¤ whether he chooses s1 or s2; and so he
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is indi¤erent between his strategies: His best response would be RJ(vJ) = fs1; s2g:
For K, PK(t1; vK) = 2  qs1 and PK(t2; vK) = 1: If she believes qs1 = 12 ; she earns
the same payo¤ whether she chooses t1 or t2; and so she is indi¤erent between her
strategies. Her best response would be RK(vK) = ft1; t2g: The support for these
capacities is: supp vJ = ft1; t2g and supp vK = fs1; s2g: The equilibrium under
ambiguity in this case is similar to the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, however
no denite probabilities can be attached to the strategies. Any strategy combination
may be chosen by the players.
iv) (vJ ; v

K) :
8><>: qs1 2

0; 1
2

; qs2 = 0; supp vJ = ft2g; RJ(vJ) = fs1g
qt1 = 0; qt2 2

0; 1
2

; supp vK = fs1g; RK(vK) = ft2g
9>=>;
Here Js expected payo¤s are, PJ(s1; vJ) = 1 and PJ(s2; vJ) = 2  qt2: If he
believes qt2 2

0; 1
2

; he is uncertain about which equilibrium will be played. His
best response would be RJ(vJ) = fs1g; since this guarantees him a sure payo¤ of 1:
For K, PK(t1; vK) = 2 qs1 and PK(t2; vK) = 1: If she believes qs1 2

0; 1
2

; she too is
uncertain about which equilibrium will be played by the opponent. Her best response
would be RK(vK) = ft2g; since this is the safe strategy for her and guarantees her
a certain payo¤ of 1: The support for these capacities is: supp vJ = ft2g and supp
vK = fs1g: The equilibrium under ambiguity in this case is (s1; t2); with each player
choosing the ambiguity safe action:
The above analysis shows that an equilibrium under ambiguity may exist even
if playerspossess non-additive beliefs that are incompatible with Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Ambiguity in Experiments
Strategic aversion to ambiguity, makes ambiguous games worthy of being studied
as a separate class of games. Studying the attitude of individuals to ambiguity
in games would not only provide a better understanding to the limitations of the
SEU theory as it stands today, but also provide an empirical justication for the
theoretical work that has been done so far in modeling individuals attitudes to
ambiguity.
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In particular, one expects ambiguity to be highest in one-shot normal form games,
which makes it a logical starting point to study the e¤ect of ambiguity in games.
Here we survey previous literature related to the e¤ect of ambiguity.
2.2.1 Papers studying Ambiguity in Single-Person Decision Problems
A "competence hypothesis" was proposed by Heath and Tversky (1991), in which
they argue that the decision makers attitude to ambiguity is determined by how
competent he feels in the situation he faces. They nd that if individuals feel compe-
tent in certain areas, they prefer ambiguous gambles to lottery tickets (thereby dis-
playing ambiguity loving behaviour). On the other hand, individuals preferred lot-
tery tickets to ambiguous gambles in areas where they were not competent (thereby
displaying ambiguity averse behaviour).
Fox and Tversky (1995), proposes a "comparative ignorance" hypothesis, ac-
cording to which, if an individual evaluates an ambiguous and an unambiguous bet
simultaneously, it undermines his feeling of competence, leading to an attitude of
ambiguity aversion. However, if the same person were to evaluate the ambiguous
and unambiguous bets individually, his ambiguity aversion would decrease.
They explain a fall in ambiguity aversion, by saying that people feel more com-
petent in evaluating an ambiguous bet in isolation, rather than jointly evaluating
it in the presence of the unambiguous bet. According to Fox and Tversky (1995),
the popular Ellsberg phenomenon and resultant ambiguity averse behaviour is in-
herently present only in comparative contexts and would not arise when uncertain
prospects are evaluated independent of each other.
Chow and Sarin (2001), test the Fox and Tversky (1995) result in order to
ascertain whether ambiguity aversion does indeed disappear in a non-comparative
context. They nd that in their experiments, subjects always price a known bet
higher than an ambiguous one and thus, ambiguity averse behaviour is prevalent in
both comparative as well as non-comparative contexts. However, the di¤erence in
prices between the known bet and the ambiguous one was found to be higher in the
comparative context, than under independent evaluation.
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Even though ambiguity aversion has been accepted in most cases, some stud-
ies have found evidence of the prevalence of an ambiguity loving attitude among
individuals. Binmore, Stewart, and Voorhoeve (2011), attempt to test whether sub-
jects are indeed ambiguity averse. They investigate whether the apparent ambiguity
averse behaviour, predominantly reported by a number of papers, can be captured
by the Hurwicz criterion.
They report that subject behaviour in experiments conducted by them is incon-
sistent with the Hurwicz criterion. Instead, they nd that the principle of insu¢ -
cient reason3 has greater predictive power with respect to their data, than ambiguity
averse behaviour.
Charness, Karni, and Levin (2012), test whether individuals display a non-
neutral attitude towards ambiguity. In particular, they investigate whether subjects
who are given a chance to interact, can persuade others to change their ambiguity
attitude. They nd that though a number of their subjects displayed an incoher-
ent attitude towards ambiguity, a majority of subjects displayed ambiguity neutral
preferences. A small minority of subjects (smaller than the number of subjects who
were ambiguity-incoherent) displayed ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking be-
haviour. More interestingly, they nd that if subjects are allowed to interact with
each other, given the right incentives, ambiguity neutral subjects often manage to
convince ambiguity seeking and ambiguity incoherent subjects to change their mind
and follow ambiguity neutral behaviour.
2.2.2 Papers studying Ambiguity in Ellsberg Urn Experiments
Halevy (2005), extends the standard Ellsberg type experiment to demonstrate
that ambiguity preferences are associated with compound objective lotteries. The
study nds that the subject pool can be divided into two groups of people. The
rst group consists of those who are ambiguity neutral and can reduce compound
3 :Let there be n > 1 mutually exclusive possibilities. According to the principle of insu¢ cient
reason, if the n possibilities are indistinguishable except in name, then the decision maker should
assign each a probability equal to 1n .
For example, a fair dice has 6 faces, labeled from 1 to 6: If the dice is thrown, it must land on
one of the six possibilities. According to the principle of insu¢ cient, we must assign each of the
possible outcomes a probability of 16 :
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objective lotteries, i.e., they have behaviour which is consistent with SEU. The sec-
ond group consists of people who display di¤erent preferences over ambiguity and
compound lotteries and are consistent with models that capture ambiguity seek-
ing/averse preferences. They conclude that there is no unique theory that can
capture all the di¤erent preference patterns observed in a given sample. As such,
the experimental ndings of Halevy (2005) are consistent with Epstein (1999), where
ambiguity aversion is dened as a behaviour that is not probabilistically sophisti-
cated and thus cannot be aligned with a specic functional form or model.
Dynamic consistency and consequentialism are the two key links between condi-
tional and unconditional preferences. Dynamic consistency entails that a decision
made ex-ante, remains unchanged if preferences are updated. For instance, suppose
there are two acts f and g; and an event E: Consider a decision maker who prefers f
to g if event E occurs and also prefers f to g if E does not occur. Then the decision
maker always prefers f to g; i.e., he does not make a decision that will be reversed
if information about event E is made known ex-post.
Consequentialism entails that only valid outcomes (that are still possible) are
taken into account once preferences are updated. Intuitively, if a decision maker
is informed that the event E has occured, while making his conditional preferences,
he should only be concerned with the ambiguity surrounding subevents of E: Indi-
viduals who display the Ellsberg paradox cannot be both dynamically consistent as
well as consequentialist.
Dominiak, Dürsch, and Lefort (2009), test individual behaviour in a dynamic
Ellsberg urn experiment, to test whether individuals behave in a manner that is
dynamically consistent and consequentialist. Subjects were presented with an urn
containing 30 balls, 10 of which were known to be yellow, the remaining an unknown
mix of blue and green. They were then asked to choose whether they would prefer
winning if a yellow ball is drawn or winning if a blue ball is drawn.
Once they had stated their choice to the earlier question, subjects were told that
a ball had been drawn from the urn and that it was not green. They were then asked
again whether they preferred winning if a yellow/blue ball was drawn. Depending
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on the choices made in the follow-up question, subjects were judged as being dynam-
ically consistent/consequentialist/both. They nd that subject behaviour is more
in tune with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency. Moreover, they nd
that subjects who are initially ambiguity-neutral when faced with a static Ellsberg
urn, cannot be described by SEU theory when faced by the dynamic version of the
Ellsberg urn.
Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011), study a three-colour Ellsberg urn in which they have
increased the level of ambiguity. Subjects face ambiguity on two accounts: the
unknown proportion of balls in the urn as well as the size of the prize money. In
their experiment, both winning and the amount that the subject could possibly
win were both perfectly correlated - either positively or negatively, depending on
which of the two treatments was run by them. In the experiment, most subjects
preferred betting in the positively correlated treatment rather than the negative one.
Moreover, subjects also showed a preference for a gamble when there was positively
correlated ambiguity, as opposed to a gamble without any ambiguity.
Another Ellsberg experiment that allows for an additional source of ambiguity is
studied by Eichberger, Oechssler, and Schnedler (2011). They consider a two-colour
Ellsberg experiment and insert an additional element of ambiguity in terms of the
money the subject wins in the various outcomes. In the standard treatment, if the
colour drawn matches the colour chosen by the subject, he receives an envelope
marked with an equal sign (=); and if it does not match he receives an envelope
with an unequal sign (6=): He is aware that the (=) envelope contains e3 and the (6=)
envelope contains e1: This standard treatment is referred to as O; or open envelope:
In the second treatment called the S or sealed envelope treatment, subjects know
that one envelope contains e3 and one contains e1; but do not know which envelope
contains which amount. In the third treatment called R or the random treatment,
subjects are told that the amount in the envelope will be determined by the toss of
a fair coin, once they have made their choice of colour for the bet on the urn.
Treatment O; is the standard Ellsberg experiment. In treatment R, winning e3
or e1 depends totally on the toss of the coin and so the subject faces equal odds
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of winning either amount. Treatment S; is di¤erent from the other two treatments
in that subjects are not sure how much they would win, even if they won. They
should thus, be indi¤erent between the ambiguous urn and the known one. Subjects
were asked to choose an urn and the colour of the ball they would like to bet on. In
addition, they could state that they are indi¤erent between the known urn and the
unknown one, as well as being indi¤erent between a green ball and a blue one. In
case of indi¤erence, subject were assigned to the unknown urn/blue ball options.
Eichberger, Oechssler, and Schnedler (2011), nd that 30 of the 48 (62%) subjects
preferred the known urn in treatment O, which is similar to the standard Ellsberg
result. In treatment R, when subjects should be indi¤erent between the ambiguous
urn and the known one since their payment depends on the ip of a coin, 25 of the 48
(52%) subjects preferred the known urn. In treatment S, 19 (40%) subjects preferred
the known urn, 17 (35%) preferred the ambiguous one, while 12 (25%) stated they
were indi¤erent between the two. It can be noted that signicantly fewer subjects
preferred the known urn to the ambiguous one in treatment S where there was
additional ambiguity, when compared to treatment O; the standard Ellsberg case:
Liu and Colman (2009), presented subjects with gambles that were modelled as
either modied Ellsberg urn choices or as marketing strategy decisions. The sub-
jects had to choose between ambiguous and risky gambles, under single as well as
multiply repeated choice conditions. It was found that subjects chose the ambigu-
ous gambles more often in repeated choice conditions than they did in single-choice
conditions. Moreover, the number of subjects choosing risky single choices and am-
biguous repeated choices exceeded the number of subjects who preferred ambiguous
single choices and risky repeated choices. One of the reasons given to explain this
behaviour, is that if subjects believed that luck was loaded against them in single
events, they might have felt safer in the repeated conditions.
2.2.3 Papers studying Ambiguity in Games
Colman and Pulford (2007), explain the concept of ambiguity aversion as a state
that arises as a result of a pessimistic response to uncertainty, mainly driven by the
loss of decision condence. They argue that people tend to become anxious and
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less condent while making decisions in the face of ambiguity, as opposed to known-
risk situations. In a series of experiments, they found that individual responses
di¤ered between ambiguous and risky versions of the game being studied. Players
did not respond to ambiguity by simply equating it to riskiness, but showed a marked
preference to avoid ambiguity whenever the option of doing so was provided to them.
Keller, Sarin, and Sounderpandian (2007) investigate whether individuals de-
ciding together as pairs (termed dyads in their paper) display ambiguity averse
behaviour. Participants were initially asked to state how much they were willing
to pay for six monetary gambles. Five of the six gambles put before the subjects
involved ambiguity, while the sixth involved no ambiguity.
Once the particpants had all disclosed their individual willingness to pay, they
were randomly paired with another subject and each pair had to re-specify how
much they were willing to pay for the six gambles. It was found that the pairs
displayed risk averse as well as ambiguity averse preferences. It was observed that
the willingness-to-pay among pairs of individuals deciding together, was lower than
the average of their individual willingness-to-pay for gambles. They thus conclude
that ambiguity averse behaviour is prevalent in group settings.
Keck, Diecidue, and Budescu (2012), conduct an experiment in which subjects
made decisions individually, as a group, and individually after interacting and ex-
changing information with others. Subjects were asked to make binary choices
between sure sums of money and ambiguous and risky bets. They found that indi-
viduals are more likely to make ambiguity neutral decisions after interacting with
other subjects. Moreover, they nd that ambiguity seeking and ambiguity averse
preferences among individuals are eliminated by communication and interaction be-
tween individuals; and as such, groups are more likely to make ambiguity neutral
decisions.
Ivanov (2009), discusses the ndings of a series of experiments on one-shot normal
form games run to distinguish between eighteen types of players. A person was
classied on the basis of his attitude to ambiguity - as being either ambiguity averse,
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ambiguity neutral, or ambiguity loving; on the basis of his attitude to risk - as being
risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving; and whether he played strategically or naively.
Each type was modelled on the basis of the dimension they fell in. Ambiguity
loving, neutral and averse individuals were modelled as having subadditive, additive
and superadditive beliefs, respectively. Risk loving, neutral and averse individuals
were modelled as having convex, linear and concave utility functions, respectively.
A person who played in a naive manner was modelled as having a uniform belief in
every game he played, whereas if he played strategically, his beliefs were di¤erent
for every game and were thus unrestricted.
The study nds that about 32% of the subjects taking part in the experiment
were ambiguity loving, as opposed to 22% who were ambiguity averse. The majority
of subjects (46%) were found to be ambiguity neutral. While being tested on the
basis of their attitude to risk, 62% of the subjects were found to be risk averse, 36%
to be risk neutral, and a mere 2% were risk loving. 90% of the subjects played in a
strategic manner, while 10% played naively.
One of the questions Ivanov (2009) raises, is the fact that there are more subjects
who are ambiguity loving/neutral, than those who are ambiguity averse, given that
on average a majority of them play strategically. This is attributed to players
altruistic behaviour, i.e., they played in a manner that would maximise the sum of
both playerspayo¤s. This may be because a player is willing to compromise with
his opponent, in order to do well himself.
Nagel, Heinemann, and Ockenfels (2009) consider strategic uncertainty in one-
shot coordination games with strategic complementarities. In the study conducted
by them, they elicit certainty equivalents for situations where a subjects payo¤
depends on his opponentsbehaviour. In each coordination game a subject had a
choice between a safe amount X; which was allowed to vary such that X  e15;
and an option where the payo¤ was dependant on his opponents decision. In the
uncertain option, a subject could earn e15 if at least a fraction k 2 (0; 1] of his
opponents chose the same option as him, else he earned nothing. Subjects were
found to choose the safe option when X was large, while they chose the uncertain
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option for small values of X. The point at which a subject switched from the safe
option to the uncertain one, was interpreted as his certainty equivalent for strategic
uncertainty. This is analogous to situations in which the risk attitude of a subject
is measured with respect to lotteries.
2.2.4 Papers studying Ambiguity in Public Goods Games
In a public goods game the dominant strategy, predicts zero contribution to the
public good, since the linear payo¤ function of the public good lies below the payo¤
the player would get from investing in the private good. However empirical ndings
show that in one-shot games and initial stages of nitely repeated games, players
contribute between 40%  60% of their initial endowment to the public good, which
is halfway between the free-riding level and the Pareto optimal level. It was also
noted that the contributions made towards the public good decreased in subsequent
rounds and increased if there was any form of interaction between the players (Davis
and Holt (1993)).
The fact that there is positive contribution towards the public good despite
a Nash prediction of free-riding, could be accrued to altruistic behaviour by the
subjects (Ledyard (1995)), or to decision errors on the part of the subjects because
they are not clear about the rules of the game (Andreoni (1995)). The third reason
for the increased contribution to the public good was put forth by Eichberger and
Kelsey (2002), who study the e¤ect of ambiguity on the voluntary provision of public
goods.
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) show that when the production function for public
goods is concave or there is diminishing marginal utility of public goods, ambiguity-
aversion causes public good provision to be above Nash equilibrium level.4 More
generally they show the deviation from the Nash equilibrium depends on the nature
of strategic interactions taking place, i.e., on the basis of whether the game being
played was one of strategic substitutes or complements.
4These results will apply even in the presence of increasing returns to scale in production
provided there is su¢ ciently strong diminishing marginal benet from public goods.
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Voluntary provision of public goods may be considered as an example of a game of
strategic substitutes with positive externalities. If one individual contributes more,
this lowers the marginal product of other peoples donations. Ambiguity aversion
causes a given individual to over-weigh bad outcomes. In this case, a bad outcome
is when others make low donations. When othersdonations are low, the marginal
benet of a donation by the given individual is high. Thus the expected e¤ect of
ambiguity would be to increase the perceived marginal benet of donations by a
given individual. If all have similar perceptions of ambiguity, total donations will
rise. Hence an increase in ambiguity is expected to raise both individual and total
donations.
Di Mauro and Castro (2008) conduct a set of experiments designed to test the
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) hypothesis that it is ambiguity that causes an increase
in contribution towards the public good, and not altruism. In order to negate the
chance that altruism, or a feeling of reciprocation prompted the subjectsactions,
the subjects were informed that their opponent would be a virtual agent and the
opponents play was simulated by a computer. It was explained to them that their
opponents (i.e., the computers) contributions would not be a¤ected in any way
by the subjects contribution to the public good. The subjects were thus made
to understand that there should be no expectation of reciprocity from the virtual
player.
Subjects played in two scenarios, one with risk, the other with ambiguity. It
was noted that contributions were signicantly higher when the situation was one
of ambiguity. These results showed that there was indeed evidence that ambiguity
signicantly a¤ects the decisions made by individuals, in a manner that depends
directly on the strategic nature of the game in consideration, and not altruism.
Another paper that tests whether ambiguity a¤ects individual behaviour in a
game setting is Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008), who study strategic ambi-
guity in games experimentally. They studied games in which subjects faced either
a granny, who was described as being ignorant of economic strategy, a game theo-
rist, who was described as a successful professor of economics, or another student
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as an opponent. It was conjectured that subjects would view the granny as a more
ambiguous opponent than the game theorist. They nd that subjects did nd the
granny to be the more ambiguous opponent, and this a¤ected their decision choices.
Ambiguity averse actions were chosen signicantly more often by subjects against
the granny, as opposed to against the game theorist, irrespective of whether the
game was one of strategic complements, strategic substitutes or one with multiple
equilibria. When the level of ambiguity the subjects faced while playing the granny
was compared to the level of ambiguity the subjects faced playing other students,
it was found that the players still found the granny a more ambiguous opponent.
Subjects were also found to react to variations in the level of ambiguity, which
was tested by altering the cardinal payo¤ in the game while keeping the ordinal
payo¤ structure unchanged. It can thus be seen that subjects react not only to
ambiguity on the part of the opponent being faced, but also to subtle changes in
the payo¤ structures of the experiment being conducted (Eichberger, Kelsey, and
Schipper (2008))
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CHAPTER 3
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF
AMBIGUITY IN A COORDINATION GAME
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reports an experimental study of the impact of ambiguity in games.
Although there is extensive experimental literature which shows that ambiguity af-
fects decision making, most of it studies single-person decisions. There are relatively
few experiments that test whether ambiguity a¤ects behaviour in games. A game is
a stylized way of representing a situation where a group of individuals have to make
a number of linked decisions and thus forms a model of many economic interactions.
Games provide a valuable setting in which economic models can be replicated in the
laboratory. Since many economic problems can be represented as games we believe
this research will be useful for understanding the impact of ambiguity in economics.
Moreover, there is very little previous experimental research on the impact of
ambiguity in strategic situations. Previous studies have established that ambigu-
ity does a¤ect decision-making. However, they do not document the nature of the
impact that ambiguity had on decision-making. It is thus di¢ cult to predict what ef-
fect ambiguity has, and in which direction ambiguity will cause behaviour to change.
The research documented in this chapter aims to experimentally test comparative
statics of ambiguity in games.
Table 3.1. Battle of Sexes Game
Player 2
Player 1
L M R
T 0; 0 300; 100 50; x
B 100; 300 0; 0 55; x
We consider a Battle of Sexes game which has an added safe strategy available
for Player 2 (See Table 3:1). The value of x, which is the safe option available to
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Player 2, varies every round in the range 60   260. For some values of x, the safe
strategy (in our game, option R) is dominated by a mixed strategy of L and M ,
and thus would not be played in a Nash equilibrium and would be deleted under
iterated dominance.
The traditional battle of the sexes games has two pure Nash equilibria, neither
of which is focal. Hence, we expect ambiguity to be high due to the potential
multiplicity of equilibria and to the fact that our games were one shot. The e¤ect
of ambiguity as to which equilibrium strategy will be chosen by the opponent is
high, making R (the ambiguity-safe option) attractive for Player 2. Thus, even if
strategy R is not played in Nash equilibrium, it may be chosen in an equilibrium
under ambiguity (EUA).
The ambiguity safe strategy is never chosen in Nash equilibrium for the parame-
ter values considered by us. Moreover for some values of x; our games are dominance
solvable and R is not part of the equilibrium strategy. Despite this, we nd that R
is chosen quite frequently by subjects in our experiment. While the behaviour of the
Row Player, is consistent with expected behaviour of randomizing 50 : 50 between
her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity
and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy. Thus, ambiguity inuences behaviour in
the games.
During the experiment, we alternated the Battle of Sexes games with Ellsberg
urn type decision problems. This had the dual aim of erasing the short term memory
of subjects, so that decisions on previous rounds did not a¤ect subsequent behaviour;
and providing an independent measure of subjectsambiguity-attitudes. Moreover,
we wished to test if there was a correlation between ambiguity-averse behaviour in
the game and ambiguity-attitude in the single person decision problem.
In the Ellsberg urn rounds, subjects were presented with an urn containing 90
balls, of which 30 were Red, and the remainder an unknown proportion of Blue or
Yellow and asked to pick a colour to bet on. The payo¤ attached to Red (the balls
whose proportion was known) was varied in order to obtain an ambiguity threshold.
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We did not observe a notable correlation between ambiguity aversion in the Battle
of Sexes game, and ambiguity-attitude in the Ellsberg urn.
It is interesting to note however, that people appeared to be more ambiguity-
averse in a two-person game experiment, as opposed to single-person decision prob-
lems. This may be because in single person decision problems a proxy for ambiguity
is introduced by the experimenter, using an articial device such as the Ellsberg
urn. However in games, ambiguity is created by the other subjects taking part in
the experiment and hence there is no need for the experimenter to introduce a proxy
for ambiguity. Behaviour in the nancial market is dependant on other people, and
games can be used to e¤ectively model such economic conditions. Natural disasters
on the other hand, are more like single person decision problems.
3.1.0.0.1 Organisation of the Chapter In Section 2, we describe the theory
being tested in the experiments. Section 3 describes the experimental design em-
ployed, Section 4 consists of data analysis and results, Section 5 reviews related
literature and Section 6 provides a summary of results together with future avenues
of research.
3.2 Preferences and Equilibrium under Ambiguity
3.2.1 Modelling Ambiguity
The Ellsberg paradox is a violation of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
Savage (1954). One version of the paradox is explained below. Consider an urn
lled with 90 balls, 30 of which are red (R) and the remaining 60 are of an unknown
mix of blue (B) and yellow (Y ). One ball is drawn at random, and the payo¤
depends on the colour of the ball drawn and the act you choose. Subjects are
asked to choose between acts f , g, f 0, g0 as shown in the Table 3.2 (Pay-o¤s in
Experimental Currency Units - ECU):
Subjects are asked to choose between f and g, generally prefer f because of
the denite 1
3
chance of winning 100 ECU to the ambiguous act g, but when asked
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Table 3.2. The Ellsberg Options
30 balls 60 balls
Act Red R Blue B Yellow Y
f 100 0 0
g 0 100 0
f 0 100 0 100
g0 0 100 100
to choose between f 0 and g0; the same subjects prefer g0 which gives a 2
3
chance of
winning 100 ECU; again avoiding the ambiguous act f 0.
These choices cannot be represented as maximising expected utility with respect
to a standard subjective probability distribution : Choosing f rather than g implies
 (R) >  (B) : However preferring g0 to f 0 implies  (B [ Y ) >  (R [ Y ) : Given
the standard additivity properties of probabilities, i.e.  (R [ Y ) =  (R) +  (Y ) ;
these two inequalities are inconsistent. The inconsistency would not arise however,
if we represented beliefs by a non-additive set function . In this case it is possible
that (R [ Y ) 6= (R) + (Y ), which could be compatible with the choices in the
Ellsberg paradox.
Non-additive beliefs were rst introduced and used by Schmeidler (1989). He
proposed a theory calledChoquet Expected Utility (CEU), where outcomes are
evaluated by a weighted sum of utilities, but unlike EUT the weights used depend
on the acts. An intuitive exposition of Schmeidlers model, which reformulates
Savages axioms is given in Sarin and Wakker (1992). The model is extended such
that it preserves additivity in beliefs for events in the face of risk, while permitting
non-additivity for ambiguous events.
The CEU model also categorises individualsresponse to ambiguity. Individuals
can be either optimistic or pessimistic in their outlook towards ambiguity. An
optimistic outlook would over-estimate the likelihood of a good outcome - inducing
one to bid on a gold mine, with the hope that it would make one very rich. On
the other hand, a pessimistic outlook would over-estimate the likelihood of a bad
outcome - such as losing all your wealth in a bad investment.
CEU uses capacities to model optimistic and pessimistic outlooks to ambiguity.
A capacity v is convex (resp. concave) if for all A and B  S; v(A[B) + v(A\B)
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 v(A) + v(B); (resp. v(A[B) + v(A\B)  v(A) + v(B)), where A; B are events
contained in the universal set S: In CEU, convex (resp. concave) capacities are used
to model a pessimistic (resp. optimistic) outlook to ambiguity.
Neo-additive capacities were introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant
(2007), and are so named because they are additive over non-extreme outcomes
and are convex combinations of an additive capacity and a special capacity. A neo-
additive capacity represents an ambiguous belief about an additive probability dis-
tribution ; with  determining the size of the set of probabilities around  and
thus measures the decision makers ambiguity. His/her attitude to ambiguity is
represented by the parameter ; with higher values of  corresponding to greater
ambiguity-aversion.
Consider a two-player game with a nite set of pure strategies S; such that si
is the players own strategy and s i denotes the set of possible strategy proles for
is opponents. The payo¤ function of player i is denoted ui(si; s i): The functional
form of preferences may be represented as:
Vi (si; i; i; i) = iiMi (si) + i (1  i)mi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i);
(3.1)
where Mi (si) = maxs i2S i ui(si; s i) and mi (si) = mins i2S i ui(si; s i):
1
Intuitively,  can be thought to be the decision makers belief. However, he
is not sure of this belief, hence it is an ambiguous belief. His condence about
this belief is modelled by (1   i); with  = 1 denoting complete ignorance and
 = 0 denoting no ambiguity. His attitude to ambiguity is measured by i; with
 = 1 denoting pure optimism and  = 0 denoting pure pessimism. If the decision-
maker has 0 <  < 1; he is neither purely optimistic nor purely pessimistic (i.e.,
ambiguity-averse), but reacts to ambiguity in a partly pessimistic way by putting a
greater weight on bad outcomes and in a partly optimistic way by putting a greater
weight on good outcomes.
1Note that Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) write a neo additive capacity in the
form (E) = + (1  )(E): We have modied their denition to be consistent with the rest of
the literature where  is the weight on the minimum expected utility.
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3.2.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In this section we present an equilibrium concept for strategic games with am-
biguity. In a Nash equilibrium, players are believed to behave in a manner that is
consistent with the actual behaviour of their opponents. They perfectly anticipate
the actions of their opponent and can thus provide a best response to it in the form
of their own action. In the case of ambiguity, represented by non-additive beliefs,
however, the Nash idea of having consistent beliefs regarding the opponents action
and thus being able to play an optimum strategy as a response to these beliefs, needs
to be modied. We assume that players choose pure strategies, and that in equi-
librium the beliefs about these pure strategies are best responses to the opponents
actions.
Consider a game with 2 players and a nite pure strategy sets Si; i = 1; 2: Each
player is beliefs about the opponents behaviour is represented by a capacity vi on
S i; which is the set of strategy combinations which his/her opponent could choose.
Given neo-additive beliefs, the expected payo¤ that a player i could earn from a
strategy si; is determined by equation (3.1),
Vi (si; i; i; i) = iiMi (si) + i (1  i)mi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i);
(3.2)
where Mi (si) = maxs i2S i ui(si; s i) and mi (si) = mins i2S i ui(si; s i):
Unlike the scenario of Nash equilibrium where a player could attach a set of
additive probabilities to his opponents actions, in the presence of ambiguity, beliefs
are represented by capacities. The support of a capacity is a players belief of how
the opponent will act. Formally, the support of a neo-additive capacity,  (A) =
 + (1  )  (A), is dened by supp () = supp (). Thus the support of a neo-
additive belief is equal to the support of its additive component. This denition is
justied in Eichberger and Kelsey (2011).
Denition 1 A pair of neo-additive capacities (1; 

2) is an Equilibrium Under
Ambiguity (EUA) if for i = 1; 2, supp (i )  R i( i); where Ri denotes the best-
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response correspondence of player i given that his/her beliefs are represented by i
is dened by
Ri(i) = Ri(i; i; i) := argmaxsi2Si Vi (si; i; i; i) :
This denition of equilibrium is taken from Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper
(2009), who adapt an earlier denition in Dow and Werlang (1994). These papers
show that an EUA will exist for any given ambiguity-attitudes for the players. In
games, one can determine i endogenously as the prediction of the players from the
knowledge of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, we treat
the degrees of optimism, i and ambiguity, i; as exogenous. In equilibrium, each
player assigns strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponents best responses given
the opponents belief. However, each player lacks condence in his/her likelihood
assessment and responds in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome,
or in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome.
Alternative approaches to equilibrium with ambiguity can be found in Klibano¤
(1993) and Lo (1996). They model players as having preferences which satisfy the
axioms of maxmin expected utility (MMEU, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Players
are allowed to have beliefs which are represented by multiple sets of conventional
probability distributions. As such, players can have mixed strategies that are chosen
from these multiple sets of additive probability distributions. They model ambiguity
aversion as a strict preference among players to randomise between strategies when
they are indi¤erent to pure strategies.
3.3 Experimental Model
3.3.1 Battle of the Sexes Game
In this section, we explain the games used in our experimental sessions. There
are similar to the standard battle of the sexes game, except that they have been
modied by giving the column player an extra option, which is the ambiguity-safe
strategy R. We shall adopt the convention that male pronouns he, his etc. denote
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the row player (also known as Player 1), while female pronouns denote the column
player or Player 2.2
3.3.1.1 Nash Equilibrium
The base game (without the secure optionR) has two pure Nash equilibria (T;M)
and (B;L), neither of which is focal. We believe this may be a cause of ambiguity.
Even if a given player believes his/her opponent will play a Nash equilibrium strat-
egy, there may be ambiguity about which of the two possible equilibrium strategies
(s)he will choose. Ambiguity-aversion makes R; which is the safe option, attractive
for Player 2. When x = 60, the secure strategy R is dominated by a mixed strategy
and hence is not played in Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium.
Theorem 1 The game has the following Nash equilibria:
1. When 0  x  75; there are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and (3
4
T + 1
4
B; 3
4
L+
1
4
M);3
2. When 75 < x  100; there are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and ( x
100
 T + 100 x
100

B; 1
61
M + 60
61
R);
3. When 100 < x < 300; there is a unique equilibrium: (B;L):
1. 0  x < 75 : By inspection (T;M) and (B;L) are pure strategy Nash
equilibria. For x in this range, R is dominated by 3
4
 L + 1
4
M; which yields an
expected pay-o¤of 75 no matter what player 1 chooses. When she plays 3
4
L+ 1
4
M;
her payo¤ from this strategy is given by 300p(1  q) + 100(1  p)q = 75: This gives
her an expected payo¤ of 75, regardless of the strategy chosen by Player 1. The
strategy R is thus dominated by a mixed strategy and hence cannot be played in
Nash equilibrium. Player 1 is indi¤erent between T and B when 300(1  p) = 100p;
p = 3=4. There are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and (3
4
 T + 1
4
B; 3
4
 L+ 1
4
M).
2. 75 < x  100 : For x in this range, (T;M) and (B;L) remain pure strategy
Nash equilibria. Player 2 is indi¤erent between M and R when: 100q = x or q =
2Of course this convention is for convenience only and bears no relation to the actual gender of
subjects in our experiments.
3The notation 34  T + 14  B denotes the mixed strategy where T is played with probability 34
and B is played with probability 14 :
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x=100. Player 1 is indi¤erent between T and B when: 300p+50(1 p) = 55(1 p), or
p = 1=61. There are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and ( x
100
T+ 100 x
100
B; 1
61
M+ 60
61
R):4
3. 100 < x < 300 : For this range, M is dominated for Player 2 by R. Once M
is eliminated, Player 1 will never play T; which is his dominated strategy. He thus
plays B. The best response for Player 2 to make to B, is to play L. In this case
there is a unique Nash equilibrium: (B;L) which satises iterated dominance. 
3.3.1.2 Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity about the behaviour of Player 1 would make the secure option R
more attractive for Player 2. Note that the best response to R; is for Player 1 to
play B. Hence of the two possible Nash (T;M) and (B;L), the latter may be more
robust to ambiguity.5
We assume that the beliefs of the players may be represented by neo-additive
capacities and that players are purely pessimistic towards ambiguity, i.e.,  = 0:
Theorem 2 The game has the following Equilibria under Ambiguity:
1. when 0  x  (1 )75; there are 3 equilibria, (T;M); (B;L) and (3
4
T+ 1
4
B; 3
4
L+
1
4
M);
2. when (1   )75 < x  (1   )100; there are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and
( x
(1 )100T +
(1 )100   x
(1 )100 B;
1
61
M + 60
61
R);
3. when (1  )100 < x < (1  )300; there is a unique equilibrium: (B;L);
4. when x > (1  )300; there is a unique equilibrium: (B;R):
1. 0 6 x 6 (1  )75 : In this range there are two EUA in pure strategies
and one in mixed strategies. In the pure equilibria, the supports of the equilibrium
beliefs are given by (T;M) and (B;L): Consider the rst of these. Dene 1 by 1 =
(1  ) M (A) ; where M is the additive probability on S2 dened by M (A) = 1
if M 2 A, M (A) = 0 otherwise. Similarly dene Player 2s beliefs 2 by 2 =
4Consider what would happen if Player 2 mixes between L and R: Player 2 will be indi¤erent
between L and R when: 300(1   q) = x or q = 300 x300 . Player 1 is indi¤erent between T and B
when: 100p+ 55(1  p) = 50(1  p), or p =   595 . It is impossible for a probability to be negative,
hence there can be no such equilibria.
5Theorem 2 conrms that (B;L) is an equilibrium for a greater parameter range than (T;M):
45
(1  ) T (A) : By denition supp 1 = M and supp 2 = T: Denote this equilibrium
by hT;Mi :
By similar reasoning we may show that there exists a pure equilibrium where
supp 1 = L and supp 2 = B; which we denote by hB;Li :
Now consider the mixed equilibria. Denote the equilibrium beliefs of Players 1
and 2 respectively by ~1 = (1  ) ~1 and ~2 = (1  ) ~2: Player 2s Choquet ex-
pected pay-o¤s are given by, V 2 (L) = 300 (1  ) ~2 (B) ; V 2 (M) = 100 (1  ) ~2 (T )
and V 2 (R) = x: If V 2 (L) < x 6 (1 )75 then ~2 (B) < 1
4
; which implies ~2 (T ) > 3
4
:
Hence V 2 (M) = 100 (1  ) ~2 (T ) > (1   )75 > x: Thus R cannot be a best re-
sponse for Player 2, hence ~1 (R) = 0. Consequently in any mixed equilibrium 2s
strategies are L and M:
In a mixed equilibrium Player 2 must be indi¤erent between L and M; hence,
V 2 (L) = V 2 (M)() 300 (1  ) ~2 (B) = 100 (1  ) ~2 (T )
, 300  1  ~2 (T ) = 100~2 (T ), ~2 (T ) = 3
4
:
In this equilibrium V 2 (L) = V 2 (M) = 75 (1  ) : Similarly we may show that
for Player 1 to be indi¤erent between T and B; we must have ~1 (L) = 3
4
and
~1 (M) = 1
4
:
Thus in the mixed equilibrium ~1 = (1  ) ~1 with ~1 (L) = 3
4
and ~1 (M) = 1
4
and supp ~1 = fL;Mg while ~2 = (1  ) ~2 with ~2 (T ) = 3
4
and ~2 (B) = 1
4
; with
support fT;Bg : In this equilibrium V 2 (L) = V 2 (M) = 75 (1  ) : By an abuse of
notation we shall denote this equilibrium by


3
4
T + 1
4
B; 1
4
L+ 3
4
M)

:
2. (1   )75 < x < (1   )100 : In this range, there are two EUA in pure
strategies: (T;M) and (B;L): The proof for these EUA in pure strategies is similar
to Part a. above.
In addition, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium. Denote the equilibrium beliefs
of Players 1 and 2 respectively by ~1 = (1  ) ~1 and ~2 = (1  ) ~2:
Player 2s Choquet expected pay-o¤s are given by, V 2 (L) = 300 (1  ) ~2 (B) ;
V 2 (M) = 100 (1  ) ~2 (T ) and V 2 (R) = x: L cannot be a best response for Player
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2, hence ~1 (L) = 0.6 Consequently in any mixed equilibrium 2s strategies are M
and R:
Player 2 is indi¤erent between M and R when:
V 2 (M) = V 2 (R), 100 (1  ) ~2 (T ) = x
, ~2 (T ) = x
(1  ) 100 :
Similarly, Player 1s Choquet expected payo¤is given by: V 1 (T ) = 300 (1  ) ~1 (M)+
50 (1  ) ~1 (R) and V 1 (B) = 55(1   )~1 (R) : Player 1 is indi¤erent between T
and B when:
V 1 (T ) = V 1 (B)
, 300 (1  ) ~1 (M) + 50 (1  ) ~1 (R) = 55(1  )~1 (R)
, 300~1 (M) = 5(1  ~1 (M)), ~1 (M) = 1
61
:
Thus in the mixed equilibrium ~1 = (1  ) ~1; with ~1 (M) = 1
61
and ~1 (R) = 60
61
and supp ~1 = fM;Rg ; while ~2 = (1  ) ~2 with ~2 (T ) = x
(1 )100 and ~
2 (B) =
((1 )100)   x
(1 )100 ; with support fT;Bg : In this equilibrium V 2 (M) = V 2 (R) = x: The
mixed strategy equilibrium is
D
x
(1 )100T +
((1 )100)   x
(1 )100 B;
1
61
M + 60
61
R
E
.
3. (1   )100 < x < (1   )300 : Denote the equilibrium beliefs of Players
1 and 2 respectively by ~1 = (1  ) ~1 and ~2 = (1  ) ~2: Player 2s Choquet ex-
pected pay-o¤s are given by, V 2 (L) = 300 (1  ) ~2 (B) ; V 2 (M) = 100 (1  ) ~2 (T )
and V 2 (R) = x; where (1  )100 < x < (1  )300:
6Consider what would happen if Player 2 mixes between L and R: For Player 2 to be indi¤erent
between L and R :
V 2 (L) = V 2 (R), 300 (1  ) ~2 (B) = x
, ~2 (B) = x
300 (1  ) :
Player 1 is then indi¤erent between playing T and B when,
V 1 (T ) = V 1 (B), 50(1  )~1 (R) = 100 (1  ) ~1 (L) + 55 (1  ) ~1 (R)
, 100~1 (L) =  5(1  ~1 (L), ~1 (L) =   5
95
:
It is impossible for a belief to be negative, hence there can be no such equilibria.
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For x in this range, V 2 (R) > V 2 (M) for any beliefs of Player 2, hence ~1 (M) = 0:
Player 1s Choquet expected pay-o¤s are given by, V 1 (T ) = 50 (1  ) ~1 (R) and
V 1 (B) = 100 (1  ) ~1 (L) + 55(1  )~1 (R) : B yields a higher Choquet expected
payo¤ than T for any beliefs of Player 1, with support contained in fL;Rg. For
Player 2, L is the best response to B. In this case there is a unique EUA: hB;Li.
4. x > (1   )300 : Denote the equilibrium beliefs of Players 1 and 2
respectively by ~1 = (1  ) ~1 and ~2 = (1  ) ~2: Player 2s Choquet expected
pay-o¤s are given by, V 2 (L) = 300 (1  ) ~2 (B) ; V 2 (M) = 100 (1  ) ~2 (T ) and
V 2 (R) = x; where x > (1  )300:
For x in this range, R strictly dominates both L and M for any beliefs of Player 2,
hence ~1 (L) = ~1 (M) = 0: Player 1s best response is to play B; with supp 1 = R:
There is a unique EUA: hB;Ri. 
In the above analysis, players are presumed to be uniformly ambiguity averse,
Assume  = 1
2
; which is in line with the ndings of Kilka andWeber (2001). Then (a)
occurs for 0 6 x 6 37:5; (b) occurs for 37:5 6 x 6 50; (c) occurs for 50 6 x 6 150 and
(d) occurs for 150 6 x: The testable hypothesis that arises from the analysis, is that
while Nash equilibrium predicts that R cannot be chosen in the range 37:5 < x < 50
or 150 < x < 300; EUA predicts R can be chosen in these ranges.
3.3.2 Ellsberg Urn Experiments
The Battle of Sexes game was alternated with single person decision problems
regarding an Ellsberg Urn. Subjects were presented with an urn containing 90 balls,
of which 30 were Red, and the remainder an unknown proportion of Blue or Yellow.
Subjects were asked to pick a colour, and a ball was drawn from the urn. If the
colour of the ball matched the colour chosen by the subject, it entitled the subject
to a prize. The decisions put to the subjects took the following form:
An urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are Red. The remainder are either Blue
or Yellow.
Which of the following options do you prefer?
a) Payo¤ of y if a Red ball is drawn.
b) Payo¤ of 100 if a Blue ball is drawn.
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c) Payo¤ of 100 if a Yellow ball is drawn.
Payo¤ yattached to the option Red was changed from round to round, with
y = 95; 90 or 80; to measure the ambiguity threshold of subjects. In addition, we also
put before subjects the classic case of Ellsberg Paradox, when y = 100, as described
in table 6. If y = 100; this has a similar structure to the above experiments.
3.4 Experimental Design
The Battle of Sexes game and Ellsberg Urn problem described above were used
in two series of paper-based experiments, one conducted at St. Stephens College
in New Delhi, India, and the other at the Finance and Economics Experimental
Laboratory in Exeter (FEELE), UK.
Sessions 1 and 2 consisted of 20 subjects each. Sessions 3 and 4 consisted of 18
and 22 subjects respectively. In total there were 80 subjects who took part in the
experiment, 38 of which were females and 42 were males. We were also interested in
whether or not participants had a mathematical background - of those taking part
in the sessions, 45 studied a quantitative subject such as Biochemistry, Electronic
Engineering or Astrophysics, while 35 studied a non-quantitative subject such as
History, Philosophy, or International Relations. Each session lasted a maximum of
45 minutes.
Subjects were allowed to read through a short but comprehensive set of instruc-
tions at their own pace, following which the instructions were also read out to all the
participants in general. The subjects were then asked to ll out some practice ques-
tions to test their understanding of the games, before the actual set of experimental
questions were handed out. At the start of the experiment, subjects were randomly
assigned the role of either a Row Player or a Column Player for the purpose of the
Battle of Sexes game, and remained in the same role throughout the rest of the
experiment.
The experiment consisted of 11 rounds, starting with a decision regarding a
Battle of Sexes game, which was then alternated with an Ellsberg Urn decision,
such that there were in total 6 Battle of Sexes rounds and 5 Ellsberg urn decisions
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to be made. Each subject had to choose one option per round: Top/Bottom if they
were a Row Player or Left/Middle/Right if they were a Column Player, and in case
of the Ellsberg urn rounds Red, Blue or Yellow.
The values of x, the ambiguity-safe payo¤ available to the Column Player that
were used for the Battle of Sexes game rounds were: 230; 120, 200, 170, 260, 60 (in
that order). In the rst three Ellsberg urn rounds, the pay-o¤s attached to drawing
a Blue or Yellow ball were held constant at 100, while those attached to drawing
a Red ball varied as 95, 90, 80: The last two Ellsberg urn rounds consisted of the
classic case of the Ellsberg paradox, where subjects had to choose between a payo¤
of 100 for a Red or 100 for a Blue ball, followed by a choice between a payo¤ of 100
for drawing a Red/Yellow ball or 100 for drawing a Blue/Yellow ball.
Once subjects had made all 11 decisions, a throw of dice determined one Battle
of Sexes round and one Ellsberg urn round for which payments were to be made.
Row Playersdecisions were matched against the Column Players according to a
predetermined matching, and pay-o¤s were announced.
Rather than using a real urn we simulated the draw from the urn on a computer.7
The computer randomly assigned the number of blue and yellow balls in the urn so
that they summed to 60, while keeping the number of red balls xed at 30 and the
total number of balls in the urn at 90: It then simulated an independent ball draw
for up to 30 subjects. If the colour of the ball drawn by the computer matched that
chosen by the subject, it entitled him to the payo¤ specied in the round chosen for
payment.
The total earnings of a subject was the sum of a show-up fee, payo¤earned in the
chosen Battle of Sexes round and payo¤ earned in the chosen Ellsberg urn round.
Average payment made to Indian subjects was Rs:420 ($6 approximately); and to
Exeter subjects was $7:40.
7The computer simulated urn can be found at the following link:
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/dk210/Ellsberg-110708.xls.
50
3.5 Data Analysis and Results
3.5.1 Behaviour of the Row Player in the Battle of Sexes Rounds
In the Battle of Sexes rounds of the experiment, the task of the Row Player was
to choose between T and B: In the mixed equilibrium, the Row Player randomises
3
4
: 1
4
between T and B: However we nd that the Row Player randomises more
closely to 50 : 50 in the experiments: See Table 3:3 and Figure 3.1 , for a summary
of the Row Players behaviour.
Table 3.3. Summary of Row Player Behaviour
x = 60 x = 120 x = 170 x = 200 x = 230 x = 260
Top 20 50% 22 55% 18 45% 26 65% 24 60% 23 58%
Bottom 20 50% 18 45% 22 55% 14 35% 16 40% 17 43%
 40 40 40 40 40 40
We conducted a binomial test with the null that the Row Player randomises
50 : 50 between T and B; for each value of x: We fail to reject this hypothesis for
each individual session even at a 10% level of signicance. When tested for each
value of x on the whole (as a sum of all sessions combined), we fail to reject the
null for all the values of x; except when x = 200; where we reject the null at 5%: In
this case, the Row Player plays T signicantly more often than B: This is puzzling,
since B would be the best response to the Column Player choosing R:
We conducted a chi-squared test with the null hypothesis that the Row Player
chooses T and B with equal probability (H0 : prob(T ) = 0:5, prob(B) = 0:5) versus
the alternative that this is not true (H1 : prob(T ) 6= 0:5): The null is rejected at 1%
level of signicance, for each value of x.
3.5.2 Behaviour of the Column Player in the Battle of Sexes Rounds
In the Battle of Sexes rounds of the experiment, the task of the Column Player
was to choose between L; M and the ambiguity-safe option R: See Table 3:4 and
Figure 3:2, for a summary of the Column Players behaviour.
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Figure 3.1. Summary of Row Player Behaviour
When x = 60 one might expect the Column player to pick L; sinceR is dominated
and L has a much higher maximum pay-o¤thanM: As seen in Table 4most subjects
do indeed choose L: However, even at this low value of x, where the ambiguity-safe
option R is dominated by randomisation between the other strategies available to
the subject, a signicant 30% of subjects still choose it. This is analogous in a
game-setting to the results of Dominiak and Schnedler (2011), who found aversion
to objective ramdomisation in the presence of ambiguity in single-person decisions.
What is more interesting to note however, is that the number of subjects playing
R, steadily increases from 28% to 98% for 120  x  260: Nash equilibrium predicts
that R cannot be chosen for any of these values, but it is the clear choice of a
majority of subjects in the presence of ambiguity, as seen in Figure 2.
Table 3.4. Summary of Column Player Behaviour
x = 60 x = 120 x = 170 x = 200 x = 230 x = 260
Left 16 40% 5 13% 7 18% 4 10% 0 0% 1 3%
Middle 12 30% 6 15% 5 13% 1 3% 2 5% 0 0%
Right 12 30% 29 73% 28 70% 35 88% 38 95% 39 98%
 40 40 40 40 40 40
We conducted a binomial test with the null that the Column Player chooses R
as often as he does L + M (H0 : prob(Right) = 0:5, prob(Left + Middle) = 0:5),
against the alternative that she plays R more often than both L + M combined
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(H1 : prob(Right) > prob(Left+ Middle)), for each value of x:8 We reject the null
at a 1% level of signicance for all the values of x in the range 120 260. This leads
us to the conclusion that subjects play R signicantly more often than both L and
M combined, at a 1% level of signicance.
A chi-squared test with the null hypothesis that the Column Player choosesR and
L+M with equal probability (H0 : prob(Right) = 0:5, prob(Left+Middle) = 0:5)
versus the alternative that this is not true (H1 : prob(Right) 6= 0:5) is also rejected
at 1% level of signicance, since R is chosen signicantly more often.
Figure 3.2. Summary of Column Player Behaviour
We ran a probit regression to ascertain what factors inuenced subjects in choos-
ing R more often than L or M . Dummy variables were dened to capture the
characteristics of the data such as: Math = 1, if the subject was doing a Quantita-
tive degree (Math = 0; for degrees like English, History, Philosophy, Politics etc.);
Male = 1, if Gender is male (0; otherwise); Delhi = 1, if the session was run in
India (0 for Exeter); x_60; x_120; x_170; x_200; x_230; x_260 = 1, depending
on the value xtook in that particular round.
8The binomial test was conducted for each value of x except x = 60, where EUA predicts that
the column player can play L: It may be noted that for x = 60; subjects play L +M more than
50% of the time.
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A probit regression of Right onMath; Male, and the various x value dummies
x_120; x_170; x_200; x_230; x_260; has a chi-square ratio of 75:55 with a p-value
of 0:0001; which shows that our model as a whole is statistically signicant.9
All the variables in the probit regression were individually statistically signicant.
We see that if the subject had a quantitative degree, the z-score increases by 0:538;
making him more likely to pick R: If the subject is male, the z-score decreases by
0:402; hence males are less likely to opt for the ambiguity-safe option R than females.
When x = 120: the z-score increases by 1:16; x = 170: the z-score increases by 1:08;
x = 200: the z-score increases by 1:75; x = 230: the z-score increases by 2:27;
x = 260 : the z-score increases by 2:57; more than the base which is x = 60: Thus,
as the value of x increases, the subject is more likely to pick the ambiguity-safe
option.
3.5.3 Player Behaviour in the Ellsberg Urn Rounds
The Ellsberg Urn rounds were alternated with the Battles of Sexes rounds. This
was designed to test whether there was a correlation between ambiguity-averse be-
haviour in the game and ambiguity attitude in single person decision problems.10
Subjects were o¤ered an Urn that held 90 balls - 30 of which were Red, the
remaining an unknown proportion of Blue and Y ellow: They were then asked to
choose between winning a payo¤ 95 experimental currency units (ECU) (90 and 80
ECU respectively, in subsequent rounds) if they picked Red, or a payo¤ of 100 ECU
if they picked Blue or Y ellow; and the colour picked by them matched the colour
of the ball drawn from the Urn.
As can be seen in Table 4:16, subjects chose Blue and Y ellow coloured balls (the
ambiguous option) more often than they chose Red:11 We had expected to observe
9An initial probit regression, showed that the dummy variable for location (Delhi=Exeter) was
not signicant, showing that behaviour of Indian subjects was very similar to the Exeter subjects.
Thus, the location dummy variable was dropped and the model was re-run without it.
10We would like to thank Peter Dursch, whose suggestions helped the design of the experiment.
11The data for y = 100 is from the classic Ellsberg paradox round. It is not completely compa-
rable as subjects were not given the option of choosing yellow. Thus it is not included in the data
analysis below.
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that subjects who chose Right (the ambiguity-safe option) in the Battle of Sexes
rounds, would choose Red (the colour with the unambiguous number of balls) in the
Urn rounds. However, the observed correlation was weak.
Table 3.5. Summary of Player Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
Red = 100 Red= 95 Red = 90 Red= 80
Red 57 71% 32 40% 22 28% 24 30%
Blue 23 29% 37 46% 36 45% 39 49%
Yellow 0 0% 11 14% 22 28% 17 21%
 80 80 80 80
One notable feature of this data is the low level of ambiguity-aversion compared
to previous studies. In the case where y = 100 our results are comparable to the
previous literature. For lower values of y; subjects have to pay an monetary penalty
to avoid ambiguity. Even small penalties produced a large drop in the number of
subjects choosing the unambiguous option.
Of the 80 subjects that took part in the experiment, only 12 subjects always
chose Red, 11 chose Red twice, 20 chose Red once, and a signicant 37 subjects
never chose Red - always opting for either Blue or Y ellow, the ambiguous options.
It is interesting to note that even in the round where the payo¤ attached to
Red was 80 ECU; a large minority (30%) still chose the safe option, despite facing
a substantial monetary penalty. Of the 12 subjects who always picked Red, 3 are
Row Players and so not relevant to our discussion. The remaining 9 are Column
Players: 7 of these always chose the ambiguity-safe combination of Right   Red
(not considering their choice when x = 60), while 2 chose Left=Middle=Right while
always picking Red.
We conducted a binomial test with the null Red was chosen often as Blue +
Y ellow combined (H0 : prob(Red) = 0:5, prob(Blue + Y ellow) = 0:5), against the
alternative that Blue+Y ellow was chosen more often (H1 : prob(Blue+Y ellow) >
prob(Red)):We reject the null at a 5% level of signicance when the payo¤ attached
to Red = 95, and at 1% level of signicance when Red = 90 & 80: Looking at
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subject choices on the whole, over the three rounds, we can reject the null at a 1%
level of signicance.
Thus, the ambiguous options Blue and Y ellow are chosen signicantly more
often than Red; which leads us to speculate whether the penalty for choosing Red
was set too high or whether subjects are mildly ambiguity-seeking in the Ellsberg
urn rounds, even though they appear to be ambiguity-averse in the Battle of Sexes
rounds. A probit regression run to investigate whether gender, location or degree
subject a¤ected subjectschoice of Blue and Y ellow was inconclusive and none of
these explanatory variables was found to be signicant.
Figure 3.3. Summary of Player Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
3.5.4 Classic Ellsberg Paradox Rounds
In the last two Ellsberg Urn rounds, subjects were o¤ered an Urn that held 90
balls - 30 of which were Red, the remainder an unknown proportion of Blue and
Y ellow: They were then asked to choose between winning a payo¤ 100 ECU if they
picked Red, or a payo¤ of 100 ECU if they picked Blue; and the colour picked by
them matched the colour of the ball drawn from the Urn. Once they had made this
choice, they were asked to choose between winning a payo¤ 100 ECU if they picked
either a Red or Y ellow ball, or a payo¤ of 100 ECU if they picked either a Blue or
Y ellow ball; and the colour picked by them matched the colour of the ball drawn
from the Urn.
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Table 3.6. Player Behaviour in Classic Ellsberg Paradox Rounds
Choice Response
Red followed by Red/Yellow 19 24%
Red followed by Blue/Yellow 38 48%
Blue followed by Blue/Yellow 16 20%
Blue followed by Red/Yellow 7 9%
As can be seen from Table 3:6, a majority of the subjects preferred Red to Blue;
and then the choice Blue=Y ellow over Red=Y ellow: 38 of the 80 (48%) subjects
that took part in the experiment chose Red followed by Blue=Y ellow; thus display-
ing the Classic Ellsberg Paradox. 7 (9%) subjects that took part in the experiment
chose Blue followed by Red=Y ellow; which indicates ambiguity preference. Look-
ing strictly at the Column Players who display the Ellsberg Paradox12: 16 (67%)
subjects always chose the ambiguity-safe option Right  but these people do play
Blue=Y ellow when the payo¤ attached to Red = 95; 90; 80, while 8 (33%) play a
mixture of Right=Left=Middle.
3.6 Related Literature
3.6.1 Papers on Games
While the current study focusses on the e¤ect of ambiguity in a Battle of Sexes
game, Eichberger and Kelsey (2002), study how ambiguity a¤ects the voluntary
provision of public goods. They show that when the production function for public
goods is concave ambiguity-aversion causes public good provision to be above Nash
equilibrium level.13 More generally they show the deviation from the Nash equilib-
rium depends on the nature of strategic interactions taking place, i.e., on the basis
of whether the game being played was one of strategic substitutes or complements.
Voluntary provision of public goods may be considered as an example of a game of
strategic substitutes with positive externalities. If one individual contributes more,
this lowers the marginal product of other peoples donations. Ambiguity-aversion
12We do not consider x = 60; where R is a dominated strategy.
13These results will apply even in the presence of increasing returns to scale in production
provided there is su¢ ciently strong diminishing marginal benet from public goods.
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causes a given individual to over-weigh bad outcomes. In this case, a bad outcome
is when others make low donations. When othersdonations are low the marginal
benet of a donation by the given individual is high. Thus the expected e¤ect of
ambiguity would be to increase the perceived marginal benet of donations by a
given individual. If all have similar perceptions of ambiguity, total donations will
rise. Hence an increase in ambiguity is expected to raise both individual and total
donations.
Di Mauro and Castro (2008) conduct a set of experiments designed to test the
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) hypothesis that it is ambiguity that causes an increase
in contribution towards the public good, and not altruism. In order to negate the
chance that altruism, or a feeling of reciprocation prompted the subjectsactions,
the subjects were informed that their opponent would be a virtual agent and the
opponents play was simulated by a computer. Subjects played in two scenarios, one
with risk, the other with ambiguity. They nd that contributions were signicantly
higher when the situation was one of ambiguity. These results are similar to our
ndings and showed that there was indeed evidence that ambiguity signicantly
a¤ects the decisions made by individuals, in a manner that depends directly on the
strategic nature of the game in consideration.
Another paper that tests whether ambiguity a¤ects individual behaviour in a
game setting is Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008), who study strategic ambi-
guity in games experimentally. They studied games in which subjects faced either
a granny, who was described as being ignorant of economic strategy, a game theo-
rist, who was described as a successful professor of economics, or another student
as an opponent. It was conjectured that subjects would view the granny as a more
ambiguous opponent than the game theorist. They nd that subjects did nd the
granny to be the more ambiguous opponent, and this a¤ected their decision choices.
In our paper, even though subjects are paired against other opponents (and not a
granny), we nd subjects display similar ambiguity averse behaviour.
Colman and Pulford (2007) explain the concept of ambiguity aversion as a state
that arises as a result of a pessimistic response to uncertainty, mainly driven by a
58
loss of decision condence. They argue that people tend to become anxious and
less condent while making decisions in the presence of ambiguity. They found that
individual responses di¤ered between ambiguous and risky versions of the game
being studied. They nd that players did not respond to ambiguity by simply
equating it to riskiness, but showed a marked preference to avoid ambiguity whenever
the option of doing so was provided to them. This is consistent with our ndings that
when an ambiguity-safe option is made available to subjects, they show a marked
preference for it.
3.6.2 Papers on Ellsberg Urns
The Ellsberg urn experiments conducted by us investigated whether there was
any correlation between ambiguity-averse behaviour in the game and ambiguity atti-
tude in single person decision problems. Moreover, we were interested in evaluating
whether there was a threshold beyond which ambiguity-averse individuals became
ambiguity-neutral (or seeking) in their preferences. Although there exists a number
of experimental studies related to Ellsberg urns, we do not nd any that is similar
to our experiment.
Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011), study a three-colour Ellsberg urn in which they have
increased the level of ambiguity. Subjects face ambiguity on two accounts: the
unknown proportion of balls in the urn as well as the size of the prize money. In
their experiment, both winning and the amount that the subject could possibly win
were both perfectly correlated - either positively or negatively, depending on which
of the two treatments was run by them.
In the experiment, most subjects preferred betting in the positively correlated
treatment rather than the negative one. Moreover, subjects also showed a preference
for a gamble when there was positively correlated ambiguity, as opposed to a gamble
without any ambiguity. This behaviour of the subjects is compatible with our results,
where we nd that more subjects were willing to gamble on Blue=Y ellow which were
the ambiguous choices rather than on Red.
Another Ellsberg experiment that allows for an additional source of ambiguity is
studied by Eichberger, Oechssler, and Schnedler (2011). They consider a two-colour
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Ellsberg experiment and insert an additional element of ambiguity in terms of the
money the subject wins in the various outcomes. In the standard treatment, if the
colour drawn matches the colour chosen by the subject, he receives an envelope
marked with an equal sign (=); and if it does not match he receives an envelope
with an unequal sign (6=): He is aware that the (=) envelope contains e3 and the (6=)
envelope contains e1: This standard treatment is referred to as O; or open envelope:
In the second treatment called the S or sealed envelope treatment, subjects know
that one envelope contains e3 and one contains e1; but do not know which envelope
contains which amount. In the third treatments called R or the random treatment,
subjects are told that the amount in the envelope will be determined by the toss of
a fair coin, once they have made their choice of colour for the bet on the urn.
Treatment O; is the standard Ellsberg experiment. In treatment R, winning e3
or e1 depends totally on the toss of the coin and so the subject faces equal odds
of winning either amount. Treatment S; is di¤erent from the other two treatments
in that subjects are not sure how much they would win, even if they won. They
should thus, be indi¤erent between the ambiguous urn and the known one. Subjects
were asked to choose an urn and the colour of the ball they would like to bet on. In
addition, they could state that they are indi¤erent between the known urn and the
unknown one, as well as being indi¤erent between a green ball and a blue one. In
case of indi¤erence, subject were assigned to the unknown urn/blue ball options.
Eichberger, Oechssler, and Schnedler (2011), nd that 30 of the 48 (62%) subjects
preferred the known urn in treatment O, which is similar to the standard Ellsberg
result. In treatment R, when subjects should be indi¤erent between the ambiguous
urn and the known one since their payment depends on the ip of a coin, 25 of
the 48 (52%) subjects preferred the known urn. In treatment S, 19 (40%) subjects
preferred the known urn, 17 (35%) preferred the ambiguous one, while 12 (25%)
stated they were indi¤erent.
It can be noted from Eichberger, Oechssler, and Schnedler (2011), that signi-
cantly fewer subjects preferred the known urn to the ambiguous one in treatment S
where there was additional ambiguity, when compared to treatment O; the standard
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Ellsberg case: This is analogous to our nding that fewer subjects preferred Red to
the ambiguous choices.
Dynamic consistency and consequentialism are the two key links between condi-
tional and unconditional preferences. Dynamic consistency entails that a decision
made ex-ante, remains unchanged if preferences are updated. Consequentialism en-
tails that only valid outcomes (that are still possible) are taken into account once
preferences are updated. Individuals who display the Ellsberg paradox cannot be
both dynamically consistent as well as consequentialist. Dominiak, Dürsch, and
Lefort (2009), use a dynamic version of the three colour Ellsberg experiment, and
nd that violations of consequentialism are more common than violations of dynamic
consistency. Moreover, they nd that subjects who are initially ambiguity-neutral
when faced with a static Ellsberg urn, cannot be described by SEU theory when
faced by the dynamic version of the Ellsberg urn.
Fox and Tversky (1995), compare ambiguity preferences in comparative as well
as non-comparative contexts and conclude that ambiguity averse preferences cannot
be seen in non-comparative contexts. According to them, the popular Ellsberg
phenomenon and resultant ambiguity averse behaviour is inherently present only
in comparative contexts and do not arise when uncertain prospects are evaluated
independent of each other.
Chow and Sarin (2001), test the Fox and Tversky (1995) result in order to
ascertain whether ambiguity aversion does indeed disappear in a non-comparative
context. They nd that in their experiments, subjects always price a known bet
higher than an ambiguous one and thus, ambiguity averse behaviour is prevalent in
both comparative as well as non-comparative contexts. However, the di¤erence in
prices between the known bet and the ambiguous one was found to be higher in the
comparative context, than under independent evaluation.
3.6.3 Preference for Randomisation
There has been a debate on whether ambiguity-aversion induces a strict prefer-
ence for objective randomisation. Rai¤a (1961) argues that in the classic Ellsberg
paradox, ambiguity can be turned into risk by objectively randomising between bet-
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ting on Blue and betting on Yellow with equal probabilities. This would suggest
that an ambiguity-averse individual should have a strict preference for randomisa-
tion. However Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) show that in the CEU model, if the
capacity is convex, individuals must be indi¤erent to randomisation. The exper-
imental literature which has tested these results has typically found aversion to
objective ramdomisations in the presence of ambiguity, see Dominiak and Schnedler
(2011).
In the context of games, the analogous question is whether a strategy which is
dominated by a mixed strategy will be played. Choosing the mixed strategy is anal-
ogous to displaying a preference for randomisation. Choosing a dominated strategy
which gives a certain pay-o¤ is analogous to displaying aversion or indi¤erence to
randomisation. As Table 3.4 indicates 30% of column players choose R even when it
is dominated by a mixed strategy. Thus we see a similar pattern to the experiments
on single person decisions with evidence that many subjects display indi¤erence to
randomisation.
Liu and Colman (2009), presented subjects with gambles that were modelled
as either modied Ellsberg urn choices or as marketing strategy decisions. The
subjects had to choose between ambiguous and risky gambles, under single as well as
multiply repeated choice conditions. Similar to subject behaviour in our experiment,
it was found that subjects chose the ambiguous gambles more often in repeated
choice conditions than they did in single-choice conditions. Moreover, the number
of subjects choosing risky single choices (gambles) and ambiguous repeated choices
exceeded the number of subjects who preferred ambiguous single choices and risky
repeated choices.
One of the reasons given by Liu and Colman (2009) to explain this behaviour,
is that if subjects believed that luck was loaded against them in single events, they
might have felt safer in the repeated conditions. This is consistent with the behaviour
seen in our experiments, where subjects believed that good and bad luck would
balance out in the long run and thus, randomising between Blue=Y ellow was better
than choosing Red:
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3.7 Conclusions
The Nash equilibrium prediction that R cannot be chosen for 150 < x < 300;
was not observed in our experiments. R; which is selected by EUA, was the choice
of a majority of subjects when 120 < x < 260: There was also a signicant minority
of subjects choosing R when x = 60: Thus, there is su¢ cient indication for us to
conclude that ambiguity does indeed a¤ect the play in the coordination game.
We expected to observe a correlation between ambiguity-averse behaviour in the
game and ambiguity attitude in the Ellsberg Urn decision problem. However, we
observed only a limited relation between the two choices. On the whole, subjects
displayed more ambiguity-aversion in Battle of Sexes rounds than in the Ellsberg
Urn rounds. This suggests that subjects perceive a greater level of ambiguity in a
two-person coordination game, than a single person decision problem.
This might be because in the absence of information, subjects use the principle
of insu¢ cient reason and attach a 50 : 50 probability to the remaining 60 blue and
yellow balls left in the urn. The principle of insu¢ cient reason thus implies that
the probability distribution attached to the Red, Blue and Yellow balls in the urn
is (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
): The ambiguity aversion perceived in the Battle of Sexes game is not
su¢ cient to overcome this assumption. More generally it suggests that perceptions
of ambiguity and even attitudes to ambiguity depend on context. Hence it may
not be possible to measure ambiguity-attitude in one context and use it to predict
behaviour in another context.
It is interesting to note that there is a growing consensus that subjects nd more
ambiguity regarding real events as opposed to simulations of/actual Ellsberg urns.
It was found that when Ellsberg-type problems were put to students in a class-
environment14, a large proportion of PhD-level students were ambiguity-neutral,
while a large proportion of MBA-level students displayed ambiguity-seeking be-
haviour. However, when asked whether they preferred a payo¤ of $100 if the US
President elected in 2016 was a Democrat (or not a Democrat) or if a fair coin came
14These observations are as recorded by Gilboa (2011), in a discussion on experiments on ambi-
guity in Ellsberg experiments.
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up heads when tossed on the day of the election, a large proportion of the students
preferred betting on the coin.
One of the reasons put forth to explain this divergence in behaviour is that it is
easy to be Bayesian in an Ellsberg experiment or that the phrasing of the Ellsberg
problem might lead to it being treated as a gamble. However, when asked to make
a decision regarding a realistic scenario such as predicting the next President of
the US, the students have no naturalprior. A realistic scenario then is better at
revealing ambiguity aversion on the part of the subject.
Parallels can be drawn between this discussion and the data we observe from
our experiment, whereby subjects clearly display ambiguity-averse behaviour when
put in the scenario of the coordination game while they fail to do so in the Ellsberg
urn rounds. Subjects might be treating the Ellsberg urn rounds as a gamble, where
they readily take a chance. However, when faced with the task of coordinating
with another participant in the environment of a one-shot game with no previous
learning, the subjects have no natural prior on the basis of which to make their
decisions. The Column Player thus selects the strategy that gives a denite payo¤
of x irrespective of the Row Players decision.
One can note that our results support the Dow and Werlang (1994) model of
equilibrium under ambiguity where in the presence of ambiguity players choose their
safe strategy, rather than the model of Lo (1996). Los equilibrium predictions
coincide with the Nash for games with only pure equilibria. Thus for many of our
game experiments Los predictions coincide with Nash equilibrium. Hence for these
experiments EUA appears to predict the implications of ambiguity better.
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CHAPTER 4
DRAGON SLAYING AND DYKE BUILDING - HOW
DOES AMBIGUITY AFFECT INDIVIDUAL
BEHAVIOUR?
4.1 Introduction
This paper reports an experimental study into whether individuals decision-
making is a¤ected by ambiguity. There exists an extensive literature that shows
that ambiguity a¤ects individual decision making. However, most of this literature
documents single person decision-making. There are relatively few experiments
that analyse ambiguity in a game setting (Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008);
Kelsey and Le Roux (2012)). Games provide a valuable setting in which economic
models can be replicated in the laboratory, and are thus a valuable tool that can be
used to understand how ambiguity a¤ects decision-making.
In the experiments we run a set of linked games to test the theoretical prediction
that ambiguity has opposite e¤ects in games of strategic complements and substi-
tutes. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002), study a public good game with Knightian
uncertainty, and explain the deviation from the expected Nash equilibrium on the
basis of the inherent nature of strategic interactions taking place, i.e., on the basis
of whether the game being played was one of strategic substitutes or complements,
and the role of externalities (postive or negative) in the game.
A players best response is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function to his op-
ponents actions, in case of a game of strategic complements (resp. substitutes).
In the case of strategic substitutes, increasing the level of ambiguity would cause a
shift in equilibrium strategies in a Pareto improving direction, whereas for strategic
complements, an increase in ambiguity would cause a shift in equilibrium, away from
the ex-post Pareto optimal level. Thus it was hypothesised that ambiguity had an
adverse e¤ect in the case of games with strategic complements, but was helpful in
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attaining a Pareto e¢ cient outcome in the case of games with strategic substitutes
(Eichberger and Kelsey (2002)).
A pair of games well suited to testing this hypothesis are the best-shot and
weakest-link models of public goods. Public goods are those goods which once
supplied can be consumed by everybody, irrespective of individual contribution.
The usual assumption made regarding the socially available amount of the public
good, is that it is the function of the sum of all individual contributions made by
members of a community.
An alternative possibility is the weakest link version of public good provision,
where the amount of the public good that is socially available is equivalent to the
minimum contribution made by an individual in the community. This may be
represented as: ui (xi; x i) = min fx1; :::; xng cxi, where xi denotes the contribution
of individual i and c denotes the marginal cost of the contribution.
Consider a small island community that must build dykes to protect itself from
ooding in a storm. The success in holding back the storm waters will depend on the
minimum height or strength of the di¤erent sections of the dyke around the island.
Similarly, a weakest-link problem is observed when trying to prevent the spread of
infectious diseases, combatting the entry of illegal drugs into a country, or providing
security on the borders of a country during war-time.
In the best shot version of the public good game, the socially available amount
of the public good is equivalent to the maximum contribution made by an individual
in the community. This may be represented as: ui (xi; x i) = max fx1; :::; xng  cxi;
where xi denotes the contribution of individual i and c denotes the marginal cost of
a contribution.
Consider a medieval village that is beseiged by a dragon. It is only the knight
endeavouring to slay the dragon, who bears the cost - in this case, the chance that
he will be burnt to a crisp by the dragon. However, if the dragon is slayed, the
benets of a dragon-free village are enjoyed equally by all the village folk! Another
example of a best-shot problem is the research into nding a cure for the common
cold. The payo¤ of the best outcome (i.e., a cure) will be available to everyone.
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The games are similar except the weakest link game exhibits strategic comple-
ments, whereas the best shot exhibits a game of strategic substitutes. Henceforth,
we refer to these games as the e¤ort rounds. Our hypothesis is that the e¤ect of
ambiguity will be to decrease individualscontributions in the weakest-link version
of the game, whereas it will lead to an increase in individualscontributions in the
best-shot version of the game.
Kilka and Weber (2001) nd that subjects are more ambiguity-averse when the
returns of an investment are dependent on foreign securities than when they are
linked to domestic securities. We used a pair of strategic complement/substitute
games in which the subject is either matched with a local opponent or with a foreign
one. The foreign opponent was intended to be the analogy of the foreign securities
used in the Kilka and Weber (2001) paper. Our hypothesis was that subjects will
be more ambiguity-averse when their opponents are individuals of a foreign country
than when they are matched with local individuals. In order to test this hypothesis,
we recruited subjects both locally at the University of Exeter as well as overseas in
St. Stephens College, India.
In addition we also alternated the main games with Ellsberg Urn type decision
problems to evaluate whether individuals display ambiguity averse, ambiguity neu-
tral or ambiguity seeking behaviour. This was done in order to test whether there
was any di¤erence in ambiguity attitude between the games and the single per-
son decision problems. Moreover, it allowed us to elicit an independent measure of
subjectsambiguity-attitudes.
We nd that behaviour of the subjects is consistent with our hypothesis and that
ambiguity perceived by subjects does indeed lead to a decrease (resp. increase) in
contributions in the weakest link (resp. best shot) game. However, though subjects
display ambiguity aversion on the whole, the level of ambiguity does not become
more pronounced when they are matched against a foreign opponent.
There are several reasons that might explain why the level of ambiguity remains
unchanged against the foreign subject, one being that subjects may view a foreign
student as akin to any other local student. Given the e¤ects of globalisation, media,
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social networking and growing international student numbers, it is understandable
that political borders do not divide subjects as much as they did in the past.
Another interesting observation from the data is that even though subjects dis-
play ambiguity-averse behaviour when faced by other opponents (whether local or
foreign), they often display ambiguity seeking behaviour when faced by nature/in
single-person decision situations. This is consistent with an earlier study (Kelsey and
Le Roux (2012)), where subjects showed di¤erences in ambiguity attitudes based on
the scenario they were facing.
We believe that subjects perceive greater ambiguity when their payo¤s depend
on the decisions of other people, rather than nature which is uncontrollable. These
di¤erences in ambiguity attitude would explain why people are more concerned with
uctuations in the nancial market - which is dependent on other people, but appear
to discount the seriousness of possible natural disasters - which are beyond anyones
control.
4.1.0.0.1 Organisation of the Chapter In Section 2, we describe the theory
being tested in the experiments. Section 3 describes the experimental design em-
ployed, Section 4 consists of data analysis and results, Section 5 reviews related
literature and Section 6 provides a summary of results together with future avenues
of research.
4.2 Preferences and Equilibrium under Ambiguity
4.2.1 Modelling Ambiguity
The Ellsberg paradox is a violation of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
Savage (1954). We describe a version of the paradox that is used by us in our
experiments. Consider an urn which contains 90 balls - 30 of which are labelled
X and the other 60 are labelled an unknown mix of Y and Z. A ball is drawn at
random and the subjects payo¤depends on the letter on the ball drawn and the act
chosen by him/her. Subjects are asked to choose between acts f , g, f 0, g0 as shown
in the table below (Pay-o¤s below are shown in terms of Experimental Currency
Units - ECU):
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Table 4.1. Acts available to Subjects
30 balls 60 balls
Act X Y Z
f 100 0 0
g 0 100 0
f 0 100 0 100
g0 0 100 100
Subjects when asked to choose between f and g, generally prefer f . This
is because of the denite 1
3
chance of winning 100 ECU when compared to the
ambiguous act g. However, when the same subjects are asked to choose between f 0
and g0; they prefer g0 which gives a 2
3
chance of winning 100 ECU rather than f 0;
again avoiding the ambiguous act.
These choices are not consistent with maximising expected utility subject to
a standard probability distribution : Opting for act f rather than g would im-
ply that  (X) >  (Y ) : However choosing g0 over f 0; would then imply that
 (Y [ Z) >  (X [ Z) : Given the standard additivity properties of probabilities,
i.e.,  (X [ Z) =  (X) +  (Z) ; these two inequalities are inconsistent!
This inconsistency could be solved by representing beliefs by a non-additive set
function . Non-additive set functions allow that (X [ Z) 6= (X) + (Z), which
would be compatible with the choices in the Ellsberg paradox.
Non-additive beliefs were rst introduced and used by Schmeidler (1989). He
proposed a theory calledChoquet Expected Utility (CEU), where outcomes are
evaluated by a weighted sum of utilities, but unlike Expect Utility Theort (EUT)
the weights used depend on the acts. An intuitive exposition of Schmeidlers model,
which reformulates Savages axioms is given in Sarin and Wakker (1992). The model
is extended such that it preserves additivity in beliefs for events in the face of risk,
while permitting non-additivity for ambiguous events.
A special class of capacities, termed neo-additive capacities, was introduced by
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007), to model optimistic and pessimistic
outlooks to ambiguity. An optimistic outlook would over-estimate the likelihood of
a good outcome - inducing one to take part in a lottery, with the hope of a large
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prize. On the other hand, a pessimistic outlook would over-estimate the likelihood
of a bad outcome - such as losing all your wealth in a bad investment.
A capacity v is convex (resp. concave) if for all A and B  S; v(A [ B) +
v(A \ B)  v(A) + v(B); (resp. v(A [ B) + v(A \ B) 6 v(A) + v(B)), where
A; B are events contained in the universal set S: In CEU, convex capacities are
used to model a pessimistic outlook to ambiguity, while concave capacities model
an optimistic outlook.
Consider a two-player game with a nite set of pure strategies S; such that si
is the players own strategy and s i denotes the set of possible strategy proles for
is opponents. The payo¤ function of player i is denoted ui(si; s i): The functional
form of preferences may be represented as:
Vi = 

(1  ) max
s i2S i
ui(si; s i) +  min
s i2S i
ui(si; s i)

+(1 )Eui(si; s i); (4.1)
where Eui(si; s i), is the conventional expectation taken with respect to the prob-
ability distribution :1
Intuitively,  can be thought to be the decision makers belief. However, he
is not sure of this belief, hence it is an ambiguous belief. His condence about
this belief is modelled by (1   ); with  = 1 denoting complete ignorance and
 = 0 denoting no ambiguity. His attitude to ambiguity is measured by ; with
 = 1 denoting pure optimism and  = 0 denoting pure pessimism. If the decision-
maker has 0 <  < 1; he is neither purely optimistic nor purely pessimistic (i.e.,
ambiguity-averse), but reacts to ambiguity in a partly pessimistic way by putting a
greater weight on bad outcomes and in a partly optimistic way by putting a greater
weight on good outcomes.
4.2.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In this section we present an equilibrium concept for strategic games with ambi-
guity. In any Nash equilibrium, players are believed to behave in a manner that is
1Note that Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) write a neo additive capacity in the
form (E) = + (1  )(E): We have modied their denition to be consistent with the rest of
the literature where  is the weight on the minimum expected utility.
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consistent with the actual behaviour of their opponents. They perfectly anticipate
the actions of their opponent and can thus provide a best response to it in the form
of their own action. In the case of ambiguity, represented by non-additive beliefs,
however, the Nash idea of having consistent beliefs regarding the opponents action
and thus being able to play an optimum strategy as a response to these beliefs, needs
to be modied. We assume that players choose pure strategies, and that in equi-
librium the beliefs about these pure strategies are best responses to the opponents
actions.
Consider a game with 2 players and a nite pure strategy sets Si; i = 1; 2: Each
player is beliefs about the opponents behaviour is represented by a capacity vi on
S i; which is the set of strategy combinations which his/her opponent could choose.
Given neo-additive beliefs, the expected payo¤ that a player i could earn from a
strategy si; is determined by equation (4.1),
Vi (si; i; i; i) = iiMi (si) + i (1  i)mi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i);
(4.2)
where Mi (si) = maxs i2S i ui(si; s i) and mi (si) = mins i2S i ui(si; s i):
Unlike the scenario of Nash equilibrium where a player could attach a set of
additive probabilities to his opponents actions, in the presence of ambiguity, beliefs
are represented by capacities. The support of a capacity is a players belief of how
the opponent will act. Formally, the support of a neo-additive capacity,  (A) =
 + (1  )  (A), is dened by supp () = supp (). Thus the support of a neo-
additive belief is equal to the support of its additive component. This denition is
justied in Eichberger and Kelsey (2011).
Denition 2 A pair of neo-additive capacities (1; 

2) is an Equilibrium Under
Ambiguity (EUA) if for i = 1; 2, supp (i )  R i( i):
Here Ri denotes the best-response correspondence of player i given that his beliefs are
represented by i; and is dened by Ri(i) = Ri(i; i; i) := argmaxsi2Si Vi (si; i; i; i) :
This denition of equilibrium is taken from Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper
(2009), who adapt an earlier denition in Dow and Werlang (1994). These papers
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show that an EUA will exist for any given ambiguity-attitude of the players. In
games, one can determine i endogenously as the prediction of the players from the
knowledge of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, we treat
the degrees of optimism, i and ambiguity, i; as exogenous. In equilibrium, each
player assigns strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponents best responses given
the opponents belief. However, each player lacks condence in his/her likelihood
assessment and responds in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome,
or in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome.
Alternative approaches to equilibrium with ambiguity can be found in Klibano¤
(1993) and Lo (1996). They model players as having preferences which satisfy the
axioms of maxmin expected utility (MMEU, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Players
are allowed to have beliefs which are represented by multiple sets of conventional
probability distributions. As such, players can have mixed strategies that are chosen
from these multiple sets of additive probability distributions. They model ambiguity
aversion as a strict preference among players to randomise between strategies when
they are indi¤erent to pure strategies.
4.3 Experimental Model
In this section, we shall explain the games used by us in the experimental sessions
and discuss the Nash equilibria as well Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) for
each game. We represent the preferences of a player in a game with neo-additive
capacities. We will rst look at the e¤ort games, followed by the coordination games
and nally have a brief look at the Ellsberg decision problems being studied by us.
Henceforth we will use male pronouns he, his etc. to denote the Row Player, while
female pronouns she, hers etc. will be used to denote the Column Player.2
2This convention is for the sake of convenience only and does not bear any relation to the actual
gender of the subjects in our experiments.
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4.3.1 E¤ort Games
In the e¤ort rounds, we use a set of linked games to test our hypothesis that
ambiguity has opposite e¤ects in games of strategic complements and substitutes.
The weakest link game exhibits strategic complements, while the best shot game
exhibits a strategic substitutes game. Our hypothesis is that ambiguity will lead to
a decrease (resp. increase) in individualscontributions in the weakest link (resp.
best shot) game.
Figure 4.1. Payo¤Matrix for the Weakest Link Game
The task given to the subjects was to choose an e¤ort level from the set E =
f100; :::; 150g. They were informed that the cost of exerting an e¤ort (c) was 50%
of the e¤ort exerted, i.e., c = 0:5: In the case of the weakest link game, the payo¤ of
the subject would thus be: ui (xi; x i) = minf100; :::; 150g  0:5xi, where xi denotes
the contribution of individual i and c = 0:5 is the marginal cost of the contribution.
The nal payo¤ matrix (after subtracting costs) was provided to the subjects and
can be seen in Figure 4:1: In the best shot game scenario, the payo¤ of the subject
was: ui (xi; x i) = max f100; :::; 150g   0:5xi; where xi denotes the contribution of
individual i and c = 0:5 denotes the marginal cost of a contribution. As before, the
nal payo¤ matrix (after subtracting costs) for this scenario was provided to the
subjects and can be seen in Figure 4:2:
The Nash equilibrium of the weakest link game is for both players to coordinate
on any one of the six e¤ort levels available in E, thus f(e1; e2) 2 E2 j e1 = e2g. As a
result, there are multiple Nash equilibria possible on which the subjects can coordi-
nate. Given this multiplicity of equilibria, it is understandable that there would am-
biguity among the subjects about which e¤ort level they should opt for/coordinate
on. The equilibrium action under ambiguity would be for a subject to choose an
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Figure 4.2. Payo¤Matrix for the Best Shot Game
Figure 4.3. Two-Player Representation of the Best Shot Game
e¤ort of 100, which gives him a denite or ambiguity-safe payo¤of 50ECU (See Fig-
ure 4:1): Selecting an e¤ort level of 100; frees the subject from having to depend on
his opponents choice and/or having to achieve perfect coordination in their chosen
e¤ort levels.
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the best shot game has two pure Nash equilibria:
f(e1; e2) = ((100; 150) ; (150; 100)g : The Nash thus predicts that one of the players
will exert the highest e¤ort level (in our case 150) ; while the other will free-ride
and choose the lowest e¤ort available to him (in our case 100). Here again, we
have multiple Nash equilibria and it is expected that subjects would be ambiguous
about which one to choose. If the level of ambiguity about the opponent is high,
the equilibrium action under ambiguity is to choose highest e¤ort level, i.e., 150;
since this provides the player with a constant payo¤ irrespective of the opponents
decision.
The equilibrium actions chosen in the weakest link and best shot games are
consistent with our initial hypotesis that that ambiguity would lead to subjects
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decreasing (resp. increasing) their e¤ort levels in case of the weakest link (resp.
best shot) game.
4.3.2 Coordination Games
The coordination games used in the experimental sessions can be seen in Figure
4:4: Games (SC1) and (SC2) (as labelled in Figure 4:4) were used in Round 5
and 9, respectively, and are games with strategic complements games and positive
externalities. Games (SS1) and (SS2), were the strategic substitutes and negative
externalities games used in Round 7 and 11, respectively.
Figure 4.4. Coordination Games
Theorem 3 In the case of games with strategic complements and positive (resp.
negative) externalities, the equilibrium strategy under ambiguity of an agent i with
neo-additive beliefs, is decreasing (resp. increasing) in ambiguity.
We assume that both players are ambiguity averse, i.e.  = 0; and have prefer-
ences that can be represented by neo-additive capacities. In order to illustrate the
theorem, we use the 3x3 game in Table 4.2 , which echoes Game (SC2) used by us
in our experiment.
Suppose 0 < a < b < c < d < e < f; then the 3x3 game given by Table 4.2 has
one pure Nash eqilibribrium: (C;M): Moreover, if we order the strategy spaces as
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Table 4.2. An example of a Strategic Complements Coordination Game
L M R
T e; b e; c e; 0
C 0; b f; c f; 0
B a; d d; c d; f
follows: T < C < B and L < M < R; the game is one of strategic complements and
positive externalities.
Let the Row Player have the following beliefs : vRP (L) = 1 RP and vRP (M;R) =
0: Then the Choquet expected payo¤ for the Row Player would be:
V RP (T ) = e
V RP (C) = fRP
V RP (B) = a+ (d  a) RP :
Thus, T is the best response for the Row Player if RP  e
f
: Intuitively, this means
that if the Row Player is su¢ ciently ambiguous about the opponents behaviour, he
would opt for T , which is the ambiguity safe option.
Similarly, if the Column Player has the following beliefs : vCP (B) = 1 CP and
vCP (T;C) = 0: Then the Choquet expected payo¤ for the Column Player would be:
V CP (L) = d+ (b  d) CP
V CP (M) = c
V CP (R) = f
 
1  CP  :
Thus, M is the best response for the Column Player if CP  f c
f
: Intuitively, this
means that if the Column Player is su¢ ciently ambiguous about the opponents
behaviour, he would opt for M , which is the ambiguity safe option.
Hence, the best response for both players in a game with strategic complements
and positive externalities, given su¢ cient ambiguity is one that decreases ambiguity.

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Theorem 4 In the case of games with strategic substitutes and negative (resp. pos-
itive) externalities, the equilibrium strategy under ambiguity of an agent with neo-
additive beliefs, is decreasing (resp. increasing) in ambiguity.
We assume that both players are ambiguity averse, i.e.,  = 0; and have prefer-
ences that can be represented by neo-additive capacities. In order to prove this by
illustration, we use the 3x3 game in Table 4.3 , which echoes Game (SS2) used by
us in our experiment.
Table 4.3. An example of a Strategic Substitutes Coordination Game
L M R
T c; a a; 0 a; b
C 0; a d; d d; b
B b; c b; d b; b
Suppose 0 < a < b < c < d; then the 3x3 game given by Table 4.3 has one pure
Nash eqilibribrium: (C;M): Moreover, if we order the strategy spaces as follows:
T > C > B and L > M > R; the game is one of strategic substitutes and negative
externalities.
Let the Row Player have the following beliefs : vRP (L) = 1 RP and vRP (M;R) =
0: Then the Choquet expected payo¤ for the Row Player would be:
V RP (T ) = c+ (a  c) RP
V RP (C) = dRP
V RP (B) = b:
Thus, B is the best response for the Row Player if RP  b
d
: Intuitively, this means
that if the Row Player is su¢ ciently ambiguous about the opponents behaviour, he
would opt for B, which is the ambiguity safe option.
Let the Column Player have the following beliefs : vCP (T ) = 1   CP and
vCP (C;B) = 0: Then the Choquet expected payo¤ for the Column Player would be:
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V CP (M) = dCP
V CP (R) = b:
The Column Player would thus prefer R if, CP  b
d
: Intuitively, this means that
if the Column Player is su¢ ciently ambiguous about the opponents behaviour, he
would opt for R, which is the ambiguity safe option.
Hence, the best response for both players in a game with strategic substitutes
and negative externalities, given su¢ cient ambiguity is one that decreases ambiguity.

Games (1) and (2) are games with strategic complements games and positive
externalities. This can be veried if we x the order T < C < B and L < M <
R: Both games have one pure Nash equilibrium: (C;M): The equilibrium under
ambiguity for these games is (T;M):
Game (3) is a strategic substitues game with negative externalities and multiple
Nash equilibria, if we x T > C > B and L > M > R: The game has three pure
Nash equilibria: (T;R); (C;M) and (B;L); none of which are focal. The equilibrium
under ambiguity for this game is (B;R): It can be noted that the equilibrium under
ambiguity (B;R) is Pareto-dominated by the Nash equilibrium (C;M):
Game (4) is a strategic substitues game with negative externalities if we x
T > C > B and L > M > R: The game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (C;M):
The equilibrium under ambiguity for this game is (B;R):
4.3.3 Ellsberg Urn Experiments
The game rounds were alternated with single person decision problems regarding
an Ellsberg Urn. Subjects were presented with an urn containing 90 balls, of which
30 were labelled X, and the remainder were an unknown proportion of Y or Z balls.
Subjects were asked to pick a letter, and a ball was drawn from the urn. If the letter
of the ball drawn matched the letter chosen by the subject, it entitled the subject
to a prize. The decisions put to the subjects took the following form:
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An urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are labelled X. The remainder are either
Y or Z.
Which of the following options do you prefer?
a) Payo¤ of y if an X ball is drawn.
b) Payo¤ of 100 if a Y ball is drawn.
c) Payo¤ of 100 if a Z ball is drawn.
Payo¤ yattached to the option X was changed from round to round, with
y = 95; 90; 80; 100; 105 (in that order), to measure the ambiguity threshold of
subjects.
In our Ellsberg urn experiments, we use balls labelled X; Y and Z, rather than
following the traditional practice of using Red, Blue and Yellow coloured balls.3 This
is because in a previous set of experiments conducted by us (Kelsey and Le Roux
(2012)), we used the traditional Ellsberg Urn setup and found that subjects often
chose Blue (the ambiguous option), simply because they had a fondness for the
colour blue. Similarly, we found a large number of Chinese subjects chose Red,
because it was considered "auspicious" in Chinese culture. In this study we use
balls labelled X; Y and Z; in order to avoid any such trivial decisions being made.
4.4 Experimental Design
The games described above were used in paper-based experiments, conducted at
St. Stephens College in New Delhi, India, and at the Finance and Economics Exper-
imental Laboratory in Exeter (FEELE), UK. The experiments were conducted with
three di¤erent treatments - under the rst treatment, subjects were only matched
with locally recruited subjects; under the second treatment, Exeter subjects were
only matched with subjects recruited in India; and under the nal treatment, sub-
jects were matched against both internationally as well as locally recruited subjects,
for the purpose of payment.
3In the traditional Ellsberg urn setup, the urn would contain Red, Blue and Yellow coloured
balls. The number of Red balls in the urn would be known, while the remaining Blue and Yellow
coloured balls would be ambiguous in number.
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Treatments 1 and 3 consisted of 60 subjects each and Treatment 2 had 61 sub-
jects. In total there were 181 subjects who took part in the experiment, 81 of
whom were males and the remaining 100 were females. We were also interested
in whether or not participants had a quantitative background - 59 of the subjects
had studied a quantitative subject such as Biochemistry, Electronic Engineering or
Astrophysics, while 122 of the subjects had studied a non-quantitative subject such
as History, Philosophy, or International Relations. Each session lasted a maximum
of 45 minutes including payment.
Subjects rst read through a short, comprehensive set of instructions at their
own pace, following this the instructions were also read out to all the participants
in general. The subjects were asked to ll out practice questions to check that they
understood the games correctly. Once the practice questions had been answered and
discussed, the actual set of experimental questions were handed out to the subjects.
Subjects were randomly assigned the role of either a Row Player or a Column Player
at the beginning of the experiment, for the purpose of matching in the coordination
games, and remained in the same role for the rest of the experiment.
The experiment consisted of 11 rounds, starting with a decision regarding a
strategic complements/substitutes game, which was then alternated with an Ellsberg
Urn decision, such that there were a total of 6 game rounds and 5 Ellsberg urn
rounds. Each subject had to select one option per round: An e¤ort level in case of the
e¤ort rounds, Top/Centre/Bottom if they were a Row Player or Left/Middle/Right
if they were a Column Player, and in case of the Ellsberg urn rounds X, Y or Z.
In the Ellsberg urn rounds, the pay-o¤s attached to drawing a Y or Z ball were
held constant at 100, while those attached to drawing an X ball varied as 95, 90,
80; 100; 105:
Once subjects had made all 11 decisions, a throw of dice determined one game
round and one Ellsberg urn round for which subjects would be paid. We picked
one round at random for payment in order to prevent individuals from self-insuring
against payo¤ risks across rounds (See Charness and Genicot (2009)). If all rounds
count equally towards the nal payo¤, subjects are likely to try and accumulate a
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high payo¤ in the rst few rounds and then care less about how they decide in the
following rounds. In contrast, if subjects know that they will be paid for a random
round, they treat each decision with care. Playersdecisions were matched according
to a predetermined matching, and pay-o¤s were announced.
Instead of using a real urn we used a computer to simulate the drawing of a ball
from the urn.4 The computer randomly assigned the number of Y and Z balls in
the urn so that they summed to 60, while keeping the number of X balls xed at
30 and the total number of balls in the urn at 90: The computer then simulated
an independent ball draw for each subject. If the label of the ball drawn by the
computer matched that chosen by the subject, it entitled him to the payo¤ specied
in the round chosen for payment.
The total earnings of a subject was the sum of a show-up fee, payo¤ earned in
the chosen game round and payo¤ earned in the chosen Ellsberg urn round. Average
payment made to Indian subjects was Rs:440 ($5:50 approximately); and to Exeter
subjects was $6:50. The maximum payment made to an Indian subject was Rs:600
($7:50 approximately), and to Exeter subjects was $8:40:
4.5 Data Analysis and Results
4.5.1 Behaviour in E¤ort Rounds
The task of the subjects in e¤ort rounds was to choose an e¤ort level from the set
E = f100; :::; 150g. The cost of exerting an e¤ort (c) was 50% of the e¤ort exerted,
i.e., c = 0:5: The Nash equilibrium of the weakest link game is for both players to
coordinate on any one of the six possible e¤ort levels. As a result, there are multiple
Nash equilibria on which the subjects can coordinate. In the best shot game, the
Nash equilibrium predicts that one of the players will exert the highest e¤ort level
(in our case 150) ; while the other will free-ride and choose the lowest e¤ort available
to him (in our case 100).
4The computer simulated urn can be found at the following link:
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/dk210/Ellsberg-110708.xls.
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The equilibrium action under ambiguity is to choose the lowest e¤ort level, i.e.,
100; in the case of the weakest link game and to choose the highest e¤ort level,
i.e., 150; in the case of the best shot game. In both scenarios, the equilibrium
action under ambiguity provides the player with a constant payo¤ irrespective of the
opponents decision. Moreover, it is expected that ambiguity would lead to subjects
reducing their e¤ort levels in case of the weakest link game, while increasing their
e¤ort levels in case of the best shot game.
4.5.1.0.2 Treatment I In this treatment, subjects were matched against other
locally recruited subjects only. Goeree and Holt (2001), study a minimum e¤ort
coordination game similar to this treatment, where subjects faced a marginal cost
of either c = 0:1 or c = 0:9: They found that for low marginal costs (c = 0:1),
subjects choose high e¤ort levels and for high marginal costs (c = 0:9) ; a majority
of subjects choose low e¤ort levels.
In our game with c = 0:5; we nd that 22% (13) of the subjects chose an e¤ort
level of 100 in the weakest link game round. This is the e¤ort level at which the
subject has a constant payo¤ which is independent of the opponents action, and is
the equilibrium action under ambiguity (See Table 4.4). Moreover, 65% (39) of the
subjects chose an e¤ort level between 100  120, i.e., the lower end of the spectrum
of e¤ort choices. This conrms our hypothesis that the e¤ect of ambiguity would
lead to subjects reducing their e¤ort levels, when compared to Nash predictions. A
small number of subjects (9); chose the maximum e¤ort level 150: However, they
were in a very small minority.
In the best shot game round, we nd that 47% (28) of the subjects chose the
e¤ort level 150 (the equilibrium action under uncertainty): Moreover, ambiguity has
led to subjects increasing their e¤ort levels with 67% (40) of the subjects choosing
an e¤ort level in the high range of 130  150.
While analysing the manner in which people switch e¤ort levels between the
two scenarios, we nd that 55% (33) of the subjects switch from a low e¤ort level
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Table 4.4. Treatment I - E¤ort Levels vs. Local Opponent
Weakest Link Best Shot
100 13 22% 12 20%
110 4 7% 3 5%
120 22 37% 5 8%
130 10 17% 8 13%
140 2 3% 4 7%
150 9 15% 28 47%P
60 60
Figure 4.5. Treatment I - Subject Behaviour in E¤ort Rounds
in the weakest link round to a higher e¤ort level in the best shot game (Please
see Table 4.5). These subjects display ambiguity averse behaviour, which is in line
with Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). Interestingly, we nd that 25% (15) of subjects
display a preference for ambiguity, choosing a high e¤ort level in the weakest link
game and then switching to a low e¤ort level in the best shot round. We also note
that 20% (12) of subjects did not change their chosen e¤ort levels between the two
rounds - these subjects could be displaying ambiguity neutral behaviour.5
5Alternatively, unchanged e¤ort levels might be caused by subjects were trying to be consistent.
Another trivial reason could be that, there are subjects who having chosen an e¤ort level in the
previous round, do not want to go to the trouble of thinking again and stick with their previous
decision.
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Table 4.5. Switching E¤ort Levels between Weakest Link and Best Shot Game
Treatment I Treatment II
Low to High 33 55% 28 46%
High to Low 15 25% 20 33%
Constant 12 20% 13 21%P
60 61
4.5.1.0.3 Treatment II In this treatment, subjects were matched with foreign
opponents only. In the weakest link round, only 8% (5) of the subjects chose e¤ort
level 100 (See Table 4.6). Even though the ambiguity-safe e¤ort level has been
chosen by a small minority, the e¤ect of ambiguity can be seen in the sizeable 59%
(36) of subjects who have chosen the lower end of the e¤ort spectrum 100  120.
In the best shot game, 43% (26) of the subjects chose an e¤ort of 150, which is
the equilibrium action under ambiguity, while 59% (36) of the subjects chose in the
high e¤ort range of 130  150. It is clear that ambiguity is resulting in e¤orts being
concentrated at the lower end, in case of the weakest link game; and at the higher
end, in case of the best shot game (See Figure 4:6):
Table 4.6. Treatment II - E¤ort Levels vs. Foreign Opponent
Weakest Link Best Shot
100 5 8% 13 21%
110 3 5% 6 10%
120 28 46% 6 10%
130 9 15% 6 10%
140 6 10% 4 7%
150 10 16% 26 43%P
61 61
Table 4.5 , summarises the manner in which people switch e¤ort levels between
the two scenarios. We nd that 46% (28) of the subjects switch from a low e¤ort
level in the weakest link round to a higher e¤ort level in the best shot game, display-
ing ambiguity averse behaviour. Moreover, 33% (20) of subjects display ambiguity
seeking behaviour, choosing a high e¤ort level in the weakest link round followed by
a lower e¤ort level in the best shot game, while 21% (13) of subjects do not change
their chosen e¤ort levels between the two rounds.
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Figure 4.6. Treatment II - Subject Behaviour in E¤ort Rounds
4.5.1.0.4 Treatment III In this treatment, subjects were matched with both
local as well as foreign opponents to check whether this would have an impact (if
any) on the level of ambiguity perceived by them, and their attitude towards such
ambiguity. Table 4.7 and Figure 4:7; provide a summary of subject behaviour in
this treatment.6
In the weakest link round, 27% (16) of the Exeter subjects chose an e¤ort level of
100 against a local subject while 28% (17) chose it against the Indian subject. The
di¤erence in the number of people choosing the lowest e¤ort level vs. the foreign
opponent is very marginal. On the whole, 58% (35) of the subjects chose an e¤ort
level between 100   120, i.e., the lower end of the spectrum of e¤ort choices vs.
the local subject, while 53% (32) chose an e¤ort in that range against the foreign
subject. There are more people choosing a low e¤ort level vs. the local subject than
vs. the foreign subject.
Another point that may be noted, is that 22% (12) of subjects chose 150 (the
highest e¤ort) against the foreign subject. Subjects had been told that the foreign
6Henceforth, in Treatment III tables, a Local Subject is referred to as L.S. and a Foreign Subject
is referred to as F.S.
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opponents were recruited at one of the Indias most famous colleges, which had
produced a number of distinguished alumni - subjects may have perceived this as a
signal that the Indian subjects would be more willing to exert a greater e¤ort and
coordinate on a higher joint payo¤, because of this background information.
Table 4.7. Treatment III - E¤ort Levels vs. both Local Subject and Foreign Subject
Weakest Link vs. L.S. Weakest Link vs. F.S. Best Shot vs. L.S Best Shot vs. F.S.
100 16 27% 17 28% 17 28% 21 35%
110 3 5% 3 5% 4 7% 4 7%
120 16 27% 12 20% 6 10% 1 2%
130 10 17% 8 13% 4 7% 4 7%
140 7 12% 7 12% 5 8% 4 7%
150 8 13% 13 22% 24 40% 26 43%P
60 60 60 60
In the best shot game, we nd that 40% (24) of the subjects chose 150 vs. the
local subject, while 43% (26) chose it vs. the foreign subject. Moreover, while 55%
(33) of the subjects chose in the high e¤ort range of 130   150, when making a
choice against the local subject, 57% (34) chose this e¤ort range against the foreign
subject. Again, we nd that 28% (17) and 35% (21) of subjects chose e¤ort level
100 against the local and foreign subjects respectively.
Even though we do not see a huge disparity in the e¤ort choices versus the
local and foreign oppoenent, Figure 6 shows that ambiguity does explain (most of)
the deviations from Nash equilibrium. In the case of the weakest link game, most
responses are concentrated towards the lower end of the spectrum between 100 120;
while in case of the best shot game, responses are concentrated towards the high
end, i.e., at 150.
4.5.2 Behaviour in Coordination Game Rounds
4.5.2.1 Row Player Behaviour
Henceforth, SC1 refers to Round 5, SC2 refers to Round 9, SS1 refers to Round
7 and SS2 refers to Round 11. The task of the Row Player in the coordination game
rounds was to choose between Top (T ), Centre (C) and Bottom (B): Games SC1;
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Figure 4.7. Treatment III - Subject Behaviour in E¤ort Rounds
SC2 and SS2 have one pure Nash equilibrium: (C;M); while SS1 has three pure
Nash equilibria: (T;R); (C;M) and (B;L): The equilibrium action under ambiguity
for the Row Player is to choose T in case of games SC1 and SC2 and to choose B
in case of games SS1 and SS2:
4.5.2.1.1 Treatment I This treatment consisted of matching subjects against
other locally recruited subjects only and as such was the base treatment.7 See Table
4.8 and Figure 4:8; for a summary of Row Player behaviour in Treatment I.
We nd that of the 30 row players who took part in this treatment, 63% (19)
and 73% (22) of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe strategy T in SC1 and SC2,
respectively. In comparison, only 13% (4) and 17% (5) of subjects opted for C,
which is the choice under Nash.
We conducted a binomial test with the null that the ambiguity-safe option T is
played as often as C + B (H0 : prob(Top) = 0:5; prob(Centre + Bottom) = 0:5);
against the alternative that T was played more often than C+B (H1 : prob(Top) >
7A probit regression showed that the dummy variable for location (Delhi=Exeter) does not
have a signicant impact on choosing the ambiguity safe option. This implies that the behaviour
of Indian subjects was very similar to the Exeter subjects, when they are matched against other
local opponents. Thus for the purpose of analysing subject behaviour in Treatment I, we can
combine the responses of the Delhi subjects with the Exeter subjects without loss of e¢ ciency.
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prob(Centre + Bottom)):8 We reject the null at a 5% level of signicance for SC1
and at a 1% level of signicance for SC2. Subjects choose the ambiguity-safe option
signicantly more often than either of the other two options available to them, in
the strategic complement games.
Table 4.8. Treatment I - Row Player Behaviour vs. Local Opponent
SC1 SC2 SS1 SS2
Top 19 63% 22 73% 3 10% 2 7%
Centre 4 13% 5 17% 12 40% 8 27%
Bottom 7 23% 3 10% 15 50% 20 67%P
30 30 30 30
In the strategic substitutes game SS1; we nd that 40% (12) of subjects, chose
C (which is a choice under Nash) while 50% (15) of subjects chose B (which is the
choice under EUA). It is interesting to note that when multiple Nash equilibria are
present, 40% of the subjects seem to be selecting the Nash (C;M)  which gives
an equal payo¤ to both players. This might indicate that fairness constraints a¤ect
these subjects more than ambiguity. However in SS2, 67% (20) of subjects chose
the ambiguity-safe strategy B, while only 27% (8) subjects chose C which is the
choice under Nash.
We conducted a binomial test with the null that the ambiguity-safe option B
is played as often as T + C (H0 : prob(Bottom) = 0:5; prob(Top + Centre) =
0:5); against the alternative that T was played more often than C + B (H1 :
prob(Bottom) > prob(Top + Centre)):9 We fail to reject the null for SS1 where
subjects play B as often as T +C; but reject the null at 5% for SS2; where subjects
play the ambiguity-safe option B more often than either of the alternatives.
8Henceforth, we shall refer to this as Binomial Test A, when using the same null and alternative
hypothesis as described here.
9Henceforth, we shall refer to this as Binomial Test B, when using the same null and alternative
hypothesis as described here.
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Figure 4.8. Treatment I - Row Player Behaviour vs. Local Opponent
4.5.2.1.2 Treatment II This treatment consisted of matching Exeter subjects
against an Indian opponent. Subjects were told that the same experiments had
been run in India and that they would be matched up against an Indian subject
whose responses had been already collected. Cultural studies conducted in the
past have shown that western societies are individual-oriented, while Asian cultures
tend to be collectivist. Members of Asian cultures have larger social networks that
they can fall back upon in the event of an emergency/loss. This makes them more
risk/ambiguity-seeking than their western counterparts (Weber and Hsee (1998)).
As such, we expected that subjects would be more ambiguous when matched against
opponents who are from a di¤erent socio-cultural background than themselves. See
Table 4.9 and Figure 4:9; for a summary of Row Player behaviour in Treatment II.
We nd that of the 30 row players who took part in this treatment, 85% (25)
and 87% (26) of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe strategy T in SC1 and SC2,
respectively. In comparison, only 7% (2) and 13% (4) of subjects opted for C, which
is the choice under Nash. When compared to the base treatment, it is clear that
subjects perceived greater ambiguity in this situation and a clear majority chose to
play the ambiguity-safe option.
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Binomial Test A (null and alternative as described in Treatment I), can be re-
jected at 1% for both SC1 as well as SC2: Subjects chose the ambiguity safe option
signicantly more often than either of the other two options available to them.
Table 4.9. Treatment II - Row Player Behaviour vs. Foreign Opponent
SC1 SC2 SS1 SS2
Top 25 83% 26 87% 2 7% 0 0%
Centre 2 7% 4 13% 13 43% 10 33%
Bottom 3 10% 0 0% 15 50% 20 67%P
30 30 30 30
In the strategic substitutes game SS1; we nd that 43% (13) of subjects, chose
C (which is a choice under Nash) while 50% (15) of subjects chose B (which is the
choice under EUA). In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, 43% of the subjects
select the Nash (C;M) rather than the other Nash eqilibrium options (T;R) or
(B;L). Even in this treatment where we perceive heightened ambiguity on the part
of the subjects, about half of them opt for the Nash outcome which would result
in equitable payo¤s for both players. In the second strategic subtitutes game, SS2,
67% (20) of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe strategy B, while 33% (10) subjects
chose C which is the choice under Nash.
Binomial Test B cannot be rejected for SS1; where subjects play B as often as
T + C: However, we do reject the null at a 5% level of signicance for SS2; where
subjects play the ambiguity-safe option B more often.
4.5.2.1.3 Treatment III In Treatment III, subjects were asked to make deci-
sions versus both the local as well as the foreign opponent. They were allowed to
choose di¤erent actions against the foreign oppoent and the domestic one. See Table
4.10 and Figure 4:10; for a summary of Row Player behaviour in SC1 and SC2.
In SC1, 67% (20) of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe strategy T against the
local subject (L.S.), while and 63% (19) of subjects chose it against the foreign
subject (F.S). Fewer subjects chose the ambiguity-safe option against the foreign
90
Figure 4.9. Treatment II - Row Player Behaviour vs. Foreign Opponent
opponent than against the local opponent. In comparison, the Nash was played by
13% (4) and 10% (3) of subjects versus local and foreign opponent, respectively.
In SC2; 67% (20) and 50% (15) of subjects chose the safe strategy T against the
local and foreign opponent respectively. It can be noted again that fewer subjects
pick the ambiguity safe option against the foreign opponent. In comparison, 27%
(8) and 33% (10) of subjects opted for C, the choice under Nash.
Table 4.10. Treatment III - Row Player Behaviour vs. both Local Subject and
Foreign Subject
SC1 vs. L.S. SC1 vs. F.S. SC2 vs. L.S. SC2 vs. F.S.
Top 20 67% 19 63% 20 67% 15 50%
Centre 4 13% 3 10% 8 27% 10 33%
Bottom 6 20% 8 27% 2 7% 5 17%P
30 30 30 30
As before, we conducted Binomial Test A for the Row Player. We reject the
null at 5% for both SC1 and SC2; when looking at responses against the local
opponent. However, we fail to reject the null when analysing choices against the
foreign opponent. Subjects choose the ambiguity-safe option signicantly more often
against the local opponent than the foreign subject.
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Figure 4.10. Treatment III - Row Player Behaviour vs. Both Local and Foreign
Subjects
Table 4.11. Treatment III - Row Player Behaviour vs. both Local Subject and
Foreign Subject
SS1 vs. L.S. SS1 vs. F.S. SS2 vs. L.S. SS2 vs. F.S.
Top 1 3% 1 3% 1 3% 0 0%
Centre 9 30% 14 47% 11 37% 10 33%
Bottom 20 67% 15 50% 18 60% 20 67%P
30 30 30 30
We nd similar behaviour in the strategic substitutes game SS1 : 67% (20) and
50% (15) of subjects chose B, the choice under EUA, against the local and foreign
subject respectively. Again, fewer subjects took the ambiguity-safe option versus
foreign subject than against Indian subject. See Table 4.11 and Figure 4:11; for a
summary of Row Player behaviour in SC1 and SC2.
In contrast, in SS2, 60% (18) and 67% (20) of subjects chose the ambiguity-
safe strategy B against the local and foreign opponent respectively. The number of
subjects choosing the ambiguity-safe option against the foreign subject is slightly
larger in this round - though very slightly.
Binomial Test B cannot be rejected for SS1 when subjects are faced by a foreign
opponent, but can be rejected at a 5% level of signicance for choices against the
local subject. When analysing decisions for SS2, we reject the null at 5% level
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of signicance for decisions pertaining to the foreign subject; but fail to reject it
against local subject.
Figure 4.11. Treatment III - Row Player Behaviour vs. Both Local and Foreign
Subjects
It can be noted that the behaviour in SS2 supports our hypothesis that when
faced by both the foreign subject and the local subject simultaneously, the safe
act would be taken more often against foreign subject. One of the reasons for not
picking the ambiguity-safe option more often against the foreign subject, may be
that subjects were trying to be dynamically consistent when making their choices.
Another reason for this behaviour could be that subjects could see the other local
subjects sitting in the experimental laboratory, whereas the foreign subject seemed
very far away. They thus chose to play cautiously against the local subject, while
taking their chances against the foreign subject.
4.5.2.2 Column Player Behaviour
The task of the Column Player in the coordination game rounds was to choose
between Left (L), Middle (M) and Right (R): Recall, that games SC1; SC2 and
SS2 have one pure Nash equilibrium: (C;M); while SS1 has three pure Nash equi-
libria: (T;R); (C;M) and (B;L): The equilibrium action under ambiguity for the
Columnn Player is to choose M in case of games SC1 and SC2 and to choose R in
case of games SS1 and SS2:
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4.5.2.2.1 Treatment I In this treatment, subjects were only matched against
other locally recruited subjects and as such was the base treatment. See Table 4.12
and Figure 4:12; for a summary of Column Player behaviour in Treatment I.
We nd that of the 30 column players who took part in this treatment, 70% (21)
and 87% (26) of subjects chose the Nash strategyM in SC1 and SC2, respectively.10
We conducted a binomial test with the null that M is played as often as L + R
(H0 : prob(Middle) = 0:5; prob(Left+Right) = 0:5); against the alternative thatM
was played more often than L+R (H1 : prob(Middle) > prob(Left+Right)):11 We
reject the null at a 5% level of signicance for SC1 and at a 1% level of signicance
for SC2. Subjects choose the Nash option signicantly more often than either of
the other two options available to them, in the strategic complement games.
Table 4.12. Treatment I - Column Player Behaviour vs. Local Opponent
SC1 SC2 SS1 SS2
Left 6 20% 4 13% 2 7% 1 3%
Middle 21 70% 26 87% 4 13% 6 20%
Right 3 10% 0 0% 24 80% 23 77%P
30 30 30 30
In the strategic substitutes games SS1 and SS2; we nd that 80% (24) and 77%
(23) of subjects choose the ambiguity-safe strategy R. In comparison, only 13%
(4) and 20% (6) of subjects chose M , which is the choice under Nash. A binomial
test with the null that the ambiguity-safe option R is played as often as L + M
(H0 : prob(Right) = 0:5; prob(Left + Middle) = 0:5); against the alternative that
R was played more often than L+M (H1 : prob(Right) > prob(Left+Middle))12;
is rejected at 1% for SS1 and at 5% for SS2.
10Note in the case of SC1 and SC2, the equilibrium action under ambiguity coincides with the
Nash strategy, for the Column player.
11Henceforth, we shall refer to this as Binomial Test C, when using the same null and alternative
hypothesis as described here.
12Henceforth, we shall refer to this as Binomial Test D, when using the same null and alternative
hypothesis as described here.
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Figure 4.12. Treatment I - Column Player Behaviour vs. Local Opponent
4.5.2.2.2 Treatment II In this treatment, Exeter subjects were only matched
against an Indian opponent. Subjects were informed they would be paired against an
Indian subject whose responses had already been collected. As mentioned before,
we expect subjects to be more ambiguous when matched against opponents who
are from a di¤erent socio-cultural background than themselves, as compared to the
base treatment. See Table 4.13 and Figure 4:13; for a summary of Column Player
behaviour in Treatment II.
In rounds SC1 and SC2; of the 31 column players who took part in this treat-
ment, 87% (27) and 100% (31) of subjects choose the Nash strategyM , respectively.
Binomial Test C can be rejected at a 1% level for both SC1 as well as SC2:
Table 4.13. Treatment II - Column Player Behaviour vs. Foreign Opponent
SC1 SC2 SS1 SS2
Left 4 13% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0%
Middle 27 87% 31 100% 8 26% 11 35%
Right 0 0% 0 0% 22 71% 20 65%P
31 31 31 31
In games SS1 and SS2;we nd that 71% (22) and 65% (20) of subjects choose
the ambiguity-safe strategy R. In comparison, 26% (8) and 35% (11) of subjects
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chose M , which is the choice under Nash. Binomial Test D is rejected at 1% for SS1
and at 5% for SS2.
Figure 4.13. Treatment II - Column Player Behaviour vs. Foreign Opponent
When faced by foreign opponents, subjects did indeed choose the ambiguity-safe
option signicantly more often than the other actions available to them. Moreover,
we encouraged subjects to write a short account at the end of the experiment, about
their reactions and what they were thinking about when they made their choices
during the experiment. A number of subjects concluded that they preferred to stick
with a safe (but denite) payo¤ rather than take a chance and lose out, since they
were not sure what prompted the foreign opponents decision choices. It was clear
that the situation was perceived by them as being ambiguous, and they were willing
to forego the possibility of getting a higher payo¤, in order to get a certain payo¤.
4.5.2.2.3 Treatment III In this treatment, subjects were matched against both
local as well as foreign opponents and as such, we expect the ambiguity perceived
by the subjects to be higher in the case of a foreign opponent. See Table 4.14 and
Figure 4:14; for a summary of Column Player behaviour in SC1 and SC2.
In SC1; of the 30 column players took part in this treatment, 93% (28) and
83% (25) of subjects chose M (the Nash strategy) against the local and the foreign
opponent, respectively. It is clear that a large majority of the subjects are choosing
the Nash; however, fewer subjects choose it against the foreign subject. In SC2,
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93% (28) and 90% (27) of subjects chose the Nash against the local and foreign
subject respectively.
We conducted Binomial Test C and reject the null at a 1% level of signicance for
both SC1 as well as SC2; irrespective of whether the subject was faced by a local
subject or a foreign one.
Table 4.14. Treatment III - Column Player Behaviour vs. both Local Subject and
Foreign Subject
SC1 vs. L.S. SC1 vs. F.S. SC2 vs. L.S. SC2 vs. F.S.
Left 2 7% 5 17% 2 7% 3 10%
Middle 28 93% 25 83% 28 93% 27 90%
Right 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%P
30 30 30 30
Figure 4.14. Treatment III - Column Player Behaviour vs. Both L.S. and F.S.
In game SS1;we nd that 70% (21) and 77% (23) of subjects chose the ambiguity-
safe strategy R; against the local and foreign subject respectively. In comparison,
27% (8) and 23% (7) of subjects chose M , which is the choice under Nash. In SS2;
half the subjects (15) chose the ambiguity-safe strategy while the other half chose
the Nash against the local opponent. When faced with the foreign opponent, 60%
(18) chose the ambiguity-safe option while 40% (12) chose the choice under Nash.
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It can be noted that in both the strategic substitutes rounds, the ambiguity-safe
option was chosen more often against the foreign subject.
As before, we conduct Binomial Test D and reject the null at a 5% level of
signicance for decisions against the local opponent and at a 1% level for decisions
against an foreign opponent for SS1. We fail to reject the null for SS2, since the
decisions are very close to the 50   50 mark. However, it is clear in both SS1 as
well as SS2; that the ambiguity-safe option is chosen more often against the foreign
subject.
Table 4.15. Treatment III - Column Player Behaviour vs. both Local Subject and
Foreign Subject
SS1 vs. L.S. SS1 vs. F.S. SS2 vs. L.S. SS2 vs. F.S.
Left 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Middle 8 27% 7 23% 15 50% 12 40%
Right 21 70% 23 77% 15 50% 18 60%P
30 30 30 30
Figure 4.15. Treatment III - Column Player Behaviour vs. Both L.S. and F.S.
4.5.3 Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
The strategic complement and substitute games were alternated with Ellsberg
Urn decisions, in order to elicit an ambiguity threshold of the subjects. Moreover,
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it enabled us to evaluate whether the ambiguity of subject remained consistent
between single player decision-making situations and situations where they were
faced by ambiguity created by interaction with other players.
In the Ellsberg urn rounds, subjects were o¤ered an urn containing 90 balls, of
which 30 were labelled X; while the remaining were an unknown mix of Y or Z:
Subjects were asked to pick a letter and if this matched the letter of the ball drawn
from the urn, they would earn a payo¤. The payo¤ attached to Y and Z balls
was 100 ECU; and the payo¤ attached to X balls was 95; 90; 85; 100 or 105 ECU;
depending on the round being played.
As can be seen in Table 4.16 ; when the payo¤ attached to X was 100 (the stan-
dard Ellsberg urn decision problem), a large majority of subjects, i.e., 73% (133) of
subjects chose X, while 27% (48) chose to bet on Y and Z:13 This result is consistent
with previous Ellsberg urn studies, with most subjects displaying ambiguity-averse
behaviour by choosing X, which is the known proportion of balls in the urn.
When there is a premium attached to X, i.e., the payo¤ on X is 105 ECU while
the payo¤ for choosing Y or Z is 100 ECU; a majority of 73% (132) of subjects opt
for X: However, what is more interesting to note is that 27% (49) of subjects opt
for Y + Z: This is very interesting because these subjects are willing to take a cut
in payo¤, in order to choose Y or Z - the balls whose proportion is unknown! We
believe this captures ambiguity-seeking behaviour on the part of the subjects.
Table 4.16. Subject Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
X = 105 X = 100 X = 95 X = 90 X = 85
X 132 73% 133 73% 47 26% 67 37% 35 19%
Y + Z 49 27% 48 27% 134 74% 114 63% 146 81%P
181 181 181 181 181
As can be seen from Figure 4:16, even a small cut in the payo¤ of X from 100
to 95 ECU; leads to a big jump in the number of subjects choosing Y + Z: When
13We consider the sum of the people who chose Y and Z, rather than the number of people who
chose Y or Z balls individually, in order to negate any e¤ect of people choosing Y just because it
appeared before Z on the choice set.
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X = 95; 74% (134) of subjects choose Y + Z: This goes up substantially to 81%
(146) of subjects choosing Y +Z; when the payo¤ of X = 85: Most subjects are not
ambiguity-averse enough to take a cut in payo¤, in order to continue choosing X.
It is interesting to note here that 19% (35) of subjects chose X; even when X = 85;
thus displaying strong ambiguity-averse behaviour.
Figure 4.16. Subject Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
We conducted a binomial test with the null hypothesis that X was chosen as
often as Y + Z combined (H0 : prob(X) = 0:5, prob(Y + Z) = 0:5), against the
alternative that Y + Z was chosen more often (H1 : prob(Y + Z) > prob(X)): We
fail to reject the null when X = 105 and X = 100; at these payo¤s subjects choose
X signicantly more often than Y +Z:14 However, for X = 95; 90 and 85; the null is
rejected at a 1% level of signicance. In these rounds subjects prefer the ambiguous
choice, i.e., Y + Z balls.
On the whole, subjects seem to prefer bettingon Y and Z. Responses gathered
from the subjects showed that subjects viewed the urn rounds as gambles, since
the computer could have picked any of the three options and Y or Z balls could
have been more in number than X balls, that were capped at 30 balls. The subjects
thus displayed an optimistic attitude towards ambiguity, choosing Y + Z rather
14This is signicant at a 1% level of signicance.
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than X. Moreover, some subjects treated these rounds as based on luck rather than
reasoning.15
4.6 Related Literature
4.6.1 Papers on Games
The study that is closest to our experiment in the existing literature, is the the-
oretical paper by Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). They nd that in a game with pos-
itive (resp. negative) externalities, ambiguity prompts a player to put an increased
(resp. decreased) weight on the lowest of his opponents actions. The marginal
benet that the player gets as a result of his own action then, gets decreased (resp.
increased) in the case of a game with strategic complements (resp. substitutes).
In the presence of positive externalities, players often have the incentive to use a
strategy below the Pareto optimal level, and so, the resultant Nash equilibrium is
ine¢ cient.
In the case of strategic substitutes, increasing the level of ambiguity would cause
a shift in equilibrium strategies towards a Pareto e¢ cient outcome, whereas for
strategic complements, an increase in ambiguity would cause a shift in equilibrium,
away from the ex-post Pareto e¢ cient outcome. Thus it was hypothesised that
ambiguity had an adverse e¤ect in case of games with strategic complements, but
was helpful in attaining a Pareto e¢ cient outcome in the case of games with strate-
gic substitutes (Eichberger and Kelsey (2002)). Ambiguity thus causes a decrease
in equilibrium actions in a game of strategic complements and positive externali-
ties or one that consists of the reverse case, i.e., strategic substitutes and negative
externalities.
Di Mauro and Castro (2008) conduct a set of experiments designed to test the
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) hypothesis that it is ambiguity that causes an increase
in contribution towards the public good, and not altruism. In order to negate the
chance that altruism, or a feeling of reciprocation prompted the subjectsactions,
15One subject in particular noted thatThe urn question is pure luck, because majority of the
unmarked balls are either Y or Z; and choosing either is a gamble.
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the subjects were informed that their opponent would be a virtual agent and the
opponents play was simulated by a computer.
Subjects played in two scenarios, one with risk, the other with ambiguity. It was
noted that contributions were signicantly higher when the situation was one of am-
biguity. The results showed that there was indeed evidence that ambiguity was the
cause of increased contribution, as hypothesised by Eichberger and Kelsey (2002),
and not altruism. This is akin to the results found in our paper that ambiguity
signicantly a¤ects the decisions made by individuals, in a manner that depends
directly on the strategic nature of the game in consideration.
Another paper that studies strategic ambiguity in games experimentally, is Eich-
berger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008). While in our paper we look at subjects be-
haviour when faced with local and foreign opponents, they studied games in which
subjects faced either a granny (who was described as being ignorant of economic
strategy), a game theorist (who was described as a successful professor of economics),
or another student as an opponent. The key hypothesis being tested was that am-
biguity has the opposite e¤ect in games of strategic complements and substitutes.
Ambiguity averse actions were chosen signicantly more often against the granny
than against the game theorist, irrespective of whether the game was one of strategic
complements, strategic substitutes or one with multiple equilibria. When the level
of ambiguity the subjects faced while playing the granny was compared to the level
of ambiguity the subjects faced playing against each other, it was found that the
players still found the granny a more ambiguous opponent.
The paper also tested whether ambiguity had the opposite e¤ect in games of
strategic complements and substitutes. Similar to our study where we found that
ambiguity had opposite e¤ects depending on the strategic nature of the game, Eich-
berger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008) too conclude that comparative statics broadly
supported the theoretical prediction. Subjects were also found to react to variations
in the level of ambiguity, which was tested by altering the cardinal payo¤ in the
game while keeping the ordinal payo¤ structure unchanged. It can thus be seen that
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subjects react not only to ambiguity on the part of the opponent being faced, but
also to subtle changes in the payo¤ structures of the experiment being conducted.
Nagel, Heinemann, and Ockenfels (2009) consider strategic uncertainty in one-
shot coordination games with strategic complementarities. In the study conducted
by them, they elicit certainty equivalents for situations where a subjects payo¤
depends on his opponentsbehaviour. In each coordination game a subject had a
choice between a safe amount X; which was allowed to vary such that X  e15;
and an option where the payo¤ was dependant on his opponents decision. In the
uncertain option, a subject could earn e15 if at least a fraction k 2 (0; 1] of his
opponents chose the same option as him, else he earned nothing. Subjects were
found to choose the safe option when X was large, while they chose the uncertain
option for small values of X. The point at which a subject switched from the safe
option to the uncertain one, was interpreted as his certainty equivalent for strategic
uncertainty. This is analogous to situations in which the risk attitude of a subject
is measured with respect to lotteries.
While our study concentrated on investigating individual behaviour in the pres-
ence of ambiguity, Keller, Sarin, and Sounderpandian (2007) investigate whether
individuals deciding together as pairs (termed dyads in the paper) display ambigu-
ity averse behaviour. Participants were initially asked to state how much they were
willing to pay for six monetary gambles. Five of the six gambles put before the
subjects involved ambiguity, while the sixth involved no ambiguity.
Once the participants had all disclosed their individual willingness to pay, they
were randomly paired with another subject and each pair had to re-specify how
much they were willing to pay for the six gambles. It was found that the pairs
displayed risk averse as well as ambiguity averse preferences. It was observed that
the willingness-to-pay among pairs of individuals deciding together, was lower than
the average of their individual willingness-to-pay for gambles. They thus conclude
that ambiguity averse behaviour is prevalent in group settings.
In the experiments conducted by us, we did not allow subjects to interact with
each other. We believed that any interaction between individuals would reduce the
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level of ambiguity they would perceive, when asked to make decisions against each
other. In contrast, Keck, Diecidue, and Budescu (2012), conduct an experiment
in which subjects made decisions individually, as a group, and individually after
interacting and exchanging information with others. Subjects were asked to make
binary choices between sure sums of money and ambiguous and risky bets.
Keck, Diecidue, and Budescu (2012) found that individuals are more likely to
make ambiguity neutral decisions after interacting with other subjects. Moreover,
they nd that ambiguity seeking and ambiguity averse preferences among individuals
are eliminated by communication and interaction between individuals; and as such,
groups are more likely to make ambiguity neutral decisions.
Ivanov (2009), discusses the ndings of a series of experiments on one-shot normal
form games run to distinguish between eighteen types of players. A person was
classied on the basis of his attitude to ambiguity - as being either ambiguity averse,
ambiguity neutral, or ambiguity loving; on the basis of his attitude to risk - as being
risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving; and whether he played strategically or naively.
A person who played in a naive manner was modelled as having a uniform belief in
every game he played, whereas if he played strategically, his beliefs were di¤erent
for every game and were thus unrestricted.
Ivanov (2009) nds that about 32% of the subjects taking part in the experiment
were ambiguity loving, as opposed to 22% who were ambiguity averse. The majority
of subjects (46%) were found to be ambiguity neutral. While being tested on the
basis of their attitude to risk, 62% of the subjects were found to be risk averse, 36%
to be risk neutral, and a mere 2% were risk loving. 90% of the subjects played in
a strategic manner, while 10% played naively. These results are opposite to ours,
since we nd more subjects who are ambiguity averse than those who are ambiguity
seeking, in the game rounds.
The study by Ivanov (2009) questions the fact that there are more subjects
who are ambiguity loving/neutral, than those who are ambiguity averse, given that
on average a majority of them play strategically. This is attributed to players
altruistic behaviour, i.e., they played in a manner that would maximise the sum of
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both playerspayo¤s. This may be because a player is willing to compromise with
his opponent, in order to do well himself.
4.6.2 Papers on Weakest Link/Best Shot Games
The weakest link game was introduced by Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990). They
study tacit coordination in a weakest link game, and conclude that it is unlikely that
a payo¤-dominant equilibrium would be chosen in a one-shot game or in repeated
play. Moreover, when there are a large number of players attempting to coordinate
in a repeated game, it results in a secure but ine¢ cient equilibrium being reached.
Our results in the weakest link round are consistent with their conclusions. We
nd that 59% (142) of subjects chose an e¤ort level in the range 100   120, which
would result in a payo¤-dominated equilibrium being reached. Furthermore, even
though our game consisted of only two subjects coordinating (and not a large number
of players), we found that 21% (51) of subjects chose an e¤ort level of 100, which
would have resulted in a secure but ine¢ cient equilibrium.
Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989), compare contribution to a public good in a sealed
bid as well as a sequential game. They implement all three possible versions of the
game - standard summation, weakest link and best shot, in order to ascertain which
of the three formats results in the greatest free-riding. They nd that both sealed
bid as well as the sequential game treatments, conrmed their hypothesis that the
underprovision of the public good expected under the standard summation format,
is mitigated under the weakest link format, but aggravated under best shot version.
The conclusions of our study are in direct contrast to those of Harrison and
Hirshleifer (1989). Our hypothesis was that individuals would reduce their e¤ort
levels in the weakest link game (i.e., more free-riding) and increase their e¤ort levels
in the best shot game (i.e., less free-riding). We found that 55% (33) and 46% (28)
of subjects in Treatment I and II switched from a low e¤ort level in the weakest link
round to a higher e¤ort level in the best shot game (Please see Table 4.5). Thus, our
ndings our opposite to those of Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989), who found that
the underprovision of the public good is greater in the best shot format and lower
in the weakest link format.
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Goeree and Holt (2001) studies, a set of games which initially conform to Nash
predictions when tested experimentally. However, they note that a small change in
payo¤s leads to a large change in observed subject behaviour and Nash predictions.
In particular, they study a minimum e¤ort coordination game where subjects could
choose an e¤ort from the set E = f110; :::; 170g at a marginal cost of either c = 0:1
or c = 0:9:
Recall that the Nash equilibrium of this game is that subjects coordinate on the
same e¤ort level f(e1; e2) 2 E2 j e1 = e2g : Goeree and Holt (2001) nd that for low
marginal costs (c = 0:1), subjects choose high e¤ort levels and for high marginal
costs (c = 0:9) ; a majority of subjects choose low e¤ort levels. They conclude that
this concentration of subject choice at the lower (resp. higher) end of the e¤ort
spectrum is caused by the high (resp. low) marginal cost of the e¤ort.
In our games, we use c = 0:5; and nd that subjectse¤ort choices do not depend
on the cost of the e¤ort, but on the e¤ect of ambiguity, given the strategic nature
of the game being played. This can be seen in Table 4.5, where even though the
marginal cost of the e¤ort is constant at c = 0:5; subjects switch their e¤ort levels
depending on whether it is a weakest link or a best shot game.
Eichberger and Kelsey (2011) provide further arguments based on ambiguity,
to explain the concentration of observations at the lower (and higher) end of the
spectrum found by Goeree and Holt (2001). The best outcome in a minimum e¤ort
game is for both subjects to choose the highest e¤ort level. Consider a scenario
where both players are coordinating on an e¤ort level other than the lowest. Each
of the players can increase his marginal benet by a+ (1  ) by reducing 1 unit of
contribution, thereby saving on marginal cost c: Thus, if c > a+ (1  ) ; it would
be rational to reduce contributions to the lowest possible level.
If however they do not coordinate in this manner, both players could increase
their marginal benet by a, at a marginal cost of c:16 Hence, it would be rational
to increase contributions to the maximum possible e¤ort level, if a > c: However,
ambiguity reduces the perceived marginal benet of increasing ones e¤ort, since
16 and  are as dened in Section 4.2.1.
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the benet from the e¤ort would only be received in the ambiguous event that ones
opponent plays a high strategy as well.
Moreover one can note that, if  and  lie in the range given by Kilka and Weber
(2001), such that 0:38  a  0:16, the prediction made by Eichberger and Kelsey
(2011) would explain subject behaviour as observed by Goeree and Holt (2001),
reasonably well.
4.6.3 Papers on Ellsberg Urns
The Ellsberg urn experiments conducted by us investigated whether there was
any correlation between ambiguity-averse behaviour in the game rounds and ambi-
guity attitude in single person decision problems. Moreover, we wanted to evaluate
whether there was any threshold at which individuals switched from being ambiguity
averse to being ambiguity neutral (or seeking) in their preferences.
Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011), study a three-colour Ellsberg urn with increased am-
biguity, in that the amount of money that subjects can earn also depends on the
number of balls of the chosen colour in the ambiguous urn. The subjects thus face
ambiguity on two accounts: the unknown proportion of balls in the urn as well as
the size of the prize money.
In their experiment, both winning and the amount that the subject could possibly
win were both perfectly correlated - either positively or negatively, depending on
which of the two treatments was run by them. In the experiment, most subjects
preferred betting in the positively correlated treatment rather than the negative one.
Moreover, subjects also showed a preference for a gamble when there was positively
correlated ambiguity, as opposed to a gamble without any ambiguity. This behaviour
of the subjects, is compatible with our ndings that subjects preferred betting on
Y=Z where there was ambiguity, rather than on X, the known choice.
Binmore, Stewart, and Voorhoeve (2011), attempt to test whether subjects are
indeed ambiguity averse. They investigate whether the apparent ambiguity averse
behaviour, predominantly reported by a number of papers, can be captured by the
Hurwicz criterion. They report that subject behaviour in experiments conducted by
them is inconsistent with the Hurwicz criterion. Instead, they nd that the principle
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of insu¢ cient reason has greater predictive power with respect to their data, than
ambiguity averse behaviour.
Our results are consistent with the ndings of Binmore, Stewart, and Voorhoeve
(2011), since we nd that subjects are not willing to pay even a moderate penalty
to avoid ambiguity in the Ellsberg urn rounds where the payo¤ attached to X were
95=90=85ECU . This might be because in the absence of information, subjects use
the principle of insu¢ cient reason and attach a 50 : 50 probability to the remaining
60 Y and Z balls left in the urn. The principle of insu¢ cient reason would imply
that the probability distribution attached to the X, Y and Z balls in the urn is
(1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
): It would thus be rational to choose Y or Z and get a payo¤ of 100ECU;
than to choose X and su¤er a penalty, i.e., get payo¤s 95=90=85ECU:
In our experiments we did not allow the subjects to communicate or interact with
each other. Charness, Karni, and Levin (2012), test whether individuals display a
non-neutral attitude towards ambiguity, and given a chance to interact, can subjects
persuade others to change their ambiguity attitude. They nd that though a number
of their subjects displayed an incoherent attitude towards ambiguity, a majority of
subjects displayed ambiguity neutral preferences.
A small minority of subjects (smaller than the number of subjects who were
ambiguity-incoherent) displayed ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking behaviour.
More interestingly, they nd that if subjects are allowed to interact with each other,
given the right incentives, ambiguity neutral subjects often manage to convince
ambiguity seeking and ambiguity incoherent subjects to change their mind and follow
ambiguity neutral behaviour (Charness, Karni, and Levin (2012)).
Halevy (2005), extends the standard Ellsberg type experiment to demonstrate
that ambiguity preferences are associated with compound objective lotteries. The
study nds that the subject pool can be divided into those who are ambiguity neutral
and reduce compound objective lotteries, i.e., they have behaviour which is consis-
tent with SEU; and those who fail to reduce compound lotteries. The latter category
of individuals display di¤erent preferences over ambiguity and compound lotteries,
and are consistent with models that capture ambiguity seeking/averse preferences.
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It is concluded (in the study), that there is no unique theory that can capture all
the di¤erent preference patterns observed in a given sample.
As such, the experimental ndings of Halevy (2005) are consistent with Epstein
(1999), where ambiguity aversion is dened as a behaviour that is not probabilis-
tically sophisticated and thus cannot be aligned with a specic functional form or
model.
4.7 Conclusions
Subject behaviour was found to be consistent with our hypothesis. We nd that
in the presence of ambiguity, subjects choose low e¤ort levels in the weakest link
game and high e¤ort levels in the best shot round. Moreover, we nd that on average,
51% (61) of the subjects who took part in Treatments I and II, display ambiguity
averse behaviour17; 29% (35) of subjects display ambiguity seeking behaviour18; and
20% (25) of subjects do not change their chosen e¤ort levels between the two rounds.
In the coordination games we nd that subjects do indeed choose the equilib-
rium action under ambiguity more often than either of the other actions available
to them. Thus, on the whole subjects display ambiguity averse preferences when
making decisions in two-person game scenarios. We expected the subjects to dis-
play a greater level of ambiguity-averse behaviour when faced by a foreign opponent.
However, though we observe ambiguity averse behaviour on the whole in the games,
we fail to see an escalation in the level of ambiguity when subjects are faced with
foreign opponents.
This is quite a curious nding, as one would expect that the ambiguity-safe
option would be chosen more often against the foreign subject and not otherwise.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that our ndings are opposite to those of Kilka
and Weber (2001), who found that subjects are more ambiguity-averse when the
17These subjects initially choose a low e¤ort level in the weakest link game followed by a higher
e¤ort level in the best shot game.
18These subjects initially choose a high e¤ort level in the weakest link game followed by a lower
e¤ort level in the best shot game.
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returns of an investment are dependent on foreign securities than when they are
linked to domestic securities.
Nonetheless, there may be several reasons that might explain why the level of
ambiguity when facing a foreign subject may remain unchanged. One of the reasons
for subjects not choosing a more ambiguity-safe action against the foreign subject
than against the local subject (in Treatment III), may be that they wanted to be
dynamically consistent in their choices. If this were the case, they would put extra
e¤ort into choosing the same action against both opponents.
In addition, one can note that decisions regarding nancial markets are much
more complex than the act of dealing with other people. This may explain part of the
heightened "ambiguity" captured by Kilka and Weber (2001), where the subjects
were asked to choose between an investment dependent on foreign securities or
one linked to domestic securities. It is easier for subjects to conceptualise another
person whom they may be faced against, rather than investments in known/unknown
nancial markets. Follow-up experiments may be run, where subjects are given a
choice of whether they would like to face a foreign opponent in a coordination game,
or invest in a foreign security.
Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008), found that subjects were more ambigu-
ous about the behaviour of the granny, as opposed to that of the game theorist.
The level of ambiguity when faced by another student, was similar to the level of
ambiguity when faced by the granny. Given the reaction of these subjects, we were
suprised to see that our subjects did not react with as much ambiguity to the for-
eign opponent. We believe that this might be because in the Granny Experiment,
the game theorist provided a stark contrast in terms of rationality to the granny.
In comparison, in our experiment we only had an agent providing ambiguity (the
foreign opponent) to the situation, but no agent to provide the analogy to the game
theorist. It might be worth introducing an analogy to the game theorist, in fu-
ture experiments to check if this causes any change in behaviour on the part of the
subjects.
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Another reason for subjects choosing the same action against both foreign and
local opponents, may be that some students were afraid that if they chose a di¤erent
option against the foreign subject, they might appear racist.19 In an attempt to
appear fair, subjects may have chosen the same option against both opponents. We
could avoid this complication in future experiments, by comparing di¤erent groups
of a similar race, such as African-Americans and Africans.
Moreover, it may have been the case that subjects viewed the foreign student
as akin to any other local student. This is not that di¢ cult to understand. Glob-
alisation and increased media awareness, together with the spreading tentacles of
social networking and escalating international student numbers, have ensured that
a foreign subject (in this case those from India) is not an unknown quantity any
more. There are not many parts of the world, that hold the kind of ambiguity for
us today, as there were in the past.
In future experiments, we could have treatments where subjects are allowed to
choose which opponent they would like to face, local or foreign. Furthermore, we
could check if they are willing to pay a penalty in order to avoid facing the foreign
opponent. It would be interesting if subjects were willing to pay a penalty to avoid
an ambiguous foreign opponent, since we nd little evidence of willingness to pay a
penalty, to avoid the ambiguous balls in the Ellsberg urn experiments conducted by
us.
In the Ellsberg Urn rounds we nd that for X = 105 and X = 100 subjects
prefer to opt for X rather than Y or Z, but even the smallest reduction on the
payo¤ attached to X leads to subjects choosing Y or Z (which is the ambiguous
choice). When the payo¤ attached to X was 95; 90; or 85; Y + Z was chosen
signicantly more often than X. We notice that the subjects are unwilling to bear
even a small penalty in order to stick with X balls (the unambiguous choice).
Thus, even though subjects displayed ambiguity averse preferences when faced
by other opponents (whether local or foreign), they displayed ambiguity seeking
19This was part of an overheard conversation between subjects, who were talking to each other
at the end of the experiment.
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preferences in the single-person decision situations. This is consistent with our earlier
study (Kelsey and Le Roux (2012)), where we found that the ambiguity-attitude of
subjects was dependent on the scenario they were facing. It might be interesting
to elicit subjectspreferences on whether they would like to face an opponent or an
Ellsberg urn.
It is our belief that subjects nd it more ambiguous to make decisions against
other people than against the random move of nature, over which everyone is equally
powerless. This might even explain why people are more concerned with scenarios
involving political turmoil or war - situations dependent on other people, but appear
to discount the seriousness of possible natural disasters - which are beyond anyones
control.
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CHAPTER 5
DEVIATIONS FROM EQUILIBRIUM IN AN
EXPERIMENT ON SIGNALLING GAMES
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide a summary of results of two series of experiments that
were run based on a modied signalling game. The experiments were computer-
based, such that the games were presented graphically to the subjects on a screen.
The design for the initial experiment was selected by Reinhard Selten. It has the
interesting property that the strategically stable outcome (Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986)) does not coincide with the outcome of the Harsanyi-Selten solution (Harsanyi
and Selten (1988)). However, it is a complex game insofar as standard renement
concepts like the intuitive criterion, or the never-a-weak-best-response criterion, do
not help to rene among the equilibria. The second motive for the design was to
analyse, how the change in the reward at a particular terminal node would a¤ect
behaviour.
In the initial set of experiments, we found that the strategically stable equilibrium
is never a good description of the data. A strategically stable equilibrium is one that
satises the conditions of backward and forward induction, iterated dominance and
invariance.1 While behaviour in some of the sessions converged to the Harsanyi-
Selten outcome, there were systematic deviations from the equilibrium behaviour.
Casual observations and discussions with participants suggested that a collective
reputation e¤ect2 might be at work within the random matching framework in
1Invariance suggests that the stable sets of a game, that are selected by backward/forward
induction and iterated dominances, are also projections of the stable sets of a larger game in which
it could be embedded. In our game this would mean that the stable set of a signalling game T; is
also the stable set of a bigger signalling game (T 0) in which it has been embedded. As such, this
ensures that the feasibility of playersstrategies is preserved.
2This term is credited to Reinhard Selten.
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which our basic games were played. The term "collective reputation" basically means
that subjects in the role of one player, abstain from a certain action which is in
their short run interest (but would harm their opponent), in order to allow for
coordination on a mutually benecial outcome. They thus forego a short run gain,
for a long term gain that accrues to both players.
Moreover in the experiments, subjects were not only given the result of their own
play, but were also given information about all the other parallel plays that were
conducted simultaneously. Our hypothesis was that a reduction of this information
would make it harder to build up a collective reputation.
In the second set of experiments we modied the initial signalling game to make
the mutually benecial outcome more attractive and hence give a stronger incentive
to build a collective reputation. In addition, we varied the information on past
outcomes given to subjects. It was conjectured that more information would make
it easier to coordinate on the mutually benecial outcome. However, though we
do nd systematic violations from equilibrium behaviour similar to those in the
initial series of experiments, we do not nd evidence that varying the amount of
information a¤ects play.
5.1.0.0.4 Organisation of the Chapter In Section 2, we provide a brief review
of previous literature on signalling games and renement criteria. Section 3 describes
the signalling games being tested in the experiments and their normative solutions.
Section 4 describes the experimental design employed, Section 5 consists of data
analysis and results, Section 6 provides alternative equilibrium concepts that might
explain some of the observed player behaviour and Section 7 summarises the results
and conclusions.
5.2 Previous Literature
5.2.1 Signalling Games and Renement Criteria
Signalling games have been used to study core strategic issues that arise due
to the economics of information, in particular the case where there is asymmetric
information. General equilibrium theories break down in the wake of asymmetric
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information. When parties taking part in an exchange of goods and services have
unequal access to information, equilibrium-forming market mechanisms get upset. In
particular, Michael Spences model of job market signalling was seminal in studying
signalling games with multiple equilibriums, where the equilibrium reached would
determine whether the market was e¢ cient or ine¢ cient (See Spence (1973)).
Signalling games model economic scenarios characterised by asymmetric infor-
mation. In a standard signalling game, there are two parties. One of the parties
is informed about the prevailing state of nature, while the other party remains
uninformed. The informed party must take an action which is observed by the un-
informed party, who then draws certain inferences from the observed action and
responds by taking a suitable action of his own.
A formal signalling game may be described by the following rules:
1. Nature draws a type t of Player 1 from a nite set T , according to some
probability distribution , such that  (t) > 0, for all t.
2. Player 1, is informed about the type of player t that he is and selects a message
m, from a nite set M .
3. Player 2, does not observe the type of player t, but does observe the message
sent out by him, i.e., Player 2 can observe m. On the basis of this observation,
he selects a response a, from a nite set A.
4. The payo¤s to Players 1 and 2 are u(t;m; a) and v(t;m; a), respectively (van
Damme (1991)).
The rules of the game are assumed to be common knowledge to both players,
such that both players know the sextuple (T;M;A; ; u; v), but asymmetry arises
since only Player 1 knows his type, Player 2 does not (van Damme (1991)). Such a
game is called a signalling game, since the action of Player 1 acts as a signal of his
type to Player 2, on the basis of which, Player 2 develops certain beliefs about the
type of Player 1 he faces.
An example of a signalling game can be seen in Figure 5.1, where Player 1 is
informed of natures move, while Player 2 is ignorant of it. Player 2s beliefs are
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Figure 5.1. Signalling Game (Peters (2008))
shown by the numbers between the square brackets at his decision nodes (Peters
(2008)). There can be two types of Player 1 in the game, t and t0, depending on
chances move, where each type occurs with a 50% probability. Each of the players
has four strategies. The strategy set of Player 1 is fLL;LR;RL;RRg, whereas
the strategy set of Player 2 is fuu; ud; du; ddg, where L, R, u and d represent the
decision to go left, right, up or down respectively. The strategic form of the game
is seen in Table 5.1, where the best replies of a given player have been marked with
an asterisk. The two pure strategy Nash equilibria that emerge as a result of this
analysis are (RL; uu) and (LL; ud).
Table 5.1. Strategic Form of Signalling Game
uu ud du dd
LL 3; 7 3; 7 1; 4 4; 1
LR 2; 3 2; 5 5; 0 5; 2
RL 4; 5 2; 4 2; 2 0; 1
RR 3; 1 1; 2 3; 1 1; 2
The Nash equilibrium (RL; uu), is only consistent if  = 0 and  = 1. Assum-
ing these beliefs, uu would be the best reply for Player 2. Hence, (RL; uu) is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium3, provided  = 0 and  = 1. (RL; uu) is a separating
equilibrium. Each type of Player 1, plays a di¤erent action and hence, (RL; uu),
3A perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that the playersbeliefs should be such that:
1. players act rationally given their beliefs
2. the conditional probabilities attached to the nodes in an information set are consistent
with the combination of strategies being considered.
In the games we consider here, renement concepts of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, se-
quential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium all coincide (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991))
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separates or distinguishes between the two types of Player 1. The equilibrium ac-
tion of Player 1 thus signals his type, and the equilibrium is information revealing
(Peters (2008)).
The other Nash equilibrium (LL; ud) is consistent with the belief that  = 1
2
.
This can be seen in that each type of Player 1 plays L, so that Player 2 assigns each
decision node in the left information set a probability of 1
2
. Since  = 1
2
, u is the
best reply to Player 1 that Player 2 can make in his left information set. On the
other hand, the beliefs (; 1  ) have not been restricted since the probability of
the right information set being reached in equilibrium is 0. The beliefs regarding
 should however be modelled such that, at Player 2s right information set, d is
the optimal response. The expected payo¤ of Player 2, resulting from playing d
should be at least equal to the expected payo¤ he would receive were he to play u,
so 4 (1  )  2 or   2
3
. Thus, with  = 1
2
and   2
3
, (LL; ud) is a pooling
equilibrium as it pools both types of Player 1, without providing any type-relevant
information about his specic type (Peters (2008)).
Literature on game theory and signalling games includes other renement criteria
as well. One such restriction put forth by Cho and Kreps (1987) is the intuitive
criterion. The intuitive criterion considers a signalling game with a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. The Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion holds that if one type of Player 1
could not possibly improve his equilibrium payo¤ by deviating, while it might be
possible for another type of Player 1 to gain by deviating, then it would be sensible
to believe that the deviation from equilibrium is made by the type who stands to
gain.
Renement concepts such as the intuitive criterion are useful while building
receiver beliefs in response to unexpected behaviour. The only scenario in which
the intuitive criterion does not place restrictions on the beliefs of Player 2, is when
all the possible types of Player 1 get excluded. Additionally, the intuitive criterion
lacks bite when analysing a separating equilibrium (like the (RL; uu) separating
equilibrium discussed in the example above), since in this case the beliefs of Player
2 are wholly determined by the optimal equilibrium actions of Player 1.
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The intuitive criterion can be applied to the pooling equilibrium (LL; ud), of
the previous example. The equilibrium payo¤ of Player 1-type t is 2. Player 1 has
the incentive to deviate by picking R, since he would earn a higher payo¤ of 4 by
doing so. The equilibrium payo¤ of Player 1-type t0 is 4 and such a Player 1 would
get at most 2 if he were to deviate and pick R instead. According to the intuitive
criterion, Player 2 would assign zero probability to Player 1-type t0 deviating to R.
The intuitive criterion thus implies that  = 1, in which case (LL; ud) can no longer
be a pooling equilibrium.
Camerer (2003) provides a critique of the intuitive criterion, in that it ties the
possibility of a deviator earning an out-of-equilibrium payo¤ (which is higher than
the equilibrium payo¤), with the plausibility of a Player 2s beliefs about which type
of Player 1 will deviate. However, the intuitive criterion fails to give a denitive
answer in case more than one type of Player 1 gains by deviating. One type of
Player 1 may have a greater incentive to deviate if the response of Player 2 to the
deviation makes it more lucrative for him to deviate. The intuitive criterion is silent
when it comes to analysing which type of Player 1 is more likely to deviate.
Banks and Sobel (1987) introduce the concept of divinity, which is the property
of one type of Player 1 having a greater incentive to deviate than the other. Divinity
requires that Player 2s beliefs should assign a greater weight to the type of Player
1, whose deviation-supporting belief set is larger. In other words, while the intuitive
criteria simply divides the set of types of Player 1 into those that might deviate and
those that would never deviate divinity divides the set of those who might deviate
into the those that deviate more often than the others. Divinity thus requires more
reasoning than the intuitive criterion. Universal divinity takes the reasoning a step
further by concluding that if the response to deviating is much higher for one type
of Player 1 than another, Player 2 must believe that the deviation came from the
more likely type, with complete certainty.
Another renement technique is the never-a-weak-best-response (NWBR) crite-
rion. The rationale of the NWBR criterion is that if it is not possible to apply
universal divinity, because the set of Player 2s responses does not make it strictly
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more protable for one type of Player 1 to deviate more than the other, there would
still be one type of Player 1 for whom the deviation payo¤ was just as protable as
the equilibrium payo¤, while the other type of Player 1 preferred the equilibrium
payo¤ to the deviation payo¤ (Camerer (2003)).
The last renement to be discussed here is stability. Roughly speaking, a stable
equilibrium requires that there is an equilibrium close to the candidate equilibrium,
for every possible tremble4 of strategies. The stability concept guarantees a stable
equilibrium and is the closest that game theorists come to nding a Holy Grail
theory.
5.2.2 Experiments on Signalling Games
Laboratory experiments provide empirical data and insights that throw a whole
new light on questions that arise in game theory. It would be di¢ cult, if not near
impossible, for a situation to arise naturally in an economy, where one could observe
a sequential, pooled, or separating equilibrium being formed. On the other hand, it
is possible to use nancial rewards during experiments, in a way that would motivate
participants to reach an equilibrium.
Previous experimental work on signalling games concentrated on the predic-
tive power of renement concepts (See Brandts and Holt (1992), Brandts and Holt
(1993), Banks, Colin, and David (1994)). The analysis in these papers concentrated
on pure strategy equilibria, but in our case the strategically stable equilibrium is
mixed. Brandts and Holt (1992), argue that deciding which renements are appro-
priate while analysing any given signalling game, can only be determined on the
basis of subjective opinion regarding the rationality of individuals taking part in the
game. Empirical work that tests the validity of such arguments would pave the way
towards more advanced and streamlined renements.
Banks, Colin, and David (1994), conducted a series of experiments that aimed
at testing whether subjects chose rened subsets of Nash equilibria in signalling
4A tremble takes place when a player who is faced with a number of actions to choose between,
decides to take a particular action, but through inattention or a slip of the hand/pen/tongue takes
another action instead (Kreps (1990)).
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games. The experiments consisted of simple signalling games where the sender was
informed of a randomly-drawn type and then chose a message. The receiver had
information about the message but not of the senders type, and had to choose an
action. The experiment showed that about 70% of the message-action pairs chose
Nash equilibrium outcomes. Subjects had a tendency to choose a more rened
equilibrium in some games, but no specic renement could be predicted. In some
games where a pooled equilibrium was predicted, senders preferred to separate rather
than pool, since it gave them a higher payo¤.
Banks, Colin, and David (1994) noted that no single, simple decision criteria
such as minimax or principle of insu¢ cient reason could explain why senders chose
non-Nash and unrened messages. However, when several criteria select a particular
message, senders picked it out about 90% of the time. The conclusion they arrived
at was that if equilibria are consistent with several di¤erent criteria, they were more
likely to be played. In our experiments we nd that behaviour di¤ers systematically
from the Nash equilibria of the game and cannot be explained by any one simple
decision criteria.
Brandts and Holt (1996), believe that as economists we should take the process
of learning and adjustment towards equilibrium seriously. In their paper they use
adjustment theories to model naïve Bayesian learning in signalling games, where sub-
jects learn and adapt in an unfamiliar environment. They nd that when standard
equilibrium assumptions fail to o¤er explanations for behaviour patterns observed
during experiments, computer simulations of Bayesian learning and adjustment can
prove to be useful. More recent experiments study how changing a game or de-
ciding in teams a¤ects behaviour in signalling games can be seen in Cooper and
Kagel (2003) and Cooper and Kagel (2005). These papers nd that teams play
more strategically than individuals especially when there are changes in payo¤s that
change the equilibrium outcome. Moreover, they nd that teams exhibit positive
learning transfer far more than individual subjects. In our experiment we test to
see whether subjects undergo any learning and though we found some evidence for
learning, it was not strong.
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5.3 Experimental Model
In this section, we shall explain the games used in the experimental sessions and
discuss the Nash equilibrium of each game. Henceforth we will use male pronouns
he, his etc. to denote Player 1, while female pronouns she, hers etc. denote Player
2.5
Figure 5.2. Game S
Figure 5.3. Game T
The experiments are based on the two signalling games shown in Figures 5.2 and
5.3. Both signalling games have the following structure: The two players have a
choice between a strategically safe and a strategically risky option. The game is one
of incomplete information in which Player 1 can be of two possible types, 1a or 1b,
with equal probability.
5This convention is for the sake of convenience only and does not bear any relation to the actual
gender of the subjects in our experiments.
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Player 1 chooses rst, followed by Player 2. Player 1 can either end the game (the
strategically safe option) or give the move to Player 2 (the strategically risky op-
tion). Player 2 can then choose between a strategically safe option which gives type-
independent payo¤s and a strategically risky option, which gives type-dependent
payo¤s.
In the rst set of experiments (related to the S game), we varied the payo¤ "x"
of type 1a at the terminal node B: The value attached to x could be 4; 5 or 6:As
can be seen from Figure 5.2, Player 1 would only take the strategically risky option
if Player 2 does so as well. Player 2 would like to take the strategically risky option
only if she faces type 1a and the strategically safe option against type 1b.
5.3.1 Normative Analysis
In this section, we work exclusively with behaviour strategies. Both games have
two Nash equilibrium components. The rst component consists of Nash equilibria
where both types of Player 1 take the strategically safe option and Player 2 chooses
the strategically safe option with a su¢ ciently high probability, namely at least with
probability x 3
3
in Game S (with x = 4; 5; 6) and at least probability 2
3
in Game
T . This component contains, the Nash equilibrium where all players and types take
their strategically safe option with certainty. The latter is uniformly stable and can
be shown to be the equilibrium selected by the theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
The second component consists of a single equilibrium where Player 1a takes
the strategically risky option with certainty, while type 1b and Player 2 randomise.
Thus, in Game S type 1b chooses the strategically safe option with probability 2
3
and Player 2 chooses the strategically safe option with probability 1
8
. In Game T
type 1b chooses the strategically safe option with probability 2
3
and Player 2 chooses
the strategically safe option with probability 1
3
. Conditional on her information
set being reached, Player 2 believes she faces type 1b with probability 1
4
. This
equilibrium component can be shown to be the only strategically stable component
of Nash equilibria in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
The purpose of the rst set of experiments (Game S) was to test the two equi-
librium renements against each other. We expected the Harsanyi-Selten solution
122
to arise for the parameter value x = 4, but did not rule out that terminal node
B would be reached more often if x was increased. In the new version (Game T ),
it was more attractive for both types of Player 1 to choose the strategically risky
choice (but we made it more attractive for type 1a than for type 1b). We hence
expected that Player 2s information set would be reached substantially more often
in the new experiment.
5.3.2 The extended games
For most part of the experiments we used the extended models, S 0 and T 0 (See
Figures 5.4 and 5.5), which were modied versions of the basic games S and T;
respectively. In essence type 1bs strategically safe option was replaced with a 2 
2 game with a unique equilibrium, which had the same expected payo¤s as the
strategically safe option in the basic game.6
Figure 5.4. The Game S 0
In the game S 0, we used a 2  2 game with unique mixed strategy equilibrium,
where both players choose Right with probability 5
8
. In the game T 0, we used a
prisoners dilemma game where Right was the dominant strategy for both players.
Since the strategically safe choice of type 1b is reached with positive probability in
the Nash equilibria of both basic games S and T , the Nash equilibria of the extended
games are obtained by replacing the strategically safe strategy of type 1b with the
6The 2  2 game was added following the strategically safe choice of type 1b, but then moves
were coalesced.
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equilibrium strategy from the 22 game. In addition, Player 2s behaviour strategy
is amended with her choice at the new information set. See Table 5.2.
Figure 5.5. The Game T 0
Table 5.2. Probabilities in the Nash equilibriat
r1l m1r r1r r2 r2
First Component Game S 0 0 3
8
5
8
x 3
x
5
8
Second Component Game S 0 1 3
12
5
12
1
8
5
8
First Component Game T 0 0 0 1 2
3
1
Second Component Game T 0 1 0 2
3
1
3
1
5.3.3 Normative Analysis with Trembling Renements
A tremble takes place when a player who is faced with a number of actions to
choose between, decides to take a particular action, but through inattention or a slip
of the hand/pen/tongue takes another action instead (Kreps (1990)). The normative
analysis with trembling renements for both Games S and T is described below.
5.3.3.1 S-Game
Let "i;s be the trembling probability of agent i for action s. We require "i;l+"i;r <
1 for all i. Moreover, "2;s < 18 and so on. Let the probability of type 1a and type 1b
taking action right be p and q respectively. The probability that type 1a trembles
and chooses left thus is "1a;l: The probability that type 1b trembles and chooses left
is "1b;l: The probability of Player 2 taking action right is :
Player 2 is indi¤erent when type 1a chooses r with maximal probability 1  "1a;l,
such that:
1
2
(1 "1a;l)4
1
2
(1 "1a;l)+ 12 (1 q)
= 3, 4 (1  "1a;l) = 3 (2  "1a;l   q) and q = 2+"1a;l3 :
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Player 2 is indi¤erent when type 1b chooses l with probability "1b;l; such that:
1
2
4p
1
2
p+ 1
2
"1b;l
= 3 , 4p = 3 (p+ "1b;l) and p = 3"1b;l:This is possible only when "1a;r 
3"1b;l, for instance when "1a;r = "1b;l.
Type 1a is indi¤erent if7: 3 = (1  )x,  = 1  3
x
, while Type 1b is indi¤erent
if: 4 (1  ) = 3:5, 0:5 = 4,  = 1
8
The Trembling Equilibria thus is:
1. Player 1a goes right with maximal probability. Player 2 and Player 1b mix to
make each other indi¤erent. This equilibrium exists for all su¢ ciently small
perturbations:

"1a;ll + (1  "1a;l) r;

1  2 + "1a;l
3

l +
2 + "1a;l
3
r;
7
8
l +
1
8
r

:
2. Player 1a and Player 2 make each other indi¤erent. Player 1b enters with
minimal probability. This equilibrium exists only for 3"1b;l  "1a;r :

(1  3"1b;l) l + 3"1b;lr; "1b;ll + (1  "1b;l) r; 3
x
l +

1  3
x

r

:
3. Both Player 1a and 1b stay out with maximal probability and Player 2 chooses
right. If the condition for existence is satised with a strict inequality, this is a
strict equilibrium and hence the unique primitive formation of the perturbed
game. Existence requires again 3"1b;l  "1a;r:
f(1  "1a;r) l + "1a;rr; "1b;ll + (1  "1b;r) r; "2;ll + (1  "2;l) rg :
For r to be the best reply for Player 2 we need 3  4 12 "1a;r1
2
"1a;r+
1
2
"1b;l
or 3"1b;l  "1a;r,
as claimed.
5.3.3.2 T-Game
Let "i;s be the trembling probability of agent i for action s. We require "i;l+"i;r <
1 for all i. Moreover, "2;s < 13 etc. The probability of Player 1a and Player 1b taking
7Recall x  4
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action right is, p and q respectively. The probability that Player 1a trembles and
chooses left is "1a;l: The probability that Player 1b trembles and chooses left is "1b;l:
The probability of Player 2 taking action right is :
Player 2 is indi¤erent when type 1a chooses r with maximal probability 1  "1a;l:
1
2
(1 "1a;l)8
1
2
(1 "1a;l)+ 12 (1 q)
= 6, 8 (1  "1a;l) = 6 (2  "1a;l   q) and q = 2+"1a;l3 :
Player 2 is indi¤erent when type 1b chooses l with probability "1b;l:
1
2
8p
1
2
p+ 1
2
"1b;l
=
6 , 8p = 6 (p+ "1b;l) and p = 3"1b;l:This is possible only when "1a;r  3"1b;l, for
instance when "1a;r = "1b;l.
Type 1a is indi¤erent if: 3 = (1   )9 ,  = 2
3
, while Type 1b is indi¤erent if:
6 (1  ) = 4,  = 1
3
:
Equilibria:
1. Player 1a goes right with maximal probability. Player 2 and type 1b mix to
make each other indi¤erent. This equilibrium exists for all su¢ ciently small
perturbations:

"1a;ll + (1  "1a;l) r;

1  2 + "1a;l
3

l +
2 + "1a;l
3
r;
2
3
l +
1
3
r

:
2. Player 1a and Player 2 make each other indi¤erent. Player 1b enters with
minimal probability. This equilibrium exists only for 3"1b;l  "1a;r :

(1  3"1b;l) l + 3"1b;lr; "1b;ll + (1  "1b;l) r; 1
3
l +
2
3
r

:
3. Both Player 1a and 1b stay out with maximal probability and Player 2 chooses
right. If the condition for existence is satised with a strict inequality, this is a
strict equilibrium and hence the unique primitive formation of the perturbed
game. Existence requires again 3"1b;l  "1a;r.
f(1  "1a;r) l + "1a;rr; "1b;ll + (1  "1b;r) r; "2;ll + (1  "2;l) rg :
For r to be the best reply for player 2 we need 6  8 12 "1a;r1
2
"1a;r+
1
2
"1b;l
or 3"1b;l  "1a;r,
as claimed.
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Thus for both games S and T,we observe the following for equilibrium
renement:
1. For 3"1b;l < "1a;r there is a unique equilibrium in the perturbed game and it
is not close to the isolated Nash equilibrium (l; r; r). The latter is hence not
part or a strategically stable set.
2. In the uniformly perturbed game with "1b;l"1a;r = " > 0 the strategy combina-
tion
((1  ") l + "r; "l + (1  ") r; "l + (1  ") r) ;
is the unique strict equilibrium of the perturbed game in standard form. One
sees immediately that the game has no other primitive formations. The initial
candidate in the selection procedure in Selten / Harsanyi thus starts with this
equilibrium point as the unique solution candidate, which is hence selected.
Taking the limit "! 0; we see that (l; r; r) is the Harsanyi Selten solution for
the game.
5.4 Experimental Design
The games above were used in two series of experiments, one conducted at the
Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics8, and the other at the Finance and
Economics Experimental Laboratory in Exeter (FEELE). The games were computer-
based and the extensive games were shown to the subjects graphically on the com-
puter screen. The subjects decided by highlighting their choice in the extensive
form on the screen. Throughout the experiment, games were repeated in a uniform
random matching environment with 6 subjects in the role of Player 1 and 6 subjects
in the role of Player 2. Subjects remained in the same role as long as the game
remained unchanged.9
8These experiments were conducted under the supervision of Reinhard Selten.
9In Bonn, subjects were assigned a role at the start of game S0 and stayed in that role till the
end of the experiment.
In Exeter, subjects were assigned a role at the start of game T and remained in that role for all
subsequent rounds that game T was played. Roles were re-assigned at the start of game T 0 and
127
The rst set of experiments consisted of 9 sessions of the game S 0, with the value
of x varied as x = 4; 5; 6 in three sessions each. After the initial random allocation of
roles, subjects played the game S 0, in strictly sequential order for 50 rounds. There
was a short break after period 25. In the nal 5 rounds, called the Tournament
rounds, subjects had to submit strategies for the extensive game. Each strategy of
a player was then evaluated against the strategies of all the players in the opposite
role and the subject received the average payo¤ from all matchings. Thus, we used
the strategy method, where subjects rst learn to play the game sequentially and
then submit complete strategies.
In the second set of experiments, subjects played the simpler game T in the
rst 25 periods and then switched to the more complex game T 0 which was played
sequentially for the next 25 rounds and the nal 5 Tournament rounds. In some
sessions we gave subjects only the results of their own play while in other sessions we
gave them additional information regarding the other 5 parallel plays that occured
simultaneously. We wanted to study whether this a¤ected subject behaviour in any
manner. In the Bonn experiments we had always given information on all plays to
the subjects. In the Exeter experiments we gave this full information only in 5 of
the 10 sessions conducted.10
The experimental sessions lasted about 31
2
hours in Bonn and about 21
2
hours in
Exeter. Average payment per subject was about $12 in Exeter.
5.5 Data Analysis and Results
5.5.1 Player 1 Behaviour at Information Set 1a
We evaluate how often the strategically safe option was taken by Player 1 at
information set 1a in Table 5.3.11 In the old set of experiments, when x = 4 or 5,
subjects remained in that role for all subsequent rounds that game T 0 was played. Subjects may
or may not have been assigned the same role in T 0 as they had in T:
10However, we did not see any indication that this di¤erence of information mattered.
11We calculated the average and standard deviation of the percentage of times Player 1 chose left
(strategically safe option) at information set 1a, relative to the number of times this information
set was reached for each session. The following tables are calculated in a similar manner.
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one can note that Player 1 preferred to take his strategically safe option, which gave
a denite payo¤ of 3, rather than risking a payo¤ of 0 were Node C to be reached.
Play changed dramatically in the x = 6 version of the game, with a majority of
Player 1s selecting their strategically risky option (See Figure 5.6).
Table 5.3. Observed Frequency of Strategically Safe Option at Information Set 1a
Old Experiments New Experiments
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Rounds 1  25 0:515437 (0:26552) 0:208411 (0:1274)
Rounds 26  50 0:43788 (0:28489) 0:265718 (0:2042)
Rounds 51  55 0:517491 (0:33409) 0:19606 (0:15302)
Figure 5.6. Player 1a Behaviour in Old Experiments
A Mann-Whitney U test shows that the strategically safe option is taken sig-
nicantly more often in Rounds 1   50 in the sessions where Player 1s payo¤ at
terminal node B was 4 or 5, as compared to when it was 6. Moreover, in each session
of the game where x = 6, Player 1 takes the safe option less often at information
set 1a in Rounds 26  50, compared to Rounds 1  25.
As found in many experiments where players have an outside option there is
a substantial fraction of subjects who take it (see Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and
Ross (1990)). We see here for Rounds 1   50 that the strategically safe option is
taken in at least 15% of the plays. We only nd one session (with x = 6) where
the strategically safe option is practically not taken in Rounds 26  50 and Rounds
51   55 of the experiment. In only one session (with x = 4) the strategically safe
option is almost always taken (in 94% of plays), for all the others it ranges between
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15 67%. The results are qualitatively the same for the tournament periods 51 55.
Thus, behaviour is overall not consistent with either of the two Nash equilibrium
components of the game where the strategically safe option is taken either with
probability 0 or with probability 1.
Comparing the old and new experiments, the strategically safe option is foregone
signicantly more often in the new experiments, as we expected (See Figure 5.7).
This is signicant by a Mann-Whitney U test conducted separately for Rounds 1 50
and tournament periods 51   55.12 In the new set of experiments the percentage
with which the strategically safe option is taken is below 50% in each session, and
separately for Rounds 1   25, 26   50 and tournament periods 51   55, with just
one exception for period 26  50 (always signicant by a sign test).
Figure 5.7. Player 1a Behaviour in New Experiments
Arguably in the new set of experiments, Player 1 did not take the strategically
risky option often enough at his information set 1a. Given the observed frequencies
with which Player 2 chose her strategically risky option at information set 2, he
would have made a gain in each session. More precisely, [(9 B%)  3] is positive
for each session13, where for a given session B% = (number of times B is reached)
(number of times B or C are reached) : In
contrast, this gainvaries considerably for the sessions in the old experiment.
12The test is highly signicant for Rounds 1 25, but not for Rounds 26 50. Thus, the original
stronger incentive for Player 1 to take the strategically risky option gets somewhat dampened by
experience.
13By session we mean Rounds 1-50 or Rounds 51-55
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However, players are not simply irrational. The number of times the strategically
risky option is taken is highly correlated with the gain to be made. This is signicant
at a 5% level of signicance, using Spearmans Rank Correlation Test for both the
new and old experiment sessions.14
5.5.2 Player 1 Behaviour at Information Set 1b
In both the old and the new sets of experiments, Player 1 always chose the
strategically risky option (left) signicantly less often than the 33% predicted by
the strategically stable Kohlberg-Mertens Nash equilibrium (See Table 5.4).15 This
is signicant by a sign test for each individual session and part of the old experiment
Rounds 1 25, 26 50 and 51 55 separately. In the new set of experiments game
T 0 was used in Rounds 26   55. Here, Player 1 chose the strategically safe option
(right) at information set 1b signicantly more often than both left and middle, in
each part of the experiment (Rounds 26  50 and 51  55) separately.
Table 5.4. Observed Frequency of Strategically Risky Option at Information Set
1b
Old Experiments New Experiments
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Rounds 1  25 0:055979 (0:04221) 0:220375 (0:09273)
Rounds 26  50 0:049949 (0:03563) 0:103184 (0:06487)
Rounds 51  55 0:056884 (0:05144) 0:098769 (0:08681)
In the old set of experiments, left was never chosen in more than 12% of the
cases for both Rounds 1   25 and 26   50, and 16% for the tournament periods
51 55 (See Figure 5.8). For the new experiments, the corresponding percentages of
choosing left are 40%, 22% and 27% for Rounds 1 25, 26 50, 51 55, respectively
(See Figure 5.9).
We calculated various proxies for the gains Player 1 could have made at informa-
tion set 1b by going left rather than right. These gains were sometimes positive and
14Except for Rounds 51-55 in the new set of experiments which just misses the 5% level of
signicance.
15This is the average and standard deviation of the percentage of times Player 1 chose left
(strategically risky option) at information set 1b, relative to the number of times this information
set was reached for each session.
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Figure 5.8. Player 1b Behaviour in Old Experiments
Figure 5.9. Player 1b Behaviour in New Experiments
sometimes negative, varying greatly from session to session. We never found any
signicant correlation between the percentages of times Player 1b chose left and the
gains. Subjects simply seemed to be reluctant to take the strategically risky option,
which would be consistent with the aim to build up a collective reputation.
5.5.3 Observed frequency for Information Set 2
Since Player 1 rarely chooses his strategically risky (left) option at information
set 1b, the relative frequency with which the right node in information set 2 is
reached is signicantly below 25% (See Table 5.5, Figures 5.10 and 5.11). A sign
test shows this is true for Rounds 1 25, 26 50 and 51 55 in the sessions of the old
experiment and Rounds 26  50 and 51  55 in the sessions of the new experiment.
This is consistent with a collective reputation e¤ect and it would thus make sense
for Player 2 to select her strategically risky option. Even for Rounds 1   25 in the
sessions of the new experiment, the percentages are close to 25% or below.
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Table 5.5. Observed Frequency of Right Node being reached at Information Set 2a
Old Experiments New Experiments
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Rounds 1  25 0:108521 (0:06229) 0:213985 (0:0844)
Rounds 26  50 0:082285 (0:06245) 0:126246 (0:08414)
Rounds 51  55 0:118831 (0:0875) 0:094254 (0:08086)
Figure 5.10. Old Experiments - Observed Frequency of being in the Right Node
at Set 2
5.5.4 Player 2 Behaviour at Information Set 2
In the new set of experiments, Player 2 chooses the strategically safe option
signicantly more often than 331
3
% which is the maximal probability in a Nash
equilibrium, when information set 2 is not reached (See Figure 5.12). This is
signicant in Rounds 1  25 and 51  55 by a Sign test; and for Rounds 26  50 by
a Wilcoxon Rank Test.16 On average, the strategically risky option is taken in 60%
of the cases, well below the 662
3
% required by the Kohlberg-Mertens strategically
stable Nash equilibrium.
Given these averages17, it makes sense for Player 1 to choose right at both infor-
mation sets 1a and 1b, which is roughly consistent with actual behaviour. However,
this is an overview on average behaviour in all the sessions. In some of individual
sessions the percentage of Player 2 choosing left is well above 662
3
% and in these
cases Player 1 would have an incentive to choose left at information set 1b.
16Signicance tests were carried out on the percentage of times left is taken minus 13 :
17This is the average and standard deviation of the percentage of times Player 2 chose left
(strategically risky option) at information set 2, relative to the number of times this information
set was reached for each session.
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Figure 5.11. New Experiments - Observed Frequency of being in the Right Node
at Set 2
Figure 5.12. Player 2 Behaviour at Information Set 2 - New Experiments
In the old experiments, information set 2 is reached less often. The rst session
may be taken as an example of the Harsanyi-Selten solution being played. In this
session, information set 2 is only reached 5 times in Rounds 1   25 and 26   50,
and never in the nal part. Disregarding this session, it is signicant by a sign test
that the strategically risky option is chosen in at least 331
3
% of the cases. However,
the percentages are signicantly below the 87:5% required by strategic stability -
with the one exception of 93% in Rounds 1  25 and 89:5% in Rounds 51  55 (See
Figure 5.13).
We wanted to analyse whether Player 2 learned from her experience (from past
plays at information set 2) and did not just make choices randomly. Since infor-
mation set 2a was not reached very often in the old experiments, we restrict this
analysis to the new experiments. In order to analyse whether learning took place,
we checked whether a player changed her behaviour more often after a failurethan
after a success. There are two ways in which Player 2 could make a failure 
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Table 5.6. Observed Frequency of Strategically Risky Option at Information Set
2a
Old Experiments New Experiments
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Rounds 1  25 0:519377 (0:29827) 0:601518 (0:09404)
Rounds 26  50 0:653417 (0:1657) 0:577839 (0:20669)
Rounds 51  55 0:631131 (0:20074) 0:580699 (0:11262)
Figure 5.13. Player 2 Behaviour at Information Set 2 - Old Experiments
1. if she chooses right and the left node of information set 2 is reached, resulting
in a payo¤ of 6 instead of 8:
2. if she chooses left and the right node of information set 2 is reached, resulting
in a payo¤ of 0 instead of 6.
Figure 5.14. Observed Direction of Switching
We counted how often each subject switched after a failure/success in Rounds
1   25 and 26   50 and took the di¤erence of the two percentages. Individuals for
whom the di¤erence was zero or for whom the information set was never reached were
disregarded. In Rounds 1  25, there were 36 individuals who switched more often
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after failure, 14 who switched more often after success and 6 who switched equally
often (See Figure 5.14). For Rounds 26  50, the corresponding numbers were 34, 8
and 7. Sign tests based on these numbers would indicate that most subjects switch
more often after failure than success. Thus, there is reasonable evidence of learning
at this information set.
5.5.5 Player Behaviour in the embedded 2x2 game
In the extended models S 0 and T 0; type 1bs strategically safe option was replaced
with a 2 2 game with a unique equilibrium, which had the same expected payo¤s
as the strategically safe option in the basic game. The 2  2 games used in the
experiments can be seen in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15. 2 2 Games used in the Experiments
In the new experiments, the Prisoners Dilemma type 2 2 game was embedded
into the signalling game in Rounds 26  50 and 51  55. As expected, both players
choose their dominant action (right) more often than the dominated action (See
Table 5.7). However, the percentages with which the dominated action is chosen
are not negligible and can be as high as 23% in Rounds 26  50 and 32% in Rounds
51  55 in individual sessions (See Figure 5.16).18
Averaged over all sessions, Player 1 chooses the dominated action more often
than Player 2, but a Wilcoxon Rank test does not yield signicant results. For
Rounds 26 50, the percentage of times the dominated action was chosen by Player
1 and Player 2 is positively correlated (correlation coe¢ cient = 0:34). However,
18The fractions are calculated relative to the number of times Nature chose right and Player 1
did not choose left.
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Table 5.7. Observed Frequency of Right being chosen in the 2x2 game - New
Experiment
Player 1 Player 2
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Rounds 26  50 0:899071 (0:08269) 0:937936 (0:0406)
Rounds 51  55 0:866204 (0:11283) 0:921962 (0:06393)
the correlation between the number of times the dominated action was chosen in
the tournament periods 51-55 is negative (correlation coe¢ cient =  0:25). It is
interesting to observe that there is no signicant di¤erence between the number of
times Player 1 chose left and the number of times he chose the dominated action
middle at information set 1b.
Figure 5.16. Observed Frequency of Dominant Action - New Experiment
In the old experiments, we embedded a 22 game with a unique mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria into the signalling game S and used the resulting game S 0 in all the
rounds. The percentages of strategy choices in the 9 sessions are roughly comparable
with the mixed-strategy equilibrium (See Table 5.8), but as in many experiments
with such 2  2 games (see for instance, Goerg, Chmura, and Selten (2008) and
the literature they cite), one has strong own-payo¤ e¤ects. For the main part of
the experiment, periods 1   50, the percentages with which right is chosen are
signicantly below the equilibrium values for Player 1 and above for Player 2 (by a
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sign test). This nding is consistent with the predictions made by the alternative
solution concepts for such 2 2 games in Goerg, Chmura, and Selten (2008).19
Table 5.8. Observed Frequency of Right being chosen in the 2x2 game - Old
Experiment
Player 1 Player 2
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Rounds 1  25 0:530085 (0:09553) 0:713404 (0:08242)
Rounds 26  50 0:578689 (0:06828) 0:663489 (0:07171)
Rounds 51  55 0:525137 (0:13771) 0:708392 (0:10936)
Figure 5.17. Observed Frequency of Dominant Action - Old Experiment
5.6 Alternative Equilibrium Concepts
As seen from the preceding section on data analysis, subject behaviour observed
in the experimental data does not match with Nash predictions. In this section we
examine alternative equilibrium concepts that might provide a better explanation
for the observed behaviour. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict analysis in this
section to Game T; since including Game S would require a separate analysis for
each case of x = 4=5=6: However, the analysis can be intuitively extended to Game
S, since both games are similar in essence.
19In the impulse balance equilibrium, right is chosen with probability 12 by Player 1 and with
probability 23 by Player 2. In the action sampling equilibrium, right is chosen with probability 0:56
by Player 1 and with probability 0:66 by Player 2.
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5.6.1 Quantal Response Equilibrium
One possible explanation for observed behaviour could be that although the
strategy choice of subjects is dependant on the expected utility of their strategies,
these choices are based on a quantal choice model. Moreover, the subjects make
the assumption that their opponents use a similar quantal choice model to choose
between their strategies as well. A proposed explanation for such an equilibrium
mechanism was put forth by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), when they introduced
the concept of a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) for normal form games.
The best response functions of a player, when based on a quantal choice model,
becomes stochastic or probabilistic in nature rather than being deterministic. QRE
makes allowance for the fact that often players may make innitesimal errors such
that, better responses are more likely to be played than worse responses and best
responses are no longer observed with complete certainty.
The di¤erence between QRE and Nash equilibrium, is that it replaces the per-
fectly rational expectations assumption of Nash equilibrium, with an equilibrium
that makes allowances for noise, imperfectness and irrational behaviour of subjects.
Mckelvey and Palfrey (1998) extends the QRE approach to include extensive form
games, where behavioural strategies are used to reach an equilibrium. Players em-
ployee Bayesrule and QRE strategies to calculate their expected payo¤s and assume
that opponents do the same.
QRE assumes that the probability that a player selects a decision, is a smooth,
increasing function of the payo¤ that the player would earn from that decision.
Thus, if the expected payo¤s of a column player from his actions Right and Left
are e(R) and e(L), then the logit probability for choosing a strategy R (resp.
L) would be: pR =
exp(e(R))
exp(e(L)) + exp(e(R))
(resp. pL = (1   pR)). Similarly, if
the row players expected payo¤s from Up and Down are e(U) and e(D); then
the logit equilibrium probability for choosing a strategy U (resp. D) would be
pU =
exp(e(U))
exp(e(D))+exp exp(e(U))
(resp. pD = (1  pU)):
It can be noted that the denominator ensures that the probability determined
from the above equation lies between 0 and 1. A rationality/error parameter is
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introduced in the form of . When  ! 1, the highest payo¤ is selected with
complete certainty, i.e., probability 1. Thus !1; signies perfect rationality and
the resultant QRE coincides with the Kohlberg-Mertens Nash equilibrium. On the
other hand, when ! 0; players become completely irrational and are equally likely
to play all strategies.
We estimated a Quantal Response Equilibrium for the signalling game T . As
can be seen in Table 5.9, at  = 0; each strategy choice is equally likely. On the
other end of the spectrum, we note that at  = 1032471 (i.e., as  ! 1); the
QRE predictions match with the Nash equilibrium. In our experiments we observed
that Player 1a; chose R with probability 0:8; while Player 1b did so with probability
0:78: The closest value of  that would reect this behaviour is at  = 0:955: One
drawback of the software tool20 used by us is that it assumes that the parameter 
is the same for both Players 1 and 2. However, at  = 0:955, Player 2 is expected
to mix 50 : 50, which does not match our data. A closer match to observed Player
2 behaviour of mixing 0:6 : 0:4 between her choices l and r; is seen  = 2:264:
Table 5.9. Estimated Quantal Response Equilibrium for Game T
 Pr(1a; L) Pr(1a;R) Pr(1b; L) Pr(1b; R) Pr(2; l) Pr(2; r)
0 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
0:955679 0:200686 0:799314 0:2729091 0:729091 0:494012 0:505988
2:264230 0:004194 0:995806 0:292784 0:707216 0:601751 0:398249
1032471 0 1 0:333333 0:666667 0:666667 0:333333
Thus, a rationality level or  = 0:955 on the part of Player 1 would explain
observed behaviour in the experiments. As mentioned above, if players are using
a quantal choice model to make their decisions, it would take very high levels of
rationality on the part of both Player 1 and 2, to reach the Nash equilibrium.
5.6.2 Cursed Equilibrium
An observation in common-value auctions is the phenomenon termed the "win-
ners curse". Winners curse alludes to bidderstendency to overbid, which results
in a winning bid that exceeds the value of the good. The reason for this over-bidding
20QRE was calculated using Gambit, which is a software tool for game theory. McKelvey,
McLennan, and Turocy (2010)
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is that bidders do not fully realise the fact that lower bids by their opponents signal
that the object is of lower value than earlier perceived. Players thus underestimate
the correlation between their opponentsactions and their information. For example,
there is no accurate method to judge the true value of a diamond mine. Consider
a mine whose true value is £ 20 million. Bidders might guess that the value of the
diamond mine is between $15   40 million. Thus, the bidder who bid $40 millon
at the auction would win, but later nd that the mine was not worth as much.
Eyster and Rabin (2005) generalise this behaviour in the form of a "Cursed Equi-
librium" model, which assumes that subjects update incorrectly at their information
sets, such that rather than having a separating equilibrium with type-specic ac-
tions, all types of players play the same action with some positive probability. Thus,
players in the cursed equilibriummodel make their choices based on maximising their
own expected payo¤s, subject to incorrect beliefs of their opponents actions. The
degree to which a player is "cursed" is denoted by a parameter  2 [0; 1] ; where 
is the probability that all types of opponents play the same action, while (1  ) is
the probability with which they play their true type-specic equilibrium action.
A variant of the lemons problem may be used to illustrate the concept of a
cursed equilibrium. Consider a simultaneous-move lemons game where both agents
(the buyer and the seller) must announce their decision to trade a car concurrently
and a sale only takes place if they both agree to trade. The seller knows whether
the car he is selling is a lemon (worth $0) or a peach (worth $6000 to the buyer
and $5000 to the seller). The buyer is willing to spend up to $2500 for the car, but
cannot perceive the true value of the car  and so assigns a 50 50 probability that
a car o¤ered for sale is a lemon or a peach. If the buyer is rational, he would realise
that the seller would only be willing to trade the car for $4000; if it was a lemon.
Thus, a rational buyer would refuse to buy the car. However in such a scenario, a
cursed buyer may agree to trade.
Consider a  cursed buyer who believes that with probability ; both types of
sellers agree to trade. The cursed buyer then believes that the probability the car is
a peach is:   1
2
+(1  ) 0 = 
2
: Its worth to him would be 
2
6000 = 3000: Thus
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all buyers cursed with a   5
6
; would make the trade and nd that they bought a
lemon (Eyster and Rabin (2005)).
If we use a similar logic to our game, consider what would happen if Player 2
did not update correctly at her information set and is instead a cursed-Player 2. In
such a situation if Player 2 has  = 1, i.e., she is fully cursed, she would believe she
faces both types of Player 1 with equal probability. Given that Player 2 expects to
face both types of Player 1 with equal probability, the expected payo¤ from left (for
Player 2) would be: 8  1
2
= 4: Thus, Player 2 makes a higher expected payo¤ (= 6)
if she goes right and would never choose to go left. The degree of cursedness causes
Player 2 to infer nothing from Player 1as signals and the result of this would be
that Player 1a would stop taking his strategically risky action.
On the other hand, if  is allowed to vary such that  2 [0; 1] ; we would have a
partially cursed Player 2 who believes that:
 with some probability ; both Player 1a and 1b play their strategically risky
action. Thus, if she is called to make a decision at Information Set 2; she
faces both types with equal probability.
 with probability (1  ) ; Player 1a and 1b choose their type-specic equilib-
rium action Player 1a chooses his strategically risky option, while Player 1b
chooses his strategically safe option. Thus, if she is called to make a decision
at Information Set 2; she faces Player 1a with certainty.
Hence, the overall probability that Player 2 faces Player 1a is:   1
2
+(1  ) 1 = 
1  
2

: In this scenario, the expected payo¤ of choosing left (for Player 2) would
be:
 
1  
2
  8; while the expected payo¤ of choosing right is 6: It would make sense
for Player 2 to choose left, if
 
1  
2
  8 > 6: Thus, Player 2s cursed with  < 1
2
would choose left, while all others would choose right.
The above discussion might explain why the Player 1s in some sessions preferred
to take their strategically safe option (the degree of cursedness of Player 2 did not
make it worthwhile for Player 1a to choose right), while in other sessions we see
a large number of Player 1a and 2s taking their strategically risky options (here
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Player 2 though cursed, still goes left with a su¢ ciently high probability). Cursed
equilibrium thus ts better with most of our data than any of the Nash equilibria -
but only for highly specic values of ; or updating of beliefs.
5.6.3 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
When a player fails to assign a subjective probability to the actions of his oppo-
nent, ambiguity arises. It is quite easy to note that in our game, if Player 1 does
not take his strategically safe option, he does not know with what subjective prob-
ability Player 2 will choose left.21 He thus faces ambiguity about Player 2s choices
and his response to this ambiguity may be postive (ambiguity-seeking), negative
(ambiguity-averse), or neither (ambiguity-neutral).
Ambiguity averse behaviour was rst identied by Ellsberg (1961). The Ellsberg
paradox documents subjectspreference for a denite chance of winning and thus,
their subsequent tendency to avoid ambiguous acts. Ambiguity averse behaviour
leads to choices are that not consistent with maximising expected utility and give
rise to probabilities that do not always sum up to 1.
This inconsistency was solved by representing beliefs by a non-additive set func-
tion . Non-additive set functions allow that (X[Z) 6= (X)+(Z): Non-additive
beliefs were rst introduced and used by Schmeidler (1989). He proposed a theory
called Choquet Expected Utility (CEU), where outcomes are evaluated by a weighted
sum of utilities, but unlike Expect Utility Theory (EUT) the weights used depend
on the acts. A special class of capacities, termed neo-additive capacities, was in-
troduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007), to model optimistic and
pessimistic outlooks to ambiguity.
A capacity v is convex (resp. concave) if for all A and B  S; v(A [ B) +
v(A \ B)  v(A) + v(B); (resp. v(A [ B) + v(A \ B) 6 v(A) + v(B)), where
A; B are events contained in the universal set S: In CEU, convex capacities are
used to model a pessimistic outlook to ambiguity, while concave capacities model an
optimistic outlook. Consider a two player game with a nite pure strategy set Si;
21For the purpose of this section, the choices available to Player 1 are either strategically safe or
strategically ambiguous (not risky).
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i = 1; 2: Each player is beliefs about the opponents behaviour is represented by a
capacity vi on S i; which is the set of strategy combinations which his/her opponent
could choose. Given neo-additive beliefs, the expected payo¤ that a player i could
earn from a strategy si; is determined by equation:
Vi (si; i; i; i) = iiMi (si) + i (1  i)mi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i);
(5.1)
whereMi (si) = maxs i2S i ui(si; s i) andmi (si) = mins i2S i ui(si; s i) and di(s i),
is the conventional expectation taken with respect to the probability distribution :22
Intuitively,  can be thought to be the decision makers belief. However, he
is not sure of this belief, hence it is an ambiguous belief. His condence about
this belief is modelled by (1   ); with  = 1 denoting complete ignorance and
 = 0 denoting no ambiguity. His attitude to ambiguity is measured by ; with
 = 1 denoting pure optimism and  = 0 denoting pure pessimism. If the decision-
maker has 0 <  < 1; he is neither purely optimistic nor purely pessimistic (i.e.,
ambiguity-averse), but reacts to ambiguity in a partly pessimistic way by putting a
greater weight on bad outcomes and in a partly optimistic way by putting a greater
weight on good outcomes.
In the case of ambiguity and non-additive beliefs, the Nash equilibrium idea of
having consistent beliefs regarding the opponents action and being able to play an
optimum strategy as a response to these beliefs, no longer holds true and needs
to be modied. Given neo-additive beliefs and expected payo¤s determined by
equation 5.1, the support of a capacity is a players belief of how the opponent will
act. Formally, the support of a neo-additive capacity,  (A) = + (1  )  (A), is
dened by supp () = supp ().
Denition 3 A pair of neo-additive capacities (1; 

2) is an Equilibrium Under
Ambiguity (EUA) if for i = 1; 2, supp (i )  R i( i):
22Note that Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) write a neo additive capacity in the
form (E) = + (1  )(E): We have modied their denition to be consistent with the rest of
the literature where  is the weight on the minimum expected utility.
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Here Ri denotes the best-response correspondence of player i given that his beliefs are
represented by i; and is dened by Ri(i) = Ri(i; i; i) := argmaxsi2Si Vi (si; i; i; i) :
This denition of equilibrium is taken from Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper
(2009), who adapt an earlier denition in Dow and Werlang (1994). These papers
show that an EUA will exist for any given ambiguity-attitude of the players. In
games, one can determine i endogenously as the prediction of the players from the
knowledge of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, we treat
the degrees of optimism, i and ambiguity, i; as exogenous. In equilibrium, each
player assigns strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponents best responses given
the opponents belief.
Table 5.10. Normal Form Game T
Left Right
LL 9; 3 3; 9
LR 7; 7 7; 7
RR 13; 12 4; 10
RL 15; 8 0; 12
Given this framework of ambiguity and an equilibrium under ambiguity, assume
that Player 1 is ambiguity averse and his beliefs can be modelled as neo-additive
capacities. Consider the normal form of Game T in Table 5.10, where Player 1
is seen as the row player and Player 2 as the column player. The strategy LL is
dominated by RR: We can thus eliminate LL, since CEU preferences will never
select a strategy which is dominated by a pure strategy.
The Choquet expected payo¤ of Player 1 for the three strategies available to
him, given a capacity v; can be calculated as under:
V (LR; v) = 7
V (RR; v) = 4 + 9  v (fLg)
V (RL; v) = 15  v (fLg) :
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Suppose that v is constructed such that V (LR; v) < V (RL; v): Intuitively this
would mean that the Choquet expected payo¤ of RL; which gives 15 some of the
time and 0 otherwise, is greater than that of LR; which gives a denite payo¤ of 7.
Then there would exist a capacity v0 that is more ambiguous than v, such that
v0 (fLg) < v (fLg) : If there exists such a capacity v0; then V (LR; v0) > V (RL; v0);
i.e., getting a denite payo¤ of 7 is valued more than getting a payo¤ of 15, which
is higher but uncertain. The necessary and su¢ cient case for this to be true is that
v (fLg) > 7
15
> v0 (fLg) :
Hence, the best response given the more ambiguous capacity v0; is for Player 1 to
always choose his strategically safe action. Thus, in the presence of ambiguity, Player
1s who are ambiguity averse would prefer their strategically safe option, rather than
taking a chance and facing ambiguous payo¤s.
5.7 Results and Conclusions
We conducted an experiments based on extensive form signalling games, which
had 2  2 games embedded in them. The initial set of experiments was conducted
with the aim of testing which of two competing theories of equilibrium selection or
renement theories better described behaviour. We nd systematic deviations from
both types of theories.
The second set of experiments was conducted in order to test for the appearance
of a collective reputation. However, though we did not nd any statistically signi-
cant evidence that would substantiate the hypothesis of collective reputation, we do
note a number of interesting observations about subject behaviour in the games.
 At information set 1a, we nd that a signicant number of players take the
strategically safe option, even if it would pay well to forego it. This is often
observed in games with outside options and could simply be explained by
risk avoidance or low aspiration levels. In addition, this may be explained by
ambiguity averse behaviour, reactions to cursed-Player 2 behaviour and the
fact that players would need to be highly rational (quantal response parameter
!1) for them to play the Nash with certainty. On the whole, behaviour was
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fairly consistent with payo¤ maximisation, such that actions yielding higher
average payo¤s were taken more often.
 Behaviour in the embedded 22 games is comparable with previous literature
on experimental results of 2  2 games played in isolation. In the Prisoners
Dilemma type game, subjects chose the dominant actions more often. How-
ever, the percentage of times that the dominated action was chosen was not
negligible. For the game with the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
observed frequencies tended to be in a 10% range around the equilibrium. De-
viations from the Nash equilibrium tended to be in the direction of behavioural
concepts which adjust for the own-payo¤ e¤ect (Goerg, Chmura, and Selten
(2008)).
 At information set 1b, players rarely take left option. This holds independent
of payo¤s and player behaviour at all the other information sets. One of the
reasons why this might happen is that the potential gains from taking this
action are not very high. In fact, in many sessions it would not pay given
the behaviour of Player 2 but even when it would pay, the action left is not
taken.
This may be some indication that the subjects in the role of Player 1 are trying
to collectively build up the reputation that they do not take this action at 1b,
in order not to destroy a cooperation which leads to the outcome at node B
(when information set 1a is reached). This may or may not point towards the
attempt to build a collective reputation.
Alternatively, the potential threat of a payo¤ of 0 may deter Player 1 from
taking the action left. Both middle and right always yield non-negative prots.
Right guarantees a payo¤ of 4 in Game T , while middle secures a minimum
payo¤ of 2 in Game S.
 At information set 2; the percentage of times that play was in the right
decision node is systematically below 1
4
. Thus, it would maximise Player 2s
payo¤ if she chose her strategically risky choice.
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 At information set 2, left is typically chosen in at least 33% of the cases.
Often this percentage is much higher although rarely above 67%. There is some
evidence for learning at this information set but it is not strong. This may
be because there is a substantial fraction of subjects who do not understand
the strategic situation very well and choose both actions equally often, for
instance, by always taking the highlighted choice randomly selected by the
computer.23 Such subjects would bias observed frequencies towards 50   50
and the behaviour of the other players may not fully compensate for this
irrationality.
In the previous section we discussed how though observed behaviour cannot
completely be explained by Nash, it may be explained using alternative equi-
librium concepts such as Quantal Response Equilibrium, Cursed Equilibrium
and Equilibrium under Ambiguity. There might be a number of other mod-
els of bounded rational behaviour that explain our ndings, however we leave
them for future research.
Appendix
Table 5.11. Old Experiment: Terminal Nodes Reached in Rounds 1-25
A B C D E F G H I
1 (x = 4)24 75 0 4 0 1 11 22 10 27
2 (x = 4) 15 59 5 8 0 12 20 6 25
3 (x = 4) 30 44 8 4 1 7 19 9 28
4 (x = 5) 66 3 10 0 2 9 24 17 19
5 (x = 5) 46 13 14 1 1 10 22 11 32
6 (x = 5) 53 9 20 3 3 10 19 11 22
7 (x = 6) 21 37 21 1 0 4 16 22 28
8 (x = 6) 38 26 18 6 2 4 34 2 20
9 (x = 6) 24 37 21 0 2 9 27 9 21
23Our programme initially highlights each choice at the relevant information set with equal
probability. Subjects can then change which choice is highlighted with the left/right cursor keys.
Once the desired choice is highlighted, subjects decide on it by pressing the Enter key.
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Table 5.12. Old Experiment: Terminal Nodes Reached in Rounds 26-50
A B C D E F G H I
1 (x = 4) 72 2 3 0 0 13 26 10 24
2 (x = 4) 51 13 13 4 2 2 21 17 27
3 (x = 4) 27 32 14 3 1 13 15 19 26
4 (x = 5) 32 38 7 1 0 13 16 13 30
5 (x = 5) 28 34 14 3 0 8 24 7 32
6 (x = 5) 50 10 13 1 3 15 17 10 31
7 (x = 6) 3 54 20 1 1 11 24 18 18
8 (x = 6) 27 33 13 5 0 9 14 19 30
9 (x = 6) 7 55 11 5 4 8 21 11 28
Table 5.13. Old Experiment: Terminal Nodes Reached in Rounds 51-55
A B C D E F G H I
1 (x = 4) 91 0 0 0 0 10 26 15 38
2 (x = 4) 72 16 3 4 2 10 51 6 16
3 (x = 4) 69 12 14 3 1 22 25 20 14
4 (x = 5) 15 68 8 0 0 16 26 17 30
5 (x = 5) 50 31 11 1 0 5 20 12 50
6 (x = 5) 62 13 20 2 5 13 20 13 32
7 (x = 6) 0 72 19 3 1 3 24 12 46
8 (x = 6) 58 17 20 1 8 8 32 10 26
9 (x = 6) 16 44 35 7 6 13 25 10 24
Table 5.14. New Experiment: Terminal Nodes Reached in Rounds 1-25
A B C D E F G H I
1 17 45 15 7 5 61 0 0 0
2 4 53 27 7 2 57 0 0 0
3 10 32 28 15 7 58 0 0 0
4 26 16 24 7 8 69 0 0 0
5 4 43 25 6 5 67 0 0 0
6 28 31 23 5 5 58 0 0 0
7 15 37 17 17 5 59 0 0 0
8 14 40 26 3 8 59 0 0 0
9 9 48 25 15 8 45 0 0 0
10 30 23 26 17 11 43 0 0 0P
157 368 236 99 64 576 0 0 0
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Table 5.15. New Experiment: Terminal Nodes Reached in Rounds 26-50
A B C D E F G H I
1 2 49 14 5 1 2 16 6 55
2 1 61 12 13 3 0 2 2 56
3 24 29 34 2 0 2 3 5 51
4 33 21 26 0 1 0 1 4 64
5 17 38 23 6 6 0 14 2 44
6 35 24 17 8 2 1 9 7 47
7 36 7 33 4 5 0 2 1 62
8 10 50 19 2 2 0 1 3 63
9 5 48 16 5 0 1 7 5 63
10 43 9 23 5 7 0 7 1 55P
206 336 217 50 27 6 62 36 560
Table 5.16. New Experiment: Terminal Nodes Reached in Rounds 51-55
A B C D E F G H I
1 7 59 23 11 3 2 17 1 57
2 0 64 32 10 6 0 2 3 63
3 19 55 20 0 0 1 9 19 57
4 31 22 27 0 0 0 5 6 89
5 16 38 35 7 2 0 26 2 54
6 39 35 30 2 5 0 15 3 51
7 25 24 27 0 0 0 0 7 97
8 7 45 41 4 3 0 2 11 67
9 0 59 25 7 4 1 7 2 75
10 32 28 36 13 9 0 15 6 41P
176 429 296 54 32 4 98 60 651
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was to document the e¤ect of ambiguity on individual
decision-making, especially in situations where individuals interact with other peo-
ple. We conducted experiments based on games, that were aimed at studying in-
dividual behaviour in games. We nd that there is indeed su¢ cient evidence that
ambiguity a¤ects decision-making in strategic situations. Moreover, the level of am-
biguity individuals face is context-dependant rather than constant across scenarios.
We provide a brief summary of our experiments below.
In Chapter Three, we reported the ndings of experiments that were conducted
to test whether ambiguity inuences behaviour in a coordination game. We studied
the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity, in order to determine whether
they prefer to choose an ambiguity safe option.
We found that though this ambiguity safe strategy is not played in either Nash
equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, it is indeed chosen quite frequently
by subjects. This provides evidence that ambiguity aversion inuences behaviour
in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player was consistent with randomising
between her strategies, the Column Player showed a marked preference for avoiding
ambiguity and choosing the ambiguity safe strategy.
We expected to observe a correlation between ambiguity averse behaviour in the
games and ambiguity attitude in the Ellsberg Urn decision problem. However, we
observed only a limited relation between the two choices. On the whole, subjects
displayed more ambiguity aversion in Battle of Sexes rounds than in the Ellsberg
Urn rounds. This suggests that subjects perceive a greater level of ambiguity in a
two-person coordination game, than in a single person decision problem.
Moreover, we note that the results of our experiments are in support of the Dow
and Werlang (1994) model of equilibrium under ambiguity, where in the presence of
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ambiguity players choose their safe strategy, rather than the model of Lo (1996). Los
equilibrium predictions coincide with the Nash for games with only pure equilibria.
Thus, for our game experiments Los predictions coincide with Nash equilibrium,
while EUA appears to predict the implications of ambiguity better.
In Chapter Four, we reported the ndings of experiments conducted to test
whether ambiguity had opposite e¤ects on individual behaviour, in games of strategic
complements and strategic substitutes. Moreover, we studied whether subjects
perception of ambiguity di¤ered between a local opponent and a foreign one.
Subject behaviour was found to be consistent with our hypothesis, and ambiguity
does indeed have opposite e¤ects in strategic complements and strategic substitutes
games. Moreover, in the coordination games we nd that subjects choose the equi-
librium action under ambiguity more often than either of the other actions available
to them. Thus, on the whole subjects display ambiguity averse preferences when
making decisions in two-person game scenarios.
We expected subjects to display a greater level of ambiguity averse behaviour
when faced by a foreign opponent. However, though we observe ambiguity averse
behaviour on the whole in the games, we fail to see an escalation in the level of
ambiguity when subjects are faced with foreign opponents. Moreover, in the Ellsberg
Urn rounds we nd that subjects are unwilling to bear even a small penalty in order
to stick with the unambiguous choice of ball.
Thus, even though subjects displayed ambiguity averse preferences when faced
by other opponents (whether local or foreign), they fail to display su¢ cient aversion
to ambiguity in the single-person decision situations. This is consistent with our
ndings in Chapter Three, where we found that the ambiguity-attitude of subjects
was context-dependent.
In Chapter Five, we report the ndings of two series of experiments based on
signalling games. We wanted to test two equilibrium concepts against each other,
to see which tted subject behaviour better; and to check whether subjects in the
role of the Player 1 could work together to build a collective reputation. However,
though subject behaviour did not match either of the Nash equilibria, we did not
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nd any statistically signicant evidence that would substantiate the hypothesis of
collective reputation.
We discussed how though observed behaviour cannot completely be explained
by Nash, it may be explained using alternative equilibrium concepts such as Quan-
tal Response Equilibrium, Cursed Equilibrium and Equilibrium under Ambiguity.
However, since the game is one of repeated matching and allows players to update
their beliefs, it is more complex to analyse than one-shot games in the presence of
ambiguity. There might be a number of other models of bounded rational behaviour
that explain our ndings, however we leave them for future research.
6.0.0.0.1 Future Research Plans In order to further study the e¤ects of ambi-
guity on decision-making, we plan to test subject behaviour in settings that compare
di¤erent groups of a similar race, such as African-Americans and Africans. The pur-
pose of this would be to eliminate racial elements that might a¤ect decision-making,
and concentrate on ambiguous beliefs and its a¤ects.
In our experiments we found that though subjects chose ambiguity safe options
in the game rounds, they were unwilling to pay even a small penalty to avoid the
ambiguous option in Ellsberg urn rounds. In future experiments, we plan to test
whether this unwillingness to pay a penalty extends to situations where subjects are
given a choice of paying a penalty, in order to avoid facing an ambiguous opponent.
Additionally, so far we have only found experimental evidence that ambiguity
does a¤ect decision-making. However, we do not know whether individuals make
optimal decisions in the presence of ambiguity. In future studies, we would like
to run experiments that test the optimality of individualsdecisions in the face of
ambiguity. One possible way of testing this, would be to study how individuals react
to ambiguous events such as climate change catastrophes.
There exists a great deal of ambiguity surrounding climate change and the pos-
sibility that this climate change could at any point trigger a catastrophe that would
cause wide-scale damage. The questions that we would like to ask are: Given the
ambiguity surrounding a catastrophic event taking place, are people su¢ ciently con-
cerned in order to insure themselves against it? Moreover, if given the opportunity
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to protect themselves against such a catastrophe, do individuals su¢ ciently insure
themselves against it?
Lastly, testing the optimality of individualsdecisions in the face of ambiguity
raises an additional question. Should a benevolent dictator/the State intervene,
if individuals fail to make optimal decisions in the face of ambiguity? Can State
intervention ensure a better outcome? We hope to answer these and other questions,
in future research papers.
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